



## Citizen assessments of clientelistic practices in South Africa

Eva Wegner, Miquel Pellicer, Markus Bayer & Christian Tischmeyer

To cite this article: Eva Wegner, Miquel Pellicer, Markus Bayer & Christian Tischmeyer (2022): Citizen assessments of clientelistic practices in South Africa, Third World Quarterly, DOI: [10.1080/01436597.2022.2099825](https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2099825)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2099825>

 View supplementary material [↗](#)

 Published online: 26 Jul 2022.

 Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)

 Article views: 62

 View related articles [↗](#)

 View Crossmark data [↗](#)



## Citizen assessments of clientelistic practices in South Africa

Eva Wegner<sup>a</sup> , Miquel Pellicer<sup>b</sup> , Markus Bayer<sup>c</sup>  and Christian Tischmeyer<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Institute for Political Science, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany; <sup>b</sup>Center for Conflict Studies, University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany; <sup>c</sup>Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, Bonn, Germany; <sup>d</sup>Independent Researcher, Erfurt, Germany

### ABSTRACT

Research on political clientelism has provided conflicting findings on citizen perceptions and evaluations of clientelism. Survey as well as ethnographic research sometimes finds that citizens reject clientelism and politicians making clientelistic offers and at other times that citizens find clientelism acceptable and perceive clientelistic politicians as caring. We build on current literature on the characteristics of diverse types of clientelism and argue that the differences in evaluations result partly from differences in the type of clientelism that is studied. To investigate this idea, we conduct focus groups in low-income urban and rural areas in South Africa about how clients and citizens understand and evaluate different forms of clientelism in South Africa. We identify five distinctive exchange types across groups. Citizens evaluate vote-buying exchanges pragmatically but all other types negatively: relational forms of clientelism are seen as stirring welfare competition and coercive forms as unlawful. Patrons are mostly seen as selfish but views on clients vary across types. Citizens describe clients in vote-buying and coercive clientelism as victims and in relational types as egoistic. These findings suggest that citizens in communities where clientelism is prevalent have highly differentiated views on different types of clientelism and the actors involved in it.

### ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 5 October 2020  
Accepted 6 July 2022

### KEYWORDS

Clientelism  
citizen perspective  
moral evaluations  
focus groups  
South Africa

## Introduction

Research on clientelism has provided conflicting findings on how citizens evaluate clientelistic exchanges. Survey research on evaluations and preferences about vote-buying (Gonzalez Ocantos, de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014; Kramon 2017; Mares and Young 2019; Muhtadi 2019) provides mixed results in terms of the general acceptability of this practice. Perceptions of vote-buying and vote-buying candidates are overwhelmingly negative in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Gonzalez Ocantos, de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014; Mares and Young 2019) but tend to be positive in Indonesia (Muhtadi 2019), or Kenya where

**CONTACT** Eva Wegner  [eva.wegner@uni-marburg.de](mailto:eva.wegner@uni-marburg.de)

 Supplemental data for this article is available online at <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2099825>.

© 2022 Global South Ltd

clientelistic candidates are even seen as more reliable and caring (Kramon 2017). The ethnographic literature on the topic also provides a range of assessments. Some studies (eg Auyero 1999 about Argentina) describe positive and affective attitudes towards patrons and others (eg Lazar 2004 about Peru) find pragmatic or cynical views, whereas yet others highlight moral condemnation and resistance to clientelism (Fernández, Martí, and Farchi 2017).

Why do findings on citizen perceptions of clientelism diverge so strongly? One reason behind the differences could come from who is being asked to evaluate clientelism. Surveys tend to draw representative samples and thus include better off citizens who do not need to rely on clientelism for handouts or access to social benefits whereas ethnographic studies focus on poorer citizens involved in or witnessing actual clientelistic exchanges. However, the main divergence is not between approaches: positive and negative evaluations have been documented in survey and ethnographic research alike. Another reason driving the different findings could be different social norms around clientelism in different countries that drive different views of citizens on how acceptable the practice is. This factor might indeed be driving part of the differences in survey research that we observe across world regions. Yet it is unlikely that this explains all the differences: for example, it is hard to imagine that norms around clientelism would be much more positive in Argentina than in Peru.

A third factor, which we explore in this paper, is that these studies partly cover different forms of clientelism. Recent literature on clientelism indeed notes the existence of distinctive types of clientelism – such as vote-buying, traditional, relational, coercive or collective – that vary in the types of goods that patrons and clients exchange and the type of interactions between citizens and patrons, as well as in the welfare implications for clients (Berenschot and Aspinall 2020; Hutchcroft 2014; Mares and Young 2019; Nichter 2018; Pellicer et al. 2020, 2021a; Yıldırım and Kitschelt 2020). It is likely that these differences lead to different evaluations depending on how citizens relate to the trade-offs these types present. In turn, these evaluations and the factors driving them are decisive in determining how promising different clientelistic strategies are for parties and politicians in a given place.

This paper investigates how different types of clientelism are evaluated by citizens through an analysis of focus group (FG) discussions on clientelism in South Africa. The FGs were conducted with citizens with close experiences of clientelistic exchanges in three low-income urban and rural areas in the KwaZulu Natal (KZN) province in South Africa. While not representative, our sample is of general interest for understanding clientelism since it consists of typical poor citizens which the literature tends to view as prospective clients (Stokes et al. 2013). The South African case is helpful for exploring different forms of clientelism because of its combination of democratic elections, a very high incidence of poverty and inequality, and an active state. These characteristics make it an ideal breeding ground for clientelistic offers and demands.

The FGs provide ample information about experiences or observations of clientelism as well as views on the exchanges and those involved in it. We identify five types of clientelism: two standard vote-buying types, two relational types, and a form of coercive clientelism (for a recent typology of clientelism, see Pellicer et al. 2020).

Views on clientelism in our FGs are predominantly negative and at best pragmatic. When negative evaluations prevail, participants explain their negative stance towards clientelism with reference to the negative effects it has on their own access to state resources such as housing, jobs or infrastructure. Our most important finding is that different forms of clientelism give rise to different evaluations. Evaluations of vote-buying types were a mix of

pragmatic and negative; the relational types and coercive clientelism were seen as altogether negative but for different reasons. The relational types were described as stirring welfare competition and the coercive one as being unlawful. Perceptions of patrons and clients in these exchanges suggest that these different rationales for negative views originate in different sources of blame attribution for the exchange. Relational types are associated with perceiving clients to be egoistic whereas in the other exchange types clients tend to be seen as victims and patrons as exploitative and selfish.

These findings provide insights into the perceptions of clientelism in communities that are strongly affected by the phenomenon. They show that citizens have a highly differentiated view of the different types of clientelistic exchanges they experience or observe and that distributional conflict is a key driver of negative evaluations. The findings also make a case for the type of approach pursued in this paper. Our qualitative, inductive approach allows us to obtain a comprehensive picture of the forms of clientelism and to unpack rationales behind evaluations of clientelism. Combining this with a non-interpretive approach to data analysis allows for a transparent and systematic discussion of findings. Cluster analysis allows for a systematic analysis of our data, leading to important findings, such as the finding that the target of blame varies across types of clientelism.

## Evaluations of clientelism

What insights does the current literature offer about citizen evaluations of clientelism? As explained above, two types of studies engage with the citizen view on clientelism. The first is survey research. This work focusses either on normative evaluations of clientelistic exchanges by asking whether engaging in clientelism is seen as 'justified' or 'acceptable' (e.g. Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2012; Gonzalez Ocantos, de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014; Muhtadi 2019) or on support for hypothetical clientelistic candidates in elections (eg Kramon 2017; Mares and Young 2019). These studies provide mixed results across countries. For example, in Nicaragua, 80% of respondents judge vote-buying to be unacceptable or highly unacceptable (Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2012) whereas in Indonesia, about 50% find it acceptable (Muhtadi 2019). Likewise, vote-buying candidates in Romania are associated with negative personal attributes, for example a lower likelihood to help the deserving poor (Mares and Young 2019) whereas in Kenya, the opposite applies (Kramon 2017).

The second literature that offers insights into this topic is the ethnographic work on clientelism. Different from survey research that analyses representative samples, ethnographic studies have a long tradition of studying poor communities and focussing on some individuals of interest. Although their focus is often not clientelism itself but community relations or views on citizenship or democracy (Pellicer et al. 2020), a considerable number of these studies describe the interactions of clients and patrons and how they perceive these interactions and relationships. Similar to survey research, these studies suggest a wide variety of moral views on patrons and brokers. The work of Auyero (1999, 2000) highlights situations where clients perceive patrons as benefactors or even 'friends' (see also Hagene and González-Fuente 2016; or Paller 2019). Other work shows more pragmatic approaches where politicians are seen as self-serving and untrustworthy but electoral campaigns are considered as an opportunity to obtain goods (eg Gay 1998 or Lazar 2004).

These vastly different views suggest that broad, country-level contextual factors (such as poverty, trust in politicians, or experiences with democracy) are likely to affect the overall acceptability of clientelism. At the same time, it is also likely that the form of clientelism a citizen is experiencing matters for the evaluation. The only survey-based work that studies attitudes not only towards vote-buying but also towards coercive forms of clientelism (Mares and Young 2019) finds that citizens indeed differentiate between patrons who use positive versus negative clientelistic inducements. Likewise, the form of clientelism depicted in ethnographic literature highlighting positive attitudes appears to differ from the type highlighting negative or neutral attitudes: positive attitudes appear to go together with a form of exchange that is very personal and iterative whereas negative/pragmatic attitudes are associated with more loose, or ad hoc, interactions.

Against this background, our analysis seeks to push forward our understanding of citizen evaluations of clientelism in three ways. First, we seek to uncover the evaluations of various clientelistic exchanges citizens are exposed to rather than of just one form as is typical in existing work. This allows us to understand whether context factors trump differences in clientelism, implying that a specific community would look at different types of clientelism in the same way, or whether differences between clientelism matter for their acceptance by communities.

Second, we investigate the drivers underlying these normative evaluations of clientelism. A negative evaluation of clientelism could be driven by many factors, including social norms, perceptions of democracy, inequality aversion, distributional conflict, or simply the fact that a person would like to be a client but has not been targeted. In turn, a positive view could be driven by a perception of economic inclusion through clientelism, affection for the patron, or a need for insurance, among others.

Third, we study whether citizens evaluate patrons and clients differently or whether they 'blame' them equally. Whether citizens blame patrons (politicians) and/or clients (citizens) is not a trivial question. Studies of protest have shown that the target of blame for citizen grievances is an important determinant of collective action (see Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Importantly, a study on South Africa finds that when citizens blame the people themselves for grievances, they are much less likely to support collective action demanding wide-ranging change than when they are blaming the government or the system for these same grievances (Pellicer, Wegner, and De Juan 2021b). To the extent that clientelism is seen as problematic, blaming patrons for clientelistic exchanges could thus lead to collective action and greater demands for accountability, whereas blaming the clients could lead rather to passivity or social conflict around the distribution of public resources.

## Clientelism in South Africa

Since the first democratic elections in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has been dominating national and local elections in South Africa. Since then, governments have invested strongly in decreasing poverty. Basic services have been rolled out, and social policies have focussed on extending social grants, such as the old age pension and the child support grant, on which an increasing number of the population depends to make ends meet. However, extremely high unemployment rates among the general population (around

one-quarter) and the youth (around one-third), and very low service levels for 90% of South Africans in 1994 imply that access to state resources remains a key issue for many South Africans. Because decentralised institutions (municipalities, ward councillors) play an important role in distributing/giving access to these state grants, public work programmes, housing and other basic services, there are ample opportunities for clientelism in local politics (Anciano 2018a; Dawson 2014; Piper and von Lieres 2016).

The extent to which these opportunities transform into actual clientelism is unknown. Typically, the generally low level of competition in a party system that is so clearly dominated by one party should translate into lower levels of clientelism (Stokes 2005). However, the ANC's dominance in elections mostly changes the locus of competition, which strongly concerns securing ANC nomination; there are many reports of patronage by different party factions (Ndletyana, Makhalemele, and Mathekga 2013). More consequential for clientelistic offers to citizens would be political competition surrounding the nomination for ANC ward councillors who are selected by the local party base or general electoral competition in more competitive wards (Ndletyana, Makhalemele, and Mathekga 2013; Wegner 2018).

How these forms of competition are linked to clientelism in South Africa has, to date, not been studied extensively. Most attention has been paid to individual vote-buying either through the distribution of food parcels to core supporters or more generally before elections (Béni-Gbaffou 2011; Gernetzky 2013; Graham, Sadie, and Patel 2016; Justesen, Woller, and Hariri 2018). However, offers of vote-buying appear fairly low in South African elections – with about 5% of citizens receiving such offers compared to more than a quarter in Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, or Benin, among other locations (Jensen and Justesen 2014). Besides vote-buying, different studies explore particular aspects of clientelism. For example, De Kadt and Larreguy (2018) show how traditional leaders function as electoral brokers by trading votes of rural populations for policy. Some qualitative studies have also documented examples of other types of clientelism, such as forms of collective clientelism pursued by clients with political capital, partisan allocation of jobs or training opportunities, or how citizens refrain from criticising local politicians for fear of being excluded from the distribution of public goods and services (Hlatshwayo 2017; Ndletyana, Makhalemele, and Mathekga 2013; Staniland 2008). Besides these studies, there is some more conceptual work, reflecting on the notion of clientelism in the South African context (Anciano 2018a, 2018b).

In sum, there are numerous examples of different forms of clientelism in South Africa, but none of these studies considers more than one form of clientelism in a locality or directly explores the citizen or client perspective on these exchanges.

## FG design and analysis

We collect data through FGs in different locations in KZN. KZN was created in 1994 as a merger of the Bantustan of KwaZulu and Natal Province. As the Bantustans did not receive much investment into basic services and education from the Apartheid state, its rural areas are very undeveloped and offer few economic opportunities. Until the implosion of the Inkatha Freedom Party in the 2014 elections, the level of political competition was much higher in KZN than in other South African provinces, which might have cemented clientelistic linkages and approaches to electoral politics.

## FG design

We use FGs to learn more about the perceptions and evaluations of clientelism by ordinary citizens and potential clients in South Africa. FGs make explicit use of group interaction to gather data (Cyr 2019; Kitzinger 1995). Group interaction implies the possibility for participants to complement, correct, or object to the statements of their peers. These dynamics can offer valuable data on the extent of consensus and diversity among the participants (Fern 1982; Morgan and Krueger 1993) and unveil shared norms of a group (Merton 1987). These features make FGs an ideal method to uncover experiences and perceptions of a socio-political phenomenon such as clientelism in communities where clientelism is prevalent.

FGs must be compiled so that the statements expressed during discussions reflect a range of prevailing opinions on and experiences with the topic in a community. We aimed to recruit individuals who could be 'potential clients' and either have experienced clientelism firsthand or personally know people who have, rather than merely recounting stories they had heard about in the media. We selected areas with a high incidence of poverty for recruitment, a client characteristic mentioned in a substantial share of the literature (see Stokes et al. (2013)).

To avoid the dominance of a single individual, Krueger (2014) suggests that participants should share characteristics such as gender, age range, ethnic and social class background. Similarly, Lehoux, Poland, and Daudelin (2006) emphasise that homogeneity in group composition helps to create a comfortable situation enabling every participant to voice their opinion. In addition, segregating groups by gender can be beneficial even when a topic is not gender-sensitive as women tend speak less than men in mixed-gender groups (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012; Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019). Therefore, we opted for groups where participants share the same socio-economic background, population group, and gender. To ensure that participants share the same socio-economic and population group background, we pre-selected small areas for recruitment: an informal settlement in the eThekweni municipality and a rural settlement in Ndwedwe. FG participants were recruited by using existing contacts in the respective areas as a starting point and snowballing from there.<sup>1</sup>

We conducted six FGs – two per area – with a total of 41 participants.<sup>2</sup> All FGs were moderated by the same female South African moderator in isiZulu. The discussions lasted for about two hours, and were recorded and transcribed in full. All groups recounted firsthand experiences of clientelism (where the respondents themselves or close relationships had engaged in clientelistic exchanges or received clientelistic offers) as well as second-hand information (further removed from the respondents, or stories about people in a neighbouring community).

Table 1 shows some basic demographic and attitudinal characteristics of our participants that we collected in a short survey during the FGs as well as some characteristics of the areas. Three factors are noteworthy about our participants and the areas from which they come.<sup>3</sup> The first is that they are typical of struggling citizens in low- and middle-income countries, with high levels of unemployment, incidence of poverty ('gone without food'), and mostly insufficient basic services. The second is their very high dependence on government social grants, such as the child support grant or the old age pension. Almost all participants live in households in which at least one member receives a social grant, implying that they have a direct connection to the state. Third, across all groups, perceptions of politicians are

**Table 1.** Characteristics of groups and locations.

|  | Urban formal<br>(Kwa-Mashu M Section) |       | Urban informal (Mayville<br>– Cato Crest) |       | Rural (Ndwedwe<br>– Ogunjini) |       |
|--|---------------------------------------|-------|---|-------|-------------------------------|-------|
| <b>Location characteristics</b>                    |                                       |       |   |       |                               |       |
| Unemployment rate                                  | 41%                                   |       | 48%                                       |       | 82%                           |       |
| No improved sanitation                             | 1%                                    |       | 74%                                       |       | 73%                           |       |
| Election results 2016                              | ANC: 83%                              |       | ANC: 66%,<br>DA: 20%                      |       | ANC 66%; Inkatha 24%          |       |
| <b>Respondent characteristics</b>                  |                                       |       |   |       |                               |       |
|  | Women                                 | Men   | Women                                     | Men   | Women                         | Men   |
| <b>Age</b>   |                                       |       |   |       |                               |       |
| Average  | 28                                    | 42    | 30  | 46    | 46                            | 29    |
| Range  | 23–38                                 | 30–56 | 28–36                                     | 28–54 | 27–54                         | 24–35 |
| Social grants                                      | 100%                                  | 100%  | 100%                                      | 100%  | 86%                           | 71%   |
| Matric   | 57%                                   | 63%   | 60%                                       | 50%   | 14%                           | 43%   |
| Gone without food                                  | 86%                                   | 75%   | 45%                                       | 55%   | 14%                           | 71%   |
| <b>Respondent attitudes</b>                        |                                       |       |   |       |                               |       |
| Politicians don't care about people like me        | 100%                                  | 86%   | 100%                                      | 100%  | 86%                           | 80%   |
| Politicians don't care about communities like mine | 71%                                   | 62%   | 80%                                       | 100%  | 86%                           | 45%   |
| Worried about future                               | 71%                                   | 62%   | 40%                                       | 83%   | 100%                          | 71%   |
| <b>Accounts of clientelism in group</b>            |                                       |       |   |       |                               |       |
| Personal accounts                                  | 15                                    | 8     | 3   | 2     | 17                            | 1     |
| Second hand  | 11                                    | 8     | 16  | 22    | 13                            | 12    |
| Number of participants                             | 7                                     | 8     | 5   | 6     | 8                             | 7     |

extremely negative, with between two-thirds and all focus group participants (FGPs) believing that politicians don't care 'about people like me' or 'communities like mine'. These survey responses highlight the general political disaffection that dominates the FGs. While our groups are not representative of poor South Africans, we believe that the characteristics of our respondents suggest that their experiences and views can exemplify those of poor South Africans, where most poor households struggle with unemployment, rely on social grants, and have high levels of political disaffection.

FGs do not simply reveal and compile the individual opinions of the participants, but tend to amalgamate them into socially acceptable and dominant opinions (Smithson 2000). As the presence of peers reminds participants to adhere to social norms, social desirability bias is an important concern in FGs (Schnell, Hill, and Esser 2013, p. 332).

We used several approaches to reduce social desirability bias in our groups. We stated that the purpose of our study was to better understand elections and participation in South Africa, rather than potentially normatively charged topics such as clientelism and vote-selling. We did not explicitly ask about moral evaluations, such as asking whether a practice was 'right' or 'wrong'. Instead, we asked about experiences with clientelism where the evaluations were rather provided as by-products of participants describing experiences. We asked the participants not to name any persons or parties during the discussions and the moderator undertook great efforts to ensure a relaxed atmosphere. Last, we introduced the topic in a neutral way by using clientelism scenarios.<sup>4</sup> The scenarios are presented as taking place in Latin American countries but use goods that are relevant in the South African context (eg old age

pension). We delivered the scenarios as neutral descriptions of a political exchange. The intention was that portraying clientelism as something that happens elsewhere generated more legitimacy/acceptability of clientelism and would encourage participants to talk more freely about their own experiences. Overall, the FG moderator reported that the participants were at ease among each other and with the topic (see [Table B1](#) in the supplementary material).<sup>5</sup>

In addition to reducing social desirability bias, the scenarios were intended to make the concept more tangible for participants and ensure that the discussion would not be restricted to food parcels (the most mediated form of clientelism in South Africa). The first is a standard vote-buying scenario in which a citizen votes for a candidate because she has been offered groceries by him before the elections. The second scenario describes a longer term, more affective relationship. The patron acts as an approachable problem solver for the client, notably helping him to receive an old age grant. The client supports the patron politically out of gratitude and respect (for examples, see [Auyero 1999](#); [Wilks 2016](#); [Hilgers 2009](#)). The final scenario describes an exchange in which clients pool their votes in exchange for preferential access to housing in their area. In this scenario, RDP houses are provided explicitly on the condition of coordinating electoral support for the candidate in the elections (inspired by [Gay \(1999\)](#)).

Each FG started with the moderator reading out the scenarios and asking each participant to indicate how frequent something akin to the scenario happened in their area. Whereas the discussion showed that participants did not always understand the scenario in the intended way, a priori, the stories appeared to resonate with participants, with about two-thirds or more stating for each scenario that something similar happened sometimes or very often in their community.

### **Coding and cluster analysis**

Initially, we expected that FG discussions would proceed in a rather organised fashion, starting with a chosen scenario, discussing its local expression with examples and evaluations, and then move on to the next scenario. This would have allowed for a form of thematic text analysis where our main categories would have been established deductively from the scenarios and sub-categories would have been the local versions of a specific form of clientelism given by the scenario. In a second step, we could have performed an evaluative analysis to understand assessments of forms of clientelism and of the actors involved in them ([Kuckartz 2014](#)). However, the discussions proceeded in a much less linear way than anticipated: Examples of a variety of clientelistic exchanges, corruption and non-clientelistic electoral strategies of parties were discussed throughout the duration of the groups without going example by example and even less so scenario by scenario. Simply coding the transcripts would have made it very challenging to see the connections between the different experiences brought up throughout the discussion process.

To be able to identify specific types of clientelism and associated evaluations, we opted for a three-step approach to put structure in the analysis. First, we coded the transcripts focussing on the types of goods that were exchanged, the characteristics and views on clients and patrons, and context factors such as general views about politicians, voting rationales, and the nature of politics in South Africa. Each statement in which a participant talked about clientelism or their views on politics was made an excerpt. To this excerpt, codes representing what was being said, e.g. 'client goods: voting', or 'view on clientelism: negative', were attached.<sup>6</sup>

Second, we identified different exchanges in the transcripts. An exchange is a specific example of clientelism developed by a participant and commented or expanded on by the group. Each part of a transcript in which participants were discussing a particular example of clientelism in some depth was labelled as a unique exchange. In total, we identified 36 exchanges.<sup>7</sup>

In the third step, we use cluster analysis to identify whether these various exchanges form distinct types of clientelistic exchanges with common characteristics and evaluations across the different groups. Type building – either quantitatively via cluster analysis or qualitatively via comparing and contrasting – reduces complexity in text analysis and can be fruitfully combined with evaluative and thematic analysis (see Kuckartz 2014, 103–119). In our analysis, the observations underlying the data set are the exchanges we identified in the transcripts. The variables for each observation are the codes we attached to the excerpts belonging to an exchange, such as information about the goods that are exchanged. Each individual code is a variable that can take a value of either 1 (excerpts belonging to a specific exchange mention this good or belief) or 0 (not mentioned). The objective of cluster analysis is to place these observations into groups (clusters) in such a way that exchanges in a given cluster are more similar to each other than exchanges in different clusters.<sup>8</sup> This implies that cluster analysis allows us to discover that, for example, a specific exchange example discussed in the male rural group has more similarities in terms of goods and actors with an exchange in the female informal group than another exchange discussed in the male formal group, and that the first two exchanges therefore belong to the same type of clientelism (cluster). This procedure implies that the types of clientelism we identify are fully inductive.

We use only information on the exchanged goods, client and patron characteristics, and the presence of targeting and coercion to identify the clusters. To determine which evaluations are associated with the identified clusters (types of clientelism), we identify the number of exchanges within a type mentioning an evaluation.

### **Types of clientelism: vote-buying, relational and coercive**

Cluster analysis reveals the existence of different types of clientelism and strong differences in how these exchanges and the involved parties are evaluated. Cluster analysis identifies five core types. Table 2 shows the codes that characterise each cluster. In particular, the table shows the items that are present in at least 50% of the exchanges in a cluster. At minimum, each cluster is defined by the goods that are exchanged, but most clusters provide additional characteristics, such as the demographic characteristics of patrons or clients, or whether there is coercion or targeting. Table 2 also provides information about the groups that discussed exchanges within these clusters. It shows some variation in terms of the depth of the clusters – three clusters are composed of six to eight exchanges but two others of only two or three exchanges – and sometimes variation in terms of main locations of exchanges within the clusters.

To connect these clusters to forms of clientelism discussed in the current literature on clientelism, we have organised them into vote-buying types, relational types, and a coercive type. In contrast, no collective clientelism cluster emerged from the groups. In the following, we will describe each of the types and illustrate it with quotes from FG participants where appropriate.

**Table 2.** Characteristics of exchange types.

|   | Vote-buying types   |                            | Relational types   |  | Coercive type   |
|---|---|----------------------------|--|--|---|
|   | Cluster I: Food and gifts   | Cluster II: Rallies        | Cluster III: Campaigning   | Cluster IV: Allegiance and loyalty           | Cluster IV: Policy coercion   |
| Patron good   | Food and gifts  | Food and gifts             | Jobs   | Access to government services; insurance     | Access to government services   |
| Client good   | Vote  | Attend rallies             | Campaigning  | Political allegiance; loyalty and friendship | Turnout, votes  |
| Client characteristics  | Elderly, precarious   | –                          | –  | Well connected                               | Precarious  |
| Patron characteristics  | Ward councillor, organisations  |                            | (Candidates for) ward councillor   | Ward councillor, organisations               | Ward councillor   |
| Coercion  | –   | –                          | –  | –  | Withdrawal of benefits  |
| Targeting   | Yes   | –                          | –  | –  | –   |
| In which groups (n indicates more than one exchange/group in a cluster) | Formal (m): 3<br>Formal (f): 2<br>Informal (m)<br>Informal (f)<br>Rural (m) | Formal (f)<br>Informal (m) | Formal (m)<br>Formal (f)<br>Informal (m)<br>Informal (f)<br>Rural (m)<br>Rural (f) | Informal (m)<br>Informal (f): 2              | Formal (f)<br>Informal (m): 2<br>Informal (f): 2<br>Rural (m): 2<br>Rural (f) |

### **Vote-buying types**

Clusters I and II are the typical vote-buying exchange type. In cluster I food or smaller gifts are exchanged for votes. This type is pursued by both individuals and organisations. Clients were described as elderly, precarious and directly targeted by vote-buying offers. From the FGPs, it appeared that close to election time, campaigners approached voters whom they knew to be particularly poor with food vouchers or small sums of money. Although it was not explicitly stated that these offers were to be matched with a vote, FGPs felt that this was self-understood. This exchange type appears more common in urban environments.

The second vote-buying cluster (cluster II) was only mentioned in two groups, namely the urban informal male and the urban formal female. This is a more low-key exchange where the clients provide manpower for political rallies and, in exchange, receive food and alcohol, t-shirts, and entertainment. This type of clientelism has been described in various qualitative studies in Latin America where citizens join rallies of often various political candidates using a pragmatic approach to obtain the goods that are distributed at these events (Lazar 2004; Muñoz 2014).

### **Relational types**

Different from vote-buying forms of clientelism that tend to be one-shot interactions between patrons and clients, relational forms of clientelism involve more frequent, personal interactions, and potentially goods of better value (Nichter 2018; Pellicer et al. 2020). In our FGs, relational types come in two forms. In cluster III, campaigning for candidates is exchanged for jobs. In this exchange, clients often take the initiative and offer to do unpaid campaign work in the hope that this will pay off if the candidate is successful. These jobs are either short-term public sector/public works jobs or come from companies with whom councillors

have special connections. Patrons are individuals – ward councillors or candidates for that office. This exchange type was evenly distributed across contexts.

In the organisation that I am working under, we went out and volunteered. We worked as volunteers and that person won in the elections and became a ward councillor, and he promised to look after those who campaigned for him, so we then campaigned and did door to door campaigns, and now I am currently working under him (formal, men, P4, 0:44:35 – 0:45:00).<sup>9</sup>

The second relational type, cluster IV: allegiance and loyalty, contains an exchange between more powerful clients who have strong ties to patrons. Clients offer loyalty and friendship and political allegiance to the patron, usually the ward councillor, in exchange for services (mostly Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses) and generalised insurance, implying that the clients could obtain privileged access to housing and jobs. FGPs described what appeared to be an ‘inner circle’ of people connected to the ward councillor.

If you are close to me and I am a councillor obviously you benefit from me; there are many people who benefit in those relationships, they get jobs from the councillor, they get tenders and some hold more than five positions within the municipality just because they are close and loyal to the councillor. (informal, women, P2, 00:54:23)

### *Policy coercion*

Cluster V describes an exchange where the patron is identified as the ward councillor who gives access to government services in exchange for votes and turnout. The item ‘access to government services’ includes a variety of services, such as proofs of residence, child support grants, or eligibility for public jobs – goods to which the citizens are entitled but for which ward councillors can facilitate or hinder access. This implies that citizens do not get positive inducements but rather have to support the patron to gain access. FGPs reported that when they ask for such services, patrons often ask for their ID cards to check whether the person had voted and to deny them services if they had not.<sup>10</sup>

Some of us vote only because we are forced by some situations, like old age pension, child support grant, smart card ID’s, because before you apply for any of these things there’s a letter that is needed which you should get from your councillor. So what used to happen when you get to the councillor’s office they used to check your ID to see if you vote. (informal, women, P1 0:12:53)

Maybe you want to open a bank account, you need to start at the councillor’s office to get a councillor’s letter, so they normally ask why you did not vote, and that they will not be able to write a councillor’s letter for you. Because they can see that there is no stamp in your identity document. (rural, men, P7 0:43:55)

In this cluster, FG participants also mentioned that they practise self-censorship with respect to the ward councillor for fear of losing access to services.

Cluster V is the only cluster characterised by coercion in the form of threats of or actual withdrawal of benefits. We therefore interpret this as a type of coercive clientelism that is akin to a form that Mares and Young (2019) have recently described as ‘policy coercion’ in Eastern Europe (see also Nichter (2014) regarding a similar form of coercion in Brazil). In the South African version, this exchange type takes the form of coercive ‘turnout buying’ (Nichter

2008); as the dominance of the ANC is not contested in many areas, the main problem is not to convince the people to vote for the 'right' party but to get them to vote at all. This exchange type is most present in the more precarious rural and urban informal groups.

In sum, the cluster analysis shows the coexistence of different types of clientelism in our setting, ranging from once-off vote-buying exchanges to relational types with more interaction and links between clients and patrons, to coercive clientelism where citizens have to give political support to gain access to goods on which they depend.

## Evaluations of clientelism, patrons and clients

FG participants experience, or have heard of, most of the range of clientelistic types described in the general literature on the topic. How do they evaluate clientelism in general, the different types of clientelism, and the actors involved in them?

### General evaluations

We start by looking into the overall evaluation of clientelism. As Table 3 shows, the view on clientelism is overwhelmingly negative. There are only two positive mentions and 10 pragmatic ones, relative to 51 negative evaluations of clientelism. Pragmatic statements portray clientelism as a business-like quid pro quo exchange in which both parties gain something. Paradigmatically, a male FGP from a formal settlement framed vote-buying clientelism in the following way:

They will ask if we know it is voting time, and they will give us R200 and say ANC .... You see they are campaigning with something in hand. And I mean, because you've received something your mind is changed – perhaps you had another political party in mind. (formal, men, P3, 1:24:27)

Such pragmatic attitudes were sometimes accompanied by participants' perceptions that clients can cheat patrons, by taking benefits without keeping their end of the bargain.

The large number of negative evaluations we see in our groups is in line with available survey evidence on clientelism in which such evaluations also predominate. Importantly, the FGs show that different considerations may underlie negative evaluations. We identified four types of rationales. The most mentioned argument is that clientelism stirs distributional conflicts in already pressured communities. Clientelistic actors are perceived to ignore grievances, or even fuel distributional conflicts – thereby undermining solidarity

**Table 3.** Overall evaluations of clientelism, patrons and clients.

| Evaluation           | Number of mentions      |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| View of clientelism: |                         |
| Positive view        | 2                       |
| Pragmatic view       | 19                      |
| Negative view        | 51                      |
| Of which:            | Distributional conflict |
| Of which:            | Unlawful                |
| Of which:            | Morally wrong           |
| Of which:            | Unfulfilled promises    |

within the community. Following Mares and Young (2019), we call this rationale for negative evaluations 'welfare competition'. The following two statements illustrate this view:

It's painful [to see] that there are people who benefit from voting whilst we also vote but we don't benefit in any way. We feel unimportant and it means our votes just go down the drain, there is no progress. (rural, women, P6, 1:17:48)

What I've observed is that development does go to people, but it comes in a discriminating form. Our councillors give first preference to their people, and the people who campaign for them. (informal, men, P1, 2:15:32)

Importantly, these statements suggest that underlying the negative evaluation is not that clientelism is unacceptable as such. The first statement by a female participant in a rural group shows that she also has an (unfulfilled) expectation of 'benefiting' from voting. Instead, clientelism is seen as negative because participants feel excluded from the distribution of resources.

Second, clientelism is judged as unlawful. It undermines the formal practices in both administrative procedures (especially eligibility criteria) and political choice (voting decision, selection of candidates). From the perspective of some FG participants, clientelism was used to sideline other, more deserving, candidates for office:

'[T]hey do buy people to vote for the candidate of their choice. [...] Whereas, there are people out there in the communities who work hard for the community, but when it comes to elections, they don't consider those people' (informal, men, P2, 2:01:22).

Third, clientelism is seen as morally wrong because it is exploitative. As a female FGP in an informal settlement stated:

it doesn't look like a good relationship because one is always begging the other [one], because they are in need of something. I think it is not right, because the one begging will feel obliged to stay, because they have a lot to lose. So I think it's not right at all. Most people get into such relationship because of being desperate. (informal, women, P1, 1:35:03)

Whereas the first three rationales underlying negative judgments are related to negative externalities for society, the last argument comes from within the clientelistic exchange logic. Several participants described clientelistic offers as deceptive or empty promises by patrons. Politicians 'lure' citizens to support them with their vote, or even to campaign for them<sup>11</sup> (informal, female, P1, 0:14:21), but then do not follow through with their part of the deal. This connects to notions of deep and widespread mistrust in politicians generally, a topic that participants across all groups frequently discussed unsolicited.

### *Evaluating different types of clientelism*

The overview showed a predominantly negative view of clientelism. Does this imply that the types of clientelism we identified through cluster analysis are morally equivalent and uniformly bad from the perspective of FGPs, or do FGPs make distinctions among them? To answer this question, we study evaluations and assessments of patrons and clients by type. [Table 4](#) lists the most prevalent evaluations by type.

The one striking similarity across clusters is indeed that most of the exchange types were evaluated negatively – the only exception being the attending-rallies cluster where

**Table 4.** Evaluations of different types of clientelism.

|                                      | Vote-buying types   |                     | Relational types                     |                                      | Coercive type                           |
|--------------------------------------|---|---------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
|                                      | Cluster I: Food and gifts                                   | Cluster II: Rallies | Cluster III: Campaigning             | Cluster IV: Allegiance and loyalty   | Cluster V: Policy coercion              |
| Overall view on type                 | Negative (5/8)<br>Pragmatic (4/8)                           | Pragmatic (2/2)     | Negative (5/7)                       | Negative (2/3)                       | Negative (6/8)                          |
| Rationale behind negative evaluation |   |                     | Stirs distributional conflicts (5/7) | Stirs distributional conflicts (2/3) | Unlawful (5/8)                          |
| View on patron                       | Unreliable (5/8)<br>Exploits clients (5/8)<br>Selfish (4/8) |                     |                                      | Selfish (1/3)                        | Exploits clients (4/8)<br>Selfish (3/8) |
| View on client                       | Victim without choice (4/8)                                 |                     | Egoistic (4/7)                       | Egoistic (2/3)                       | Victim without choice (7/8)             |

Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate in how many exchanges out of the total exchanges making up the cluster a characteristic was indicated. We only note the most frequent views *across* groups.

pragmatic evaluations predominated. A survey would probably report that citizens in our settings dislike clientelism and would be less likely to elect politicians making such offers.

However, our analysis shows that some clusters are associated with different rationales behind negative evaluations and different views on patrons and clients. The negative evaluation in the policy coercion cluster is associated with the assessment that this is unlawful behaviour – an assessment that makes sense given that it involves denying access to goods citizens are entitled to. In contrast, the negative judgement of the relational clusters came together with the view that these forms of clientelism stir distributional conflicts.

These different views on clientelism are likely to originate at least in part in perceptions of the *motives* of patrons and clients. Most patrons were perceived to be selfish and sometimes exploitative, but the judgement of the client varied strongly across cluster. Clients in coercive clientelism and vote-buying tended to be seen as victims. The perception that clients are victims is generally in line with how the literature thinks about clients – as precarious voters who are forced to trade their votes for short-term material gains. At most, clients might sometimes be condemned on the grounds that they do not fulfil their civic duty.

In contrast, clients in the relational clusters were seen to be egoistic. This evaluation appears to originate in the perceived high value of the goods they receive, goods that other citizens also need.

They end up being the ones who are getting things that are supposed to come to us. What is supposed to come to us ends up going to them and their families. So you see there is more for them and we get nothing but we are the ones who voted. (women, formal, P7 0:52:44)

In essence, this suggests that it is the logic of welfare competition that leads to perceptions of egoistic clients in relational clusters.

An additional important observation is that this type of clientelism generates divisions in communities between clients who are either well-connected to the councillor or campaigning and the rest of the community that feels betrayed by them. The following statement illustrates this.

I think being in that relationship makes one have no friends, real friends. If we are friends and there I am with the councillor 'living the life' and yet I know my friends are struggling. We were struggling together, and they know I was a nothing together with them. They'll start hating me and I'll always have to watch my back and avoid them[.] I'd be ashamed to be seen by them 'living the life'. (women, informal, P1, 1:37:18)

This statement implies that one cannot be part of both worlds, the councillor's and the community's. Being connected to the councillor implies a higher living standard that sets a client apart from the community. In the view of this participant, benefiting in this way is shameful in a context where the community is struggling. Another statement focusses on the campaigners and implies that deceit in campaigning leads to a similar social isolation:

P7: Sometimes it is bad for them [the campaigners], because they end up being hated by people. They go around campaigning something which is not there. [...] So this backfires on them because we will go back to them and say you promised us this and how come we are not getting this? [...]

Moderator: So we are saying that they end up finding themselves in danger because they go to communities promising people things that will not happen, at the end they are the only ones getting them, and that causes problems in the community?

P5, P6, P4, P7: Yes! [*all the other participants nodding*]

P6: They are the only ones benefiting, they eat alone, they work alone. (women, formal, P4, P5, P6, P7, 0:52:44-0:53:43)

This suggests that evaluations of clientelism are driven by two factors. One is directly tied to the benefits of the exchange. The more clients are seen to benefit from opportunities or public goods that FGPs felt they should also be entitled to (such as public jobs or RDP houses), the higher the dislike and mistrust from the community. The second factor that appears to matter is proximity to the patron. Essentially, those clients who are seen as close to the patron come to be viewed as belonging to the circle of local political elites rather than to the community.<sup>12</sup>

## Discussion

Figure 1 attempts to systematise these insights. The horizontal axis displays proximity to the patron and benefits that appear to be highly correlated from the perspective of the FG participants: higher benefits go together with greater closeness to the patron. On the vertical axis are the social costs – that is, the degree of moral rejection local communities feel regarding the different types of clientelism. The figure shows that there are essentially two core forms when it comes to evaluations. In the upper right corner are the well-connected clients and the campaigners that work closely with the patron. These are the clients who receive jobs from the public works programme and other municipal projects, and access to infrastructure such as RDP housing and general insurance. In the bottom left corner are the types where clients are largely disconnected from the patron and receive either little or 'negative' benefit (when clients have to provide political support to access government services for which they are eligible).



**Figure 1.** Determinants of social costs.

The figure shows that the highest social costs are incurred by clients in cluster IV. These are morally condemned because they receive all (and sometimes multiple) goods FGPs would also need, and because they are seen as part of the councillor's circle and no longer as sharing the grievances and experiences of the local community. Almost as disliked as these are clients who offer campaigning as a good to patrons. The key reason why FGPs felt strongly negatively about these campaigners is that they exploited their knowledge of the needs of the local communities while reaping the benefits they had promised to communities in the campaign. While having campaigned for an unsuccessful candidate might alleviate some of the social costs because one did not reap the benefits, one still had to bear a large share as one was then known as someone doing a politician's bidding and making empty promises. As discussed above, the other exchange types did not have such costs attached, and perceptions of few benefits and victimhood prevailed.

Figure 1 also highlights how the disconnect average citizens feel from their elected representatives is reproduced in clientelism. Rather than providing a form of linkage with formal politics and an avenue to access public goods, as suggested by some scholars of clientelism in other world regions (Auerbach and Thachil 2018; Hilgers 2012; Shefner 2013; see also discussion in Berenschot and Aspinall 2020), clientelism only appears to work in this way for a selected few in the study communities. For most, clientelism appears rather to offer small-scale goods or takes coercive forms and does not generate any positive form of contact with their elected representatives.

## Conclusion

Our locations were purposefully selected to potentially cover many different types of clientelism, and our respondents are fairly typical of the type of individuals that the literature describes as vulnerable to clientelism. At the same time, our results cannot represent the views of poor South Africans about clientelism in the strict sense as the evidence is based on only six FGs conducted in a specific province of South Africa. While the exact forms of

clientelistic interactions and the level of negativity about clientelism that we uncovered could thus be community-specific, we believe that the groups allow us to learn something about the drivers/mechanisms behind evaluations of clientelism.

The most important finding from our study is that citizens in poor communities do indeed have highly differentiated views on the forms of clientelistic exchanges they participate in or observe. The groups showed that different types of clientelistic exchanges have different forms of moral implications for them. Moral condemnation did not originate from giving up one's vote in exchange for goods but from generating distributional conflict. Citizens attributed blame depending on how much clients appeared to benefit from the exchange. Clients receiving scarce, valuable goods (especially jobs and housing) were seen as egoistic and were both envied and despised, whereas clients receiving small goods or experiencing policy coercion were seen as victims without choice. When clients were benefitting, community members appeared to be much more incensed about the actions of the clients than those of the patrons, suggesting that in such cases, clientelism creates divisions in the community between those who are included in 'high-quality' clientelistic exchanges and those who are not.

Our comparative analysis of how citizens in poor communities evaluate different forms of clientelism and the actors involved in them opens the door for additional insights into the persistence of different forms of clientelism. In particular, linking these findings back to the literature on collective action would suggest that relational forms of clientelism are particularly likely to persist. As this literature shows, mobilisation requires not only an agreement about something being 'unfair' but also a shared perception on who is to blame for that grievance. Moreover, when citizens within a community are themselves blamed for grievances, such broad-based mobilisation becomes even more unlikely. In contrast, vote-buying and coercive types have such a shared understanding, and it would thus be easier to generate collective action against them.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

## Funding

This research was funded by the the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG): Reference PE 2423/3-2 und WE 4253/5-1).

## Notes on contributors

**Eva Wegner** is Professor of Comparative Politics at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Marburg, Germany. Her research focusses on political participation and accountability in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Her work has appeared in *Perspectives on Politics*, the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *International Political Science Review*, and *Party Politics*, among other journals.

**Miquel Pellicer** is Professor for Inequality and Poverty at the Center for Conflict Studies at the University of Marburg, Germany. He works on inequality, political behaviour and development. His articles have appeared, among other publications, in *Perspectives on Politics*, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *Political Research Quarterly* and the *Journal of Development Economics*.

**Markus Bayer** is Senior Researcher at the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies (BICC), in Bonn, Germany. His main research areas are obedience and (non)violent resistance, democratisation, civil–military relations and arms control. His works thereon focus mainly on the African continent. His previous articles have been published in the *Journal of Peace Research*, *Peacebuilding* and *Third World Quarterly*, among other journals.

**Christian Tischmeyer** is an independent researcher, based in Erfurt, Germany. He holds an MA in International Relations and Development Policy, obtained at the University of Duisburg-Essen. His research interests centre on the political economy of (neo)liberal practices of governance and the political culture they evoke.

## Notes

1. Details on the recruitment strategy, venues and dynamics within each group are provided in the supplementary material, section S.B.
2. We received ethical approval (17-7849-BO) from the ethics committee (Ethik-Kommission) at the University of Duisburg-Essen.
3. The socio-economic characteristics of the locations are based on the 2011 population census.
4. We developed the three scenarios from ethnographic literature. The complete scenarios are presented in the FG guidelines in the supplementary material section, S.A.
5. The exception to this was initially the rural male group. The beginning of the transcript shows that answers are short and imply that nothing along the lines of the scenarios was happening. However, after half an hour the group became more vocal, and it turned out that they had experience with various forms of clientelism.
6. Table S.C1 in the supplementary material displays the frequencies of key codes in each group.
7. From these, we excluded nine exchanges that we judged too vague to contribute productively to the analysis.
8. We use hierarchical clustering, a method suitable when there is no a priori information on the number of clusters that there may be.
9. References to transcripts are given in the format site, gender, speaker ID (P1–P9) and time stamp.
10. ID cards are stamped at the polling station to prevent multiple voting. This practice enables politicians to check whether someone has voted.
11. We take this to be clientelism, as these are promises for personal benefit, contingent on political support.
12. We acknowledge that there is a degree of ambiguity about whether these ‘well-connected’ individuals and the councillor are in a patron–client relationship in the strict sense of the literature that looks at these as unequal relationships or whether they are part of a local elite who interchanges material goods and political support. There is also some ambiguity whether the campaigners should be classified as clients or as brokers. However, from the perspective of the FGPs, all these individuals appear to be clients of local politicians. Moreover, the campaigners were self-describing as entrepreneurial people who volunteered their services, which better fits the profile of someone seeking to become a client rather than being part of a local party machine.

## ORCID

Eva Wegner  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2014-0460>

Miquel Pellicer  <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7334-8751>

Markus Bayer  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2437-0578>

## Bibliography

- Anciano, F. 2018a. "Clientelism as Civil Society? Unpacking the Relationship between Clientelism and Democracy at the Local Level in South Africa." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 53 (4): 593–611. doi:10.1177/0021909617709487.
- Anciano, F. 2018b. "Decolonising Clientelism: 'Re-Centring' Analyses of Local State–Society Relations in South Africa." *Politikon* 45 (1): 94–111. doi:10.1080/02589346.2018.1418214.
- Auerbach, A. M., and T. Thachil. 2018. "How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India's Slums." *American Political Science Review* 112 (4): 775–791. doi:10.1017/S000305541800028X.
- Auyero, J. 1999. "'From the Client's Point (s) of View': How Poor People Perceive and Evaluate Political Clientelism." *Theory and Society* 28 (2): 297–334. doi:10.1023/A:1006905214896.
- Auyero, J. 2000. "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account." *Latin American Research Review* 35 (3): 55–81.
- Bénit-Gbaffou, C. 2011. "'Up Close and Personal' – How Does Local Democracy Help the Poor Access the State? Stories of Accountability and Clientelism in Johannesburg." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 46 (5): 453–464. doi:10.1177/0021909611415998.
- Berenschot, W., and E. Aspinall. 2020. "How Clientelism Varies: Comparing Patronage Democracies." *Democratization* 27 (1): 1–19. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1645129.
- Cyr, J. 2019. *Focus Groups for the Social Science Researcher*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dawson, H. J. 2014. "Patronage from below: Political Unrest in an Informal Settlement in South Africa." *African Affairs* 113 (453): 518–539. doi:10.1093/afraf/adu056.
- De Kadt, D., and H. A. Larreguy. 2018. "Agents of the Regime? Traditional Leaders and Electoral Politics in South Africa." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (2): 382–399. doi:10.1086/694540.
- Fern, E. F. 1982. "The Use of Focus Groups for Idea Generation: The Effects of Group Size, Acquaintanceship, and Moderator on Response Quantity and Quality." *Journal of Marketing Research* 19 (1): 1–13. doi:10.1177/002224378201900101.
- Fernández, P. D., I. Martí, and T. Farchi. 2017. "Mundane and Everyday Politics for and from the Neighborhood." *Organization Studies* 38 (2): 201–223. doi:10.1177/0170840616670438.
- Gay, R. 1998. "Rethinking Clientelism Demands, Discourses and Practices in Contemporary Brazil." *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Del Caribe/European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 65: 7–24.
- Gay, R. 1999. "The Broker and the Thief: A Parable (Reflections on Popular Politics in Brazil)." *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 36(1): 49–70.
- Gernetzky, K. 2013. "Piglets Meant to Pay off at Polls, Says ANC." Business Live, 11 June 2013. <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2013-06-11-piglets-meant-to-pay-off-at-polls-says-anc/>, last accessed 28th July 2022.
- Gonzalez Ocantos, E., C. K. de Jonge, and D. W. Nickerson. 2014. "The Conditionality of Vote-Buying Norms: Experimental Evidence from Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (1): 197–211. doi:10.1111/ajps.12047.
- Gonzalez Ocantos, E., C. K. de Jonge, C. Melendez, J. Osorio, and D. W. Nickerson. 2012. "Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (1): 202–217. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00540.x.
- Graham, V., Y. Sadie, and L. Patel. 2016. "Social Grants, Food Parcels and Voting Behaviour: A Case Study of Three South African Communities." *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa* 91 (1): 106–135. doi:10.1353/trn.2016.0020.
- Hagene, T., and . González-Fuente. 2016. "Deep Politics: Community Adaptations to Political Clientelism in Twenty-First-Century Mexico." *Latin American Research Review* 51 (2): 3–23. doi:10.1353/lar.2016.0019.
- Hilgers, T. 2009. "Who Is Using Whom? Clientelism from the Client's Perspective." *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research* 15 (1): 51–75. doi:10.1080/13260219.2009.9649902.
- Hilgers, T. 2012. "Democratic Processes, Clientelistic Relationships, and the Material Goods Problem." In *Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics*, edited by T. Hilgers, 3–22. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Hlatshwayo, M. S. 2017. "The Expanded Public Works Programme: Perspectives of Direct Beneficiaries." *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* 13 (1): 1–8. doi:10.4102/td.v13i1.439.
- Hutchcroft, P. D. 2014. "Linking Capital and Countryside: Patronage and Clientelism in Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines." In *Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy*, edited by D. Abente Brun and L. Diamond, 174–203. Baltimore: JHU Press.
- Jensen, P. S., and M. K. Justesen. 2014. "Poverty and Vote Buying: Survey-Based Evidence from." *Africa. Electoral Studies* 33: 220–232. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.07.020.
- Justesen, M. K., A. Woller, and J. G. Hariri. 2018. "The Cost of Voting and the Cost of Votes." American Political Science Association, APSA Annual Meeting, Boston 2018.
- Karpowitz, C. F., T. Mendelberg, and L. Shaker. 2012. "Gender Inequality in Deliberative Participation." *American Political Science Review* 106 (3): 533–547. doi:10.1017/S0003055412000329.
- Kitzinger, J. 1995. "Qualitative Research: Introducing Focus Groups." *BMJ* 311 (7000): 299–302.
- Kramon, E. 2017. *Money for Votes: The Causes and Consequences of Electoral Clientelism in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Krueger, R. A. 2014. *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research*. London: Sage.
- Kuckartz, U. 2014. *Qualitative Text Analysis*. London: Sage.
- Lazar, S. 2004. "Personalist Politics, Clientelism and Citizenship: Local Elections in El Alto, Bolivia." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 23 (2): 228–243. doi:10.1111/j.1470-9856.2004.00106.x.
- Lehoux, P., B. Poland, and G. Daudelin. 2006. "Focus Group Research and "the Patient's View"" *Social Science & Medicine* 63 (8): 2091–2104. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2006.05.016.
- Mares, I., and L. Young. 2019. *Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Merton, R. K. 1987. "The Focussed Interview and Focus Groups: Continuities and Discontinuities." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (4): 550–566. doi:10.1086/269057.
- Morgan, D. L., and R. A. Krueger. 1993. "When to Use Focus Groups and Why." *Successful Focus Groups: Advancing the State of the Art* 1: 3–19.
- Muhtadi, B. 2019. *Vote Buying in Indonesia: The Mechanics of Electoral Bribery*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Muñoz, P. 2014. "An Informational Theory of Campaign Clientelism: The Case of Peru." *Comparative Politics* 47 (1): 79–98. doi:10.5129/001041514813623155.
- Ndletyana, M., P. O. Makhalemele, and R. Mathekgga. 2013. *Patronage Politics Divides Us: A Study of Poverty, Patronage and Inequality in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Real African Publishers.
- Nichter, S. 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." *American Political Science Review* 102 (1): 19–31. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080106.
- Nichter, S. 2014. "Political Clientelism and Social Policy in Brazil." In *Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy*, edited by D. Abente Brun and L. Diamond, 130–151. Baltimore: JHU Press.
- Nichter, S. 2018. *Votes for Survival: Relational Clientelism in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paller, J. W. 2019. *Democracy in Ghana: Everyday Politics in Urban Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parthasarathy, R., V. Rao, and N. Palaniswamy. 2019. "Deliberative Democracy in an Unequal World: A Text-As-Data Study of South India's Village Assemblies." *American Political Science Review* 113 (3): 623–640. doi:10.1017/S0003055419000182.
- Pellicer, M., E. Wegner, M. Bayer, and C. Tischmeyer. 2020. "Clientelism from the Client's Perspective: A Meta-Analysis of Ethnographic Literature." *Perspectives on Politics*, 1–17. doi:10.1017/S153759272000420X.
- Pellicer, M., E. Wegner, L. J. Benstead, and E. Lust. 2021a. "Poor Peoples' Beliefs and the Dynamics of Clientelism." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 33 (3): 300–332. doi:10.1177/09516298211003661.
- Pellicer, M., E. Wegner, and A. De Juan. 2021b. "Preferences for the Scope of Protests." *Political Research Quarterly* 74 (2): 288–301. doi:10.1177/1065912920905001.
- Piper, L., and B. von Lieres. 2016. "The Limits of Participatory Democracy and the Rise of the Informal Politics of Mediated Representation in South Africa." *Journal of Civil Society* 12 (3): 314–327. doi:10.1080/17448689.2016.1215616.

- Schnell, R., P. B. Hill, and E. Esser. 2013. *Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung*. 10th ed. München: Oldenbourg.
- Shefner, J. 2013. "What Is Politics for? Inequality, Representation, and Needs Satisfaction under Clientelism and Democracy." In *Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics*, edited by T. Hilgers, 41–59. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Smithson, J. 2000. "Using and Analysing Focus Groups: Limitations and Possibilities." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 3 (2): 103–119. doi:10.1080/136455700405172.
- Staniland, L. 2008. "'They Know Me, I Will Not Get Any Job': Public Participation, Patronage, and the Sedation of Civil Society in a Capetonian Township." *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa* 66 (1): 34–60. doi:10.1353/trn.0.0005.
- Stokes, S. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 315–325. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051683.
- Stokes, S., T. Dunning, M. Nazareno, and V. Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Zomeren, M., T. Postmes, and R. Spears. 2008. "Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives." *Psychological Bulletin* 134 (4): 504–535.
- Wegner, E. 2018. "Local-Level Accountability in a Dominant Party System." *Government and Opposition* 53 (1): 51–75. doi:10.1017/gov.2016.1.
- Wilks, A. 2016. "Money, Morality, and Politics in the Slums of Buenos Aires." *Horizontes Antropológicos* 22 (45): 49–76. doi:10.1590/S0104-71832016000100003.
- Yıldırım, K., and H. Kitschelt. 2020. "Analytical Perspectives on Varieties of Clientelism." *Democratization* 27 (1): 20–43. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1641798.