

What is bad about clientelism?  
Citizen perceptions in poor communities in South Africa and  
Tunisia

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**Abstract**

Political clientelism - the exchange of particularistic goods for political support - is thought to have strong negative implications for the functioning of democracies. Beyond the lack of accountability, the literature regards clientelism as a negative practice because of its particularism, informality, inequality, and inefficiency. At present, we know little on whether citizens in communities where clientelism is prevalent share these evaluations. However, their evaluations are the ones that count for the persistence of the practice as they determine what social costs clients face in their communities. We explore the attitudes of citizens towards clientelism with conjoint experiments administered to respondents in two poor communities of South Africa and Tunisia, and a sample of academic experts that we use as benchmark for the literature. We find that, on average, Tunisian and South African respondents evaluate clientelism substantially more favourably than academics. However, they have shared opinions about which aspects of clientelism are negative: Respondents in all samples negatively evaluate the particularism and inequality typical of clientelism, but only academics care about its informality. Clients are evaluated much more favourably than patrons. Our findings have implications for the literature on the role of citizens in clientelism and the persistence of the phenomenon.

## 1 Introduction

Political clientelism - the exchange of particularistic goods for political support - is thought to have strong negative implications for the functioning of democracies (Hicken, 2011). Clientelism reverses the standard accountability relationship as voters give up political rights in exchange for access to benefits (Stokes, 2005). Voters in clientelistic

systems have been found to be particularly cynical and disillusioned about democratic politics (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Indeed, many argue that “clientelistic politics is a major driver of democratic decline” (Berenschot and Aspinall, 2020, see p.12-13).

Beyond these general implications for the quality of democracy, there are several aspects of clientelism that are typically considered negative. First, the *particularistic* nature of clientelism leads to an under-provision of public goods (Keefer and Khemani, 2004; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Second, because clientelism is *ad-hoc and informal*, it undermines formal rules and is often associated with corruption (Hicken, 2011; Singer, 2009). Third, clientelism is thought to generate *distortions in the allocation* of public resources, with public jobs allocated irrespective of merit, and social policies distorted to benefit supporters (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Fritzen, 2007; Keefer, 2007). Fourth, clientelism is associated with *inequality* by putting the citizen in a subordinate position.<sup>1</sup> Overall, clientelism is thought to have particularly bad implications for poorer voters as they are most likely to suffer from bad governance and the under-provision of public goods in democracies where clientelism is prevalent (Keefer and Khemani, 2004).

If clientelism has so many negative features for citizens, why do they not opt out of it? As citizens are one of the parties in the exchange, clientelism could hardly persist without their collaboration (see Nichter (2018)). Some of the literature has made the point that poorer citizens are locked in to clientelism. Clientelism provides short-term benefits such as money, food, or building materials to poorer voters to whom the immediacy of the provision is crucial. It also provides access to social services or serves as an insurance in countries where state capacity is low (Auyero, 2000; Berenschot and Aspinall, 2020; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Nichter, 2018; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013; Szwarcberg, 2015). Recent research on clientelism indeed emphasizes how citizens often actively engage in clientelism by requesting goods and selecting suitable brokers (Auerbach and Thachil, 2018; Nichter and Peress, 2017). Clientelism is thus depicted as a collective action problem, where, in the absence of a coordinated move to vote

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<sup>1</sup>A commonly used definition of clientelism emphasizes its unequal nature, as an “exchange relationship in which a powerful actor trades resources for political support from less powerful actors”(Shefner, 2012, p.44).

programmatic, clean candidates into office, citizens are locked into supporting clientelistic politicians (e.g. Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon and McClendon (2019).

It is, however, also possible that citizens in poor communities do not think about clientelism in such negative terms. As emphasized by Piliavsky (2014), many arguments against clientelism are based on Western perceptions of what is desirable or undesirable political behavior. As Piliavsky puts it, Western ideals imply that “sound political choices should emerge from concern for the greater social good, and be driven by policies and ideologies whose benefits stretch beyond any individual’s interests or lifespan” (2014, p.28) and that mutually beneficial, respectful, social relations cannot be based on inequality (ibid, p. 30). Thus, the particularism, informality, and inequality involved in exchanging goods for political support is perceived to be morally wrong. But, as Pilavsky notes, this is clientelism interpreted from the perspective of Western *ideals* [our emphasis]. Whereas such ideals might inform the views of academics, it is possible that local communities in which clientelism is prevalent care about different things. From this perspective, clientelism would not only persist because poor citizens lack suitable alternatives or have coordination problems, but because they find clientelism morally unproblematic.

To understand better how citizens perceive clientelism, research has recently started to study moral evaluations with surveys. This research suggests that citizens have clearly differentiated moral evaluations of clientelism (Gonzalez Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson, 2014; Mares and Young, 2018). It also suggests that views of clientelism differ between richer and poorer citizens, with richer citizens being more negative about clientelism than poorer ones (Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2014; Mares and Young, 2018). While this research offers some first important insights into citizen evaluations of clientelism, there are many open questions. First, the literature is so far mostly limited to understanding perceptions of vote-buying, a specific form of clientelism among other types, such as relational or collective clientelism (Pellicer, Wegner, Bayer and Tischmeyer, 2020b). Second, current studies look at the general population and focus on differences in demographic or partisan characteristics. However, it is mostly poorer citizens who are crucial for sustaining clientelism. Lastly, research thus far offers general evaluations of

clientelism but does not offer insights into what it is that citizens might find unacceptable about clientelism and whether this matches what the literature identifies as problematic aspects of clientelism.

The aim of this paper is to take this research a step further and study attitudes towards clientelism in poor communities, where clientelistic offers are potentially attractive. Understanding the moral evaluations of poorer citizens can help understand the potential for citizens to reduce or sustain clientelistic practices as only negative peer evaluations will impose social costs on the practice. This hinges particularly on how they evaluate the role of fellow citizens (the clients). If communities condemn clientelism in general but do not hold citizens responsible, citizens will not face social costs when engaging in clientelism.

This paper addresses three questions. First, how do citizens *in disadvantaged communities* morally evaluate clientelism relative to the literature? Second, which aspects of clientelism do these citizens consider acceptable and unacceptable? Third, when considering clientelistic exchanges, do citizens evaluate differently the actions of fellow citizens relative to politicians? We explore these questions with conjoint experiments implemented in two poor communities in South Africa and Tunisia, and with academic experts.

Our experiments present exchanges between a politician and a citizen (or group of citizens). The politician provides some type of good and the citizen (or group of citizens) some type of political support. We vary the characteristics of the exchange in ways that reflect the different potentially negative aspects of clientelism (particularism, informality, allocative distortions, and inequality). We find that Tunisian and South African respondents are less negative about clientelism than the academic benchmark respondents. Whereas academics give an average acceptability rating of around 3 on a scale ranging from 1-10, the average for Tunisians is around 4 and for South Africans around 5. Despite these differences, all samples agree on the most negative aspects of clientelism: These are its particularism and its inequality. We also find that in all samples the behavior of the client is judged to be more acceptable than that of the patron.

Our paper contributes to the rapidly growing literature on the role of citizens in

clientelism and in particular, of citizen evaluations of clientelism. We expand upon this literature by focusing on the values of citizens in poor communities where clientelism is prevalent, by attempting to disentangle the reasons for the dislike of clientelism, and by examining the different judgments of patrons and clients. Last, our findings have implications for the persistence of clientelism. Our findings suggest that beyond citizens that might dislike clientelism but find it hard to opt out (i.e. that are locked in to clientelism), there are also many citizens who simply find some forms of clientelism acceptable.

## 2 Citizen Evaluations of Clientelism, Clients, and Patrons

In recent years, work on clientelism has started to focus more directly on the role of citizens for the persistence of clientelism. The starting premise of this recent work is that “citizens play a crucial yet underappreciated role in sustaining clientelism” (Nichter, 2018, p.5). To understand this role better, several recent contributions study the citizen perspective on and engagement with clientelism (for example Auerbach and Thachil (2018); Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2014); Kramon (2017); Mares and Young (2018); Nichter and Peress (2017); Pellicer et al. (2020b); Wegner, Pellicer, Bayer and Tischmeyer (2019).

Part of this underappreciated role of citizens has to do with their moral evaluation of clientelism. Moral evaluations affect the value of clientelism for citizens directly and indirectly. Directly, because finding an offer morally unacceptable decreases its value for a citizen, and indirectly because negative peer evaluations affect the social cost of engaging in clientelism. Because of this, some recent work indeed looks at social norms about clientelism and allows us to derive some first insights about citizen evaluations. Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2014) study the acceptability of vote-buying with representative surveys in different Latin American countries. Overall, they find that vote-buying is seen as highly unacceptable, that is, socially undesirable, in these countries with between 60 to 80 per cent of the respondents stating that it was either unacceptable or highly unacceptable. For Nicaragua and Peru, they moreover find that exposure to clientelism correlates

positively with acceptability, whereas education negatively correlates with acceptability. Mares and Young (2018) also find that vote-buying is seen as a clearly negative practice in Romania and Hungary overall and that income negatively affects view on politicians using clientelism. In contrast, Kramon (2016) finds that citizens in Kenya are highly favorable toward candidates engaging in vote-buying. These findings suggest that the acceptability of vote-buying depends on the country context, on personal characteristics of citizens, and on exposure to clientelism.

While these findings offer some important insights into moral evaluations of clientelism in different parts of the world, the current literature offers little insight into what it is exactly that citizens dislike about clientelism and to what extent this matches with discussions in the literature. Following the literature discussed in the introduction, there would be four core reasons why citizens might dislike clientelistic exchanges: First, the particularistic nature of clientelism, as clientelism implies that some citizens get resources and others do not. Second, the disrespect or absence of transparent, formal rules for the allocation of scarce resources. Third, distortions in the allocation of resources as resources are allocated to followers/ clients for political support not because of need or merit. Fourth, the inequality in patron-client relationships as clientelism implies (to different degrees) a subordinate role of the client. All these factors could, in principle be drivers of negative evaluations. However, these normative judgments of what is bad about clientelism are, at present, mostly based on academic assessments of these exchanges and we are at agnostic as to whether they will matter for disadvantaged citizens in countries where clientelism is prevalent.

Moreover, the current literature on citizen evaluations of clientelism is thus far limited to a specific form of clientelism, vote-buying. Vote-buying is a form of clientelism that is characterized by low value exchanges and more equal relations between clients and patrons (Pellicer et al., 2020b). However, the literature on clientelism describes several other forms of clientelism, such as relational, traditional, or collective clientelism (for a typology from the client perspective, see Pellicer et al. (2020b)).<sup>2</sup> Because different types

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<sup>2</sup>Other typologies describing different forms of clientelism are provided by Nichter (2018), Yildirim and Kitschelt (2020), Schaffer (2007) or Stokes et al. (2013), among others.

of clientelism involve different goods, different relations between patrons and clients, and different beneficiaries, each of these types will have different negative implications and might therefore be evaluated differently by citizens.

Whereas the first two questions we address in this paper deal with evaluations of the exchange itself, the third question concerns possible differences between the evaluation of citizens and politicians in the exchange. Social costs would only accrue for citizens if own their role is evaluated negatively. Research on clientelism does not provide a clear answer as to how citizens would assess these two parties. Some work suggests that sometimes politicians engaging in clientelism are seen as benefactors (e.g. Auyero (1999); Kramon (2017); Paller (2014), suggesting that patrons could be seen in a more positive light than clients. On the other hand, much scholarship depicts patrons and brokers as self-interested, opportunistic and exploitative, whereas clients are rather seen as victims in the exchange (e.g. Lazar (2004), Szwarcberg (2015), or Wegner et al. (2019)). Citizens may thus evaluate fellow citizens engaging in clientelism particularly positively or negatively relative to patrons.

### 3 Experiments

We provide respondents a series of vignettes in which a citizen or group of citizens “exchanges” with a patron some form of political support for some material benefit.<sup>3</sup> We consider as clientelistic any informal exchange where a citizen or group of citizens trades political support for some targeted benefit. Thus, we include in our definition exchanges between a community and a politician.

In the experiments, we vary certain dimensions of the exchange in order to capture possible reasons why clientelism may be judged negatively: particularism, informality/ rules, inequality, and distortions. We designed two conjoint experiments, the first experiment focuses on particularism and informality/ rules; and the second on inequality and distortions.

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<sup>3</sup>A Pre-Analysis plan was registered with EGAP prior to researcher access to outcome data. <https://egap.org/registration-details/5412>.

To make the exchanges and dimensions more tangible to respondents, we show simple illustrations. In addition, there are very short text explanations of the exchange that respondents can either read themselves or that are read by the enumerators to them while the respondent looks at the images.

Respondents see two illustrations with exchanges of different characteristics and are then asked to evaluate how acceptable would they find such exchanges. The process is repeated several times, depending on the experiment and the sample. Respondents are asked to evaluate separately the exchange, the behavior of the politician, and the behavior of the citizen.<sup>4</sup>

All images and outcome questions used in the two experiments can be found in appendix A.

## Experiment 1: Particularism and Informality

Our first experiment measures evaluations of the particularism and informality of clientelistic exchanges. Table 1 shows the features of the clientelistic exchange that we vary in order to achieve this.

Table 1: Attributes and Levels Conjoint 1

Concept	Attributes	Levels
Particularism	Size of Beneficiary Group	<i>Individual</i> , only one citizen benefits from access to a public good <i>Community</i> , one or several communities benefit from a (local) public good
Informality	Extent of Rules	<i>Ad Hoc/ informal</i> The politician uses his influence to provide the good. <i>Manipulation of Rules</i> : The politician changes the eligibility rules to provide the good. <i>Rule Based</i> : The politician implements a policy to provide the good.

For particularism, we vary the size of the group that benefits from the clientelistic

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<sup>4</sup>In practice, politicians often do not engage themselves in the clientelistic exchange but rely on brokers (Auerbach and Thachil, 2018; Stokes et al., 2013). For the purpose of this study, introducing this further level of complexity would not have made a difference as it is generally clear to clients that the broker is working for a politician.




exchange. We consider one exchange where only an individual or family benefits and three exchanges where whole communities benefit. In the individual case, an individual campaigns for the politician to get individual benefits; in the community cases, a community votes as a block in order to improve community or regional outcomes. To maximize consistency across scenarios, all exchanges involve access to health care for the citizens.


The illustrations in figure 1 show how we operationalize this. The top of each illustration shows what the citizen or group of citizens do and the bottom shows the politician. In order to underline the exchange nature of the interaction, a double arrow is displayed from the actions of the citizens to the politician and back. The individual-level exchange shows the family of the person campaigning for the politician obtaining privileged access to health care. The short texts read: “Citizen campaigns for politician”, and “Politician gives privileged access to healthcare”. The community level exchange shows a village with members queuing to vote, with the politician pointing towards a clinic that is being built. In the text, it is emphasized that the “Community gives block of votes”, and that the politician provides a clinic.

For informality we vary the extent that the politician provides goods based on rules. In the informal cases, the politician is shown directly enabling access to health care in an “ad-hoc” way (top drawings of figure 1). To illustrate this, we show the politician simply standing next to the clinic while a doctor lets the client’s family in ahead of the queue (individual case), or pointing with a finger at the clinic being built while the text emphasizes that the politician uses his “influence” to provide the clinic (community case). The drawings at the bottom emphasize the use of rules. The politician is shown sitting at a table writing (presumably to change a formal rule) and the text emphasizes that the politician “changes laws” in order to provide the good. The rules-based case is not very plausible for the individual level case (it seems implausible that the politician could use rules or laws to grant a family privileged access to health-care), so all rules-based scenarios are at the community level.


We consider two different ways in which the politician could make use of rules. In one case, the politician manipulates eligibility rules of a special program of clinic building




(a) Individual - Ad hoc/ Informal



(b) Community - Ad hoc/ Informal



(c) Community - Manipulation of Rules



(d) Community - Rules Based

Figure 1: Illustrations used in Experiment 1

to allow him to include the village that votes for him. In the other case we consider a more standard case where the politician enacts a program of general construction of clinics for the entire region. These two approaches to using rules are different. While the manipulation of rules approach is less informal than that of the first and second scenario, the changing the eligibility criteria to provide a clinic could be seen as a case of “bending” the rules, rather than respecting them. In contrast, the second approach captures a more standard case of using rules to conduct policy.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup>Strictly speaking, the scenario where the politician enacts a program of general clinic construction differs from the scenario where eligibility rules are changed in both rules and size of the beneficiary group: In the general clinic construction scenario other communities than the one voting for the politician benefit.

In all samples (South Africa, Tunisia, and Academic), each respondent is asked to evaluate two exchanges in this experiment.

## **Experiment 2: Inequality and Distortions**

The second experiment studies whether inequality and distortions are relevant for the evaluation of clientelistic exchanges. Table 2 shows the dimensions of the exchange that we vary to capture the role of these. For inequality, we vary the power relation between patron and client. This is operationalized using two scenarios (see figure 2). In the “unequal” scenario, the client is shown in a clearly subordinate body posture the text reads: “The politician has the upper hand. Citizen and politician know that the citizen needs the politician and has to show him respect.” The “equal” scenario shows non-hierarchical body postures and the text: “The relation is equal. The citizen and the politician realize that they need each other”.

In order to capture distortions, we vary two dimensions of the clientelistic exchange: the value of the goods exchanged, and the scarcity of the good provided by the patron. Both of these dimensions capture how valuable are the goods that the patron provides. The rationale is that clientelism is distortionary to the extent that the patron offers valuable goods as part of the exchange. The efficiency cost of misallocating a low value good ought to be small. Indeed, the literature emphasizing the allocative distortions of clientelism focuses on types of clientelism where high value goods are provided (public sector jobs, as opposed to groceries or other small goods, as in the vote-buying literature).

We consider three types of goods provided by the patron of increasing value: a bag of groceries, a job in a public works program, and a good long-term office job. In order to keep the scenarios realistic, these goods are matched with services provided by the client of “commensurate value”. When receiving a bag of groceries, the client provides a vote in exchange; when receiving a job in the public goods program, the client campaigns for the

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In fact, in the registered Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP), we emphasized the difference in beneficiary group more than the difference in rules, as we do here. We depart from the PAP in this case because the data strongly suggests that the differences in rules seem particularly salient. In particular, academics view the rule where the eligibility border is changed as a manipulation of rules (akin to gerrymandering), rather than following the rules. We now believe that the most salient difference between the scenarios is about rules, not about beneficiaries, and treat it as such in the text.

Table 2: Attributes and Levels Conjoint 2


Concept	Attributes	Levels
Inequality	Power Relation	<i>Unequal</i> : The politician has the upper hand. Citizen and politician know that the citizen needs the politician and has to show him respect. <i>Equal</i> : The relation is equal. The citizen and the politician realize that they need each other
Distortions 1	Goods exchanged	<i>Not very valuable</i> , a bag of groceries (patron) for a vote (client) <i>Fairly valuable</i> , a job in a public works program (patron) for campaigning for politician in community (client) <i>Very valuable</i> , a long-term, office job (patron) for being at the patron's disposal (client)
Distortions 2	Scarcity/ Abundance	<i>Abundance</i> : In this community, there are many [bags of groceries/ temporary jobs/ long term jobs] and most people can have them. <i>Scarcity</i> : In this community, there are very few [bags of groceries/ temporary jobs/ long term jobs] so very few people can have them.

politician, and when receiving a long term office job the client offers to be at the patron's disposal.

We operationalize the scarcity vs. abundance of the good provided by the patron by showing exchanges where the good is in short supply and high demand, or vice versa. For instance, in figure 2 the left panel shows a low value good (a bag of groceries exchanged for a vote), and scarcity (shown by the few bags and the many people that are turned away). The right panel shows an exchange of medium value goods (public works program), and abundance (shown by the many people working and a short queue of people waiting to get jobs).

In total, this experiment comprises twelve different exchanges that combine a different value of the good, different scarcity and different equality (see appendix). Tunisian and South African respondents evaluate four of these exchanges; Academics evaluate two.

Figure 2: Example of Exchanges in Experiment 2



## 4 Context

South Africa and Tunisia are both fairly “new” democracies, South Africa’s first democratic election took place in 1994, Tunisia’s in 2011. As in almost all countries around the world, vote-buying is explicitly banned - however, allegations of clientelism usually arise at election time. In both countries, economic expectations that many citizens associated with the democratic transition have not been met and there is widespread unemployment, especially among youth (55% in South Africa and 35% in Tunisia). Possibly as a result, disillusionment with formal politics is high. For example, according to the latest round of the Afro Barometer, about two thirds of respondents in the two countries stated that they have no or low trust in parliament and about half of the respondents felt that MPs “never” listened to citizens demands.<sup>6</sup>

Overall, the patterns of clientelism in Sub-Saharan African tend to lean more toward vote-buying, whereas Middle East clientelism is more relational (Lust, 2009; Yıldırım and Kitschelt, 2020). If this hold true in practice is not clear as there are no systematic studies of clientelism in either South Africa and Tunisia as of yet. South African politics have been dominated by the African National Congress since the end of Apartheid which,

<sup>6</sup>A 2016 study on youth in Ettadhamen moreover finds that more than 95% of the respondents felt that politicians did not act for the common good, but for their own personal interests (Lamloum, 2016). See also Pellicer, Assaad, Krafft and Salemi (2020a) for the political exclusion of uneducated youth in Tunisia.

in principle, would provide less fertile ground for clientelism. However, many local races are very competitive and other parties have successfully challenged the ANC in elections for city halls or even provinces. There is also competition for nominations inside the ANC (Wegner, 2018) where clientelism plays a role. Some qualitative studies in different localities have moreover documented examples of various forms of clientelism, such as vote-buying through food parcels (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2011), collective clientelism pursued by citizens with political capital (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2011), the partisan allocation of jobs in the public sector or public works programs (Anciano, 2018), or the conditioning of access to administrative services on political support Wegner et al. (2019).

In pre-transition Tunisia, clientelism was systematically practiced by the ruling party as a tool of tying citizen interests to the survival of the regime (Allal and Geisser, 2011; Cournoyer Paquin, 2020). After the transition, some of the intermediate regime elites converted themselves into clientelistic brokers offering their services to new political parties. Tunisia's present party system is heavily fragmented and volatile; in the latest parliamentary election, few parties won more than ten seats and many parties just have one MP. Such turnout rates would make clientelism a fruitful electoral strategy as few votes can have a great influence. Indeed, in a report on the 2019 parliamentary election, Tunisia's anti corruption body (Instance nationale de lutte contre la corruption) identified both voter intimidation and vote buying among the problems. In addition, Cournoyer Paquin (2020) documents relational forms of clientelism in hiring in both the public and private sector.

The objective of our study is to understand the drivers of evaluations in communities where people are likely to be familiar with different types of clientelistic exchanges. Following this objective, we choose neighborhoods where citizens are relatively poor and where citizens have a high number of needs that could potentially be addressed by politicians, either individually or at community level through clientelism. We focus on urban areas, selecting one neighborhood in Tunis (Ettadhamen), and one in Cape Town (Khayelitsha). While clientelism exists in rural as well as urban communities, urban areas are more likely to be familiar with different forms of clientelistic offers, including gifts or

jobs, relative to rural areas.<sup>7</sup>

Both survey locations are characterized by low levels of employment and education (see table B.1 showing information about our survey locations from the latest censuses). They also have low levels of household assets. At the same time, it is worth noting that the South African location is much worse off than the Tunisian in absolute terms. Residents of Khayelitsha own only half as many cars and one fifth of computers compared to Ettadhamen, and have much lower levels of connection to the grid in terms of electricity, water, and sanitation. Twice as many people are unemployed in Khayelitsha and only 5% have university education, compared to 10 % in Ettadhamen.

## 5 Data

The data for this study were collected in between December 2018 and April 2019 using face-to-face interviews. The survey is designed to be representative of the respective locality. Enumerators were assigned a starting point in the enumeration area and then selected the household with a random walk. The respondent in the household was selected with a Kish grid.<sup>8</sup> The sample size is 300 respondents in each country, but as each respondents evaluates six exchanges, our data contain around 1900 evaluations of clientelism by country. This implies that for our analysis, the sample size is large enough and we obtain fairly precise estimates.

In addition, a (shorter) English version of the experiments was distributed to academics. We targeted specifically academics working on the politics of developing countries or on normative democratic theory. Their views are supposed to proxy the literature on clientelism. We deliberately designed a questionnaire to be filled in around five minutes in order to maximize response rates. For this reason, each academic evaluated four exchanges (instead of six, as the South African and Tunisian samples), two from each experiment. We obtained 90 responses.

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<sup>7</sup>Anecdotally, in focus groups that we conducted in rural and urban areas in Tunisia and South Africa as part of this research project, rural voters reported less experiences with clientelism and fewer variety of clientelistic exchanges.

<sup>8</sup>In South Africa, we used an English and a Xhosa version of the questionnaire, for Tunisia, the questionnaire and text on the images was translated into Tunisian Arabic.

Table 3 shows some characteristics of our Tunisian and South African samples. Aligning with the features of the location, respondents perceive their social standing to be very low (around 3.5 on a 10 point scale) and less than half report to earn a salary. Attitudes towards politics are very negative: Trust in politicians is low and so are beliefs that political leaders of the country care about “people like them” or “communities like theirs”. However, it is noteworthy that these negative attitudes are far more extreme in the Tunisian sample with almost 60% disagreeing strongly with the sentiment that leaders care relative to around 35% in South Africa. The two samples also display different levels of attachment to formal politics. Around half of South Africans feel at least some degree of party identification, but this is only the case for 15% of Tunisians. This difference is a likely result of different levels of party institutionalization in the two countries. Overall, the attitudes show a high level of disaffection with elected leaders and a strong sense of not being considered by them.

Table 3: Sample Characteristics

	(1)	(2)
	South Africa	Tunisia
<i>Demographics:</i>		
Female	0.58	0.54
Age	35.79	49.38
Earn	0.47	0.43
Subjective Status	3.71	3.30
<i>Attitudes:</i>		
Politicians Can Be Trusted - Disagr. Str.	0.57	0.53
Leader Care Communities Like Mine - Disagr. Str.	0.37	0.59
Leaders Care People Like Me - Disagr. Str.	0.37	0.57
Not Close To Party	0.46	0.85
<i>Clientelism: Beliefs</i>		
Clientelism Very Likely Here	0.33	0.50
Most Citizens Would Accept	0.48	0.57
<i>Clientelism: Personal Experience</i>		
Similar Clientelistic Exchange Offered	0.15	0.06
Observations	317	308

Subjective status ranges from 1-10 with low values indicating low status

Table 3 also illustrates beliefs about and experiences with clientelism among our respondents. For a random exchange, we ask how likely it is that something similar hap-



pens in their community, how many of their fellow citizens would be willing to engage in the exchange, and whether something similar had been offered to them. Relatively few respondents state that they have been offered a clientelistic exchange similar to the (random) one that they have seen: 15% in South Africa and 6% in Tunisia. However, it is likely that this is an underestimate. Precisely because of social norms against clientelism, people may not truly report the extent of personal exposure to it. Indeed, studies that seek to circumvent this problem by granting anonymity to respondents through list experiments find that, when asked directly, respondents under-report exposure and engagement in vote-selling dramatically (see Gonzalez Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, Melendez, Osorio and Nickerson (2012) on Nicaragua or Corstange (2010) on Lebanon). When asked about prevalence of clientelism in a less personal way, respondents indeed report much higher figures. One third of South African and half of Tunisian respondents believe that it is “very likely” that something similar was happening “around here”. And around half believe that most Tunisians/ South Africans would be willing to engage in such an exchange.<sup>9</sup> On the basis of these responses, it seems sensible to conclude that the exchanges we presented to the respondents resonated with them and are believed to be widespread and appealing to citizens.

## 6 Results

We have three core outcome variables that tap into the acceptability of clientelism, one asking about the acceptability of the overall exchange and one each for the behavior of the politician and the citizen in the exchange. All are measured on a ten-point scale where 10 is totally acceptable and 1 is totally unacceptable. We see a score of five as the threshold for acceptability. If an exchange was evaluated below a score of five of acceptability the respondent was asked to answer an open follow-up question about their reasons for classifying a specific exchange as unacceptable.

In the following, we address the three main questions we raised. First, how do citizens

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<sup>9</sup>This question offered as answer options “few”, “around half”, and “most”. The table only displays the share of respondents stating that “most” would accept; including the option “around half” brings the share up to 75% in both countries.

in disadvantaged communities evaluate clientelism relative to academics? Second, which aspects of clientelism do these two groups find problematic? And, third, how do they judge the acceptability of the two main actors in the exchange, the politician and the citizen?

## **Overall evaluation of clientelism: Citizens vs. Academics**

Figure 3 shows the average evaluation of all clientelistic exchanges, including the clientelistic exchange taking place at the community level in our three samples, the South African, the Tunisian and the Academic sample. In addition, it shows a vertical line at 5 to illustrate what we consider to be a threshold of acceptability.


There are three relevant messages from this simple figure. First, as expected, academics tend to evaluate clientelistic exchanges very negatively, with an average evaluation of 3, out 10. Second, there is indeed a substantial and significant difference between the evaluations of academics and those of the Southern respondents. Southern respondents evaluate clientelism more acceptable than academics by 1.5 points on a 1-10 scale, corresponding to a 50% higher score. Third, South African respondents view clientelism clearly in the most positive light; their mean evaluation is above 5, suggesting that they lean toward finding clientelistic exchanges overall acceptable. In comparison, Tunisians provide a score around 4, substantially smaller but still one point higher than academics.

## **Negative dimensions of clientelism**

Clientelism can be viewed as unacceptable for different reasons. We study how the evaluation of clientelistic exchanges depends on the attributes of the exchange, as explained above. We perform simple OLS regressions of the evaluation on indicator functions capturing different attributes of the exchange. We conduct the regressions separately by sample (South Africa, Tunisia, and academic). All regressions include respondent fixed effects, given that all respondents evaluate at least two exchanges per experiment.

In the first experiment we study whether particularism and informality affect views on

Figure 3: Mean Evaluation of Clientelistic Exchanges



acceptability of clientelism. The results are shown in Table 4. In all samples, respondents tend to dislike particularism strongly: Clientelistic exchanges where only an individual/family benefits are deemed far less acceptable than exchanges where a whole community benefits. The effects are very large: between one and three on a scale of 1-10, depending on the sample. The effect is largest for academic respondents. Given that clientelism typically takes the form of an individual exchange, these results suggests that one of the reasons why academics evaluate clientelism worse is because they find its particularism more unacceptable.

Results regarding informality are markedly different. South African and Tunisian respondents do not evaluate differently whether the patron goods are allocated in an ad-hoc fashion or using different types of rules. Academics, in contrast, appear to be more responsive to the use of rules. In particular, relative to the ad-hoc provision of a clinic by the patron, academics evaluate positively the case where the politician enacts a policy to increase construction of clinics. However, the manipulation of eligibility rules is judged negatively, even worse than the ad-hoc allocation. In table 4, the two coefficients corresponding to these scenarios are statistically significant only at the 10% level, but jointly they are clearly different from zero. This is shown by the large F-statistic (and low p-value) in the table, which rejects the hypothesis that the two coefficients (of manipulated rules and rule-based) equal zero.

Table 4: Effect of Particularism and Informality on Evaluation

	(1) South	(2) South Africa	(3) Tunisia	(4) Academics
<i>Size of Beneficiary group. Refcat: individual</i>				
many: community/province	1.778*** (0.245)	2.433*** (0.297)	1.072** (0.387)	3.277*** (0.514)
<i>Allocation Mechanism. Refcat: informal</i>				
manipulation of rules	0.169 (0.198)	0.206 (0.216)	0.0803 (0.352)	-0.764 (0.454)
rule-based	0.553 (0.303)	0.627 (0.354)	0.444 (0.499)	0.859 (0.458)
F-stat	1.69	1.63	0.40	6.41
p-value	0.184	0.197	0.672	0.003
<i>N</i>	1181	634	547	176

*Note:* Respondent fixed effects model with robust standard errors. Outcome variable: How acceptable is exchange (1-10). The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the coefficients for manipulation of rules and rule-based are both equal to zero.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

Whereas the first experiment differentiated individual from collective exchanges and identified particularism as a key negative dimension of clientelism, the second experiment taps into different aspects of *individual* exchanges, the most common form of clientelism considered in the literature. Here, potential sources of unacceptability are the inequality in the relationship between patron and client and the potential allocative distortion of clientelism, as proxied by the value and scarcity of the good given by the patron.

Table 5 shows the results for the second experiment. In all samples, portraying the relationship between the politician and the citizen in an explicitly unequal way has strong negative impact on the acceptability of the exchange. The effects are large, ranging from 1 to 2 in a 1-10 scale, depending on the sample. The effects are not bigger for academics than for our Southern sample, and this suggest that inequality is not a key reason for the lower evaluation of clientelism by academics. In fact, the effect of inequality is largest for the South African sample. This shows that the higher acceptability of clientelism in South Africa is not the result of an overall indifference towards negative dimensions

of clientelism; quite the contrary, South African citizens have particularly strong moral judgments of specific dimensions of clientelism, but not of others.

Table 5: Effect of Inequality and Distortions on Evaluation

	(1) South	(2) South Africa	(3) Tunisia	(4) Academics
<i>Inequality</i>				
relationship unequal	-1.540*** (0.120)	-1.902*** (0.155)	-1.091*** (0.177)	-1.100*** (0.255)
<i>Distortions</i>				
good scarce	-1.265*** (0.121)	-2.109*** (0.162)	-0.237 (0.157)	-0.183 (0.240)
low value	-0.816*** (0.129)	-1.001*** (0.160)	-0.578** (0.198)	-0.616* (0.282)
high value	0.300* (0.133)	0.0201 (0.178)	0.629** (0.195)	-0.0367 (0.305)
Observations	2351	1267	1084	175

*Note:* Respondent fixed effects model with robust standard errors.  
Outcome variable: How acceptable is exchange (1-10).

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

In contrast, the different forms of distortions shown in the experiment do not affect respondents uniformly in the direction of expectations from the literature. Whether the good that is exchanged is depicted as scarce only matters for the South African respondents but not for Tunisians and Academics. The value of the depicted goods has an effect on the acceptability but in the opposite direction than hypothesized. Controlling for scarcity and the inequality of the relationship, low value goods are seen by all respondents as less acceptable than higher value goods (both small short-term and more attractive jobs). The Tunisian sample reacts mostly strongly to gradations of the value of the good and evaluates each increase in the value as more acceptable. We will come back to this puzzling result about distortions in the discussion below.


## Citizen vs. Politicians: who is held responsible?

The third question we seek to address is whether the behavior of politicians and citizens is evaluated differently. Figure 4 shows the mean evaluations of the behavior of politicians and citizens in the exchanges. As before, we restrict this analysis to evaluations of all exchanges that we consider as unambiguously clientelistic, that is, including the collective clientelistic exchange where the politician uses his influence to provide a community with a clinic in exchange for a block of votes.

In all samples, respondents evaluate the politician more negatively than the citizen. Acceptability scores are between 1 to 2 points higher for citizens than for politicians on the 10 point scale, with citizen behavior in all samples evaluated around the acceptability threshold of 5 or above. This implies that respondents do not fully “absolve” citizens engaging in clientelism and seem to attribute them some agency and responsibility in sustaining clientelistic exchanges. However, the responsibility for clientelism is most clearly attributed to the politicians. This could be because some respondents view citizens rather as “victims” or because they see them as legitimately making “the best of elections” in a pragmatic way. The open text evaluations in our data, in which we asked about “why” an exchange was unacceptable, make no mention of bad behaviour by citizens; in contrast, 14% state that the politician is opportunistic and 35% state that the politician is mistreating or abusing the citizen (see table B.2 in the appendix). This suggests that the “victim” aspect dominates in these evaluations.

At the same time, it is interesting to note that citizen-politician gap in evaluations is smaller for Southern respondents, relative to Academics. This gap is around 1 for South African and Tunisian samples (6 for the citizen and somewhat less than 5 for the politician), whereas it is almost 2 for academics (5 for the citizen and 3 for the politician). This suggests that, while Southern respondents on average evaluate citizens less harshly than academics, this may not be simply because of in-group favoritism. For at least some respondents, citizens engaging in clientelism might be considered to be threatening the positive identity of the group, as suggested in Pinto, Marques, Levine and Abrams (2010). Indeed, consistently with this idea, we find a higher share of Southern

Figure 4: Mean Evaluation of Politicians and Clients in the Exchange



respondents, compared to Academics, judging the behavior of the client to be “totally unacceptable” - despite the overall higher mean evaluation (see histogram in figure B.1 in the appendix).

For the South African sample, it is noteworthy that even the behavior of the politician is seen as rather acceptable (above 5). This is in line with research arguing that politicians engaging in clientelism are seen as helping out or signaling their commitment to help in the future (Kramon, 2017; Paller, 2014).

## 7 Discussion

How acceptable are clientelistic exchanges in communities that experience clientelism? And what drives the evaluation? Are these evaluations and reasons different from those of academics and the literature? And are citizens involved in clientelism viewed as negatively as patrons? We study these question because the acceptability of clientelistic exchanges in a community affects the direct value that clientelism has for individual citizens engaging in clientelism as well as the social costs they face. We use two conjoint experiments and run them with two samples of citizens in Tunisia and South Africa in neighborhoods that are poor relative to the national standards. We also have a small sample of academic evaluating the same exchanges as a benchmark.

We find substantial and statistically significant overall differences in how negatively clientelism is judged by Southern respondents relative to academics and the literature. In the South African sample clientelism was judged to be rather acceptable. These results go in line with the idea that a practice that can be seen as unacceptable by the literature might not carry social costs in some settings. For the South African sample, acceptability was more than 2.5 points higher on a scale from 1 to 10, relative to academics.

Besides this significant difference in overall judgment of clientelism, we find many commonalities between our three very different samples. Respondents in all samples broadly agree on judging negatively the particularism and inequality inherent in most clientelistic exchanges. Similarly, in all samples, citizen behavior is seen as much more acceptable than the behavior of politicians. The heterogeneity of our samples suggest that these results have some generality.

We also find interesting differences between the Academic and the South African and Tunisian samples. Most notably, our academic respondents care more about particularism than the Tunisian and South African respondents. And academics are the only ones that seem to care about the informality inherent in clientelism. These differences give some clues as to why academics may judge clientelism more negatively than citizens in poor communities in the South.

There is also evidence for the importance of context among Southern respondents. South African respondents display substantially higher levels of acceptability of clientelistic exchanges compared to the Tunisian sample (a difference of around 1.5 points on our 10 point “acceptability scale”). We find some suggestive evidence that this gap emerges from differences in contextual factors such as needs, exposure to clientelism, and trust in formal politics. We discuss this in appendix C.

One puzzle that emerges from our findings concerns the role of distortions. Contrary to expectations, low value exchanges (gifts for votes) are seen as less acceptable than higher value exchanges. This goes against the reasoning that clientelism is bad because public resources are misallocated. Following this line of reasoning, higher value goods should be seen as less acceptable because the misallocation of a public sector job should



be seen as more problematic than the misallocation of some bags of groceries. One possible explanation for these findings could be that politicians offering better goods are seen, not as generating more distortions, but as offering better deals/ making more efforts and therefore, being more acceptable, whereas patrons offering low value exchanges are trying to buy political support “cheaply”.

This explanation is consistent with the picture that emerges from the open text evaluations in our data. When respondents were asked to indicate “why” an exchange was unacceptable (that is, when they gave an exchange a value below 5), low value exchanges, relative to higher value exchanges, stand out as involving opportunistic politicians and corruption, or trying to buy or bribe a citizen. In other words, low value exchanges are judged negatively because they “short change” the citizen. In contrast, the value of the exchange has no impact on the evaluation of an exchange as unfair resource allocation (see table B.3 in the appendix).

## 8 Concluding Remarks

The findings in this paper provide relevant insights for the literature on the role of citizens for sustaining clientelism. Our findings suggest that citizens in communities where clientelism is prevalent might have few incentives to opt out of clientelism. To the extent that they face little social cost for these practices in their communities, the challenge for citizens might rather be to identify suitable patrons or brokers so that they can take part in the distributive benefits of clientelism. This is particularly true for types of clientelism that have little inequality, such as vote-selling or that have a larger beneficiary group, such as collective clientelism. Our findings suggest that the only form of clientelism that might generate higher social costs is a form of “traditional” clientelism that is characterized by high inequality, the provision of scarce and valuable resources. In that latter case, however, these costs might be counterbalanced by the higher value of the goods that clients receive.

Lastly, our findings can shed some light on why voter education campaigns against

vote-buying have produced mixed results. A typical approach in recent campaigns is to emphasize citizen agency and the negative implications of vote-selling on public good provision Blattman, Larreguy, Marx and Reid (2019); Green and Vasudevan (2016). The findings from our paper would suggest that emphasizing citizen responsibility in clientelism is a delicate matter. According to our results, citizen behavior is seen as substantially more acceptable than politician behavior. Moreover, when exchanges were seen as unacceptable and respondents provided a reason for this judgment in the open text evaluations, the blame was put more with the politicians, and less on the clients. More generally, our findings suggest that emphasizing the inequality often involved in clientelistic exchanges could be a fruitful avenue to design campaigns that resonate with the values of citizens exposed to clientelism.

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
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# Appendix


## Appendix A. Experiments: Images and Outcome Questions

### Experiment 1


Figure A.1: Illustrations used in Experiment 1




(a) Individual - Ad hoc/ Informal



(b) Community - Ad hoc/ Informal



(c) Community - Manipulation of Rules




(d) Community - Rules Based

## Experiment 2


Figure A.2: Low Value Exchanges



(a) Value low, abundant, equal



(b) Value low, scarce, equal




(c) Value low, abundant, unequal



(d) Value low, scarce, unequal




Figure A.3: Medium Value Exchanges



(a) Value medium, abundant, equal



(b) Value medium, scarce, equal





(c) Value medium, abundant, unequal





(d) Value medium, scarce, unequal


Figure A.4: High Value Exchanges




(a) Value large, abundant, equal



(b) Value large, scarce, equal



(c) Value large, abundant, unequal



(d) Value large, scarce, unequal

## Introduction and Questions

Introduction to experiment:

Politicians and citizens relate to each other in many different ways. Sometimes they agree on exchanges where the politician gives something special to a citizen and the citizen gives something special back.

We will now show you several drawings representing some of these exchanges and ask for your opinion about them. The drawings may appear a little strange at the beginning. Please take half a minute to familiarize yourself with the drawings, at least with the first one. We will hand you over the tablet so that you can look at the drawing.

Remember that there are no right or wrong answers to a question, just tell us what you think.

Outcome questions acceptability

1. How do you feel about this exchange ? How acceptable is it? [Answer options: from 1 (totally unacceptable) to 10 (totally acceptable)]
2. What do you think about the behavior of the politician in this exchange? How acceptable is it? [Answer options: from 1 (totally unacceptable) to 10 (totally acceptable)]
3. What do you think about the behavior of the citizen in this exchange? How acceptable is it? [Answer options: from 1 (totally unacceptable) to 10 (totally acceptable)]

Questions on prevalence

1. How likely is an exchange like the one you saw in the last picture to happen around here? [Answer options: very unlikely, unlikely, likely, very likely]
2. What do you think : How many Tunisians would be willing to engage in such an exchange? [Answer options: few, around half, most]

3. Have you ever been offered an exchange like the one described in the last picture?

[Answer options: yes, no]

## Appendix B

Table B.1: Characteristics of Survey Locations (census)

	Cité Ettadhamen	Khayelitsha
<hr/>		
<i>Household Assets</i>		
Computers	31.0	6.3
Car	19.0	9.6
<i>Services</i>		
Electricity	98.2	81.0
Water	96.5	34.5
Sanitation	98.5	71.5
<i>Demographics</i>		
Unemployment	17.3	38.0
University Education	9.7	4.9
<hr/>		

Cell figures indicate household percentages. Electricity figure for South Africa is share of households indicating that they use electricity for lightning.

Source: Census data (2014 Tunisia, 2011 South Africa)

Figure B.1: Distribution of Citizen Evaluations among Academics and Southern Respondents




Table B.2: Text Evaluations: Reasons for Unacceptability

	(1)
	mean
<i>Actors:</i>	
politician opportunistic	0.14
citizen opportunistic	0.00
improper relationship	0.04
<i>Dignity:</i>	
buying citizen	0.04
mistreating, abusing citizen	0.35
<i>Externalities:</i>	
unequal, unfair resource allocation	0.10
undemocratic	0.01
corruption	0.11
negative externalities	0.02
Observations	1289

*Note:* Restricted to observations where the respondent evaluated an exchange below 5 and was therefore given the opportunity to state a reason for this evaluation in the form of open text. Coding of open text for South Africa by authors, for Tunisia, a pre-grouping was done by the service provider.

Table B.3: Correlations between text evaluations and attributes in Experiment 2

	(1) politician opportunistic	(2) buying citizen	(3) corruption	(4) unfair resource allocation
<i>Refcat: High Value</i>				
low value	0.103** (0.0355)	0.0880*** (0.0198)	0.153*** (0.0265)	0.00848 (0.0236)
medium value	0.0714 (0.0370)	-0.0164 (0.0207)	0.0184 (0.0277)	0.0385 (0.0246)
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040

*Note:* Respondent Fixed Effects. Restricted to observations where the respondent evaluated an exchange below 5 and was therefore given the opportunity to state a reason for this evaluation in the form of open text. Coding of open text for South Africa by authors, for Tunisia, a pre-grouping was done by the service provider.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Standard errors in parentheses.



## Appendix C. Differences between South Africa and Tunisia

We find differences in the degree of acceptability of clientelism between South Africa and Tunisia of a magnitude of around 1.5 on the 10 point scale. We explore whether this difference could be driven by the differences in contextual factors. In the following we combine evidence from the demographic background of the respondents (shown in table B.1 above), their attitudes (table 3) with OLS regressions of acceptability on contextual factors (see table C.1 below). Overall, we find some suggestive evidence that citizens with lower living standards, with more exposure to clientelism, and with lower distrust in politicians tend to find clientelism more acceptable. Since our respondents in South Africa and Tunisia differ markedly along these dimensions, these contextual factors are likely to play a role for explaining the overall differences in acceptability we observe.

First, the needs of our South African respondents are much higher than those of the Tunisians - even if relative to other citizens in their country both samples are poor (see table B.1). South Africans were much more likely to be unemployed and to lack basic services such as water or sanitation than the Tunisian respondents. The higher living standards in Tunisia could lead to lower acceptability of clientelism (Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2014). Table C.1 does not indicate a strong relationship between needs and acceptability within country but this could be due to our relatively homogeneous samples.

Second, some literature argues that more exposure to clientelism leads to higher levels of acceptability (e.g. Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2014)). Our findings suggest that this might play a role although the relationship does not appear to be very robust.

Lastly, respondents in Tunisia have substantially higher distrust than South Africans. In principle, such cynical attitudes could plausibly lead to the opposite effect, namely *higher* levels of acceptability because citizens believe that formal democratic politics do not work for them and it is acceptable to just get what they can from elections. However, the very robust *negative* correlation between distrust and acceptability suggests that positive attitudes towards political leaders makes citizens see their actions in a more positive light, including when these actions are the engagement in clientelistic exchanges. In short, it is most likely that differences in needs and trust in formal politics contribute

to the differences in the acceptability of clientelism.

Table C.1: Exposure, trust, living standards and evaluation

	South Africa		Tunisia	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Eval Exchange	Eval Citizen	Eval Exchange	Eval Citizen
Exposure to clientelism	0.0607 (0.0800)	0.158* (0.0762)	0.238* (0.105)	0.180 (0.109)
Living Standards	-0.210** (0.0773)	-0.153* (0.0732)	-0.0615 (0.110)	-0.192 (0.118)
Distrust in Politicians	-0.555*** (0.0977)	-0.431*** (0.0922)	-0.553*** (0.0943)	-0.411*** (0.0981)
Age	0.0118 (0.100)	0.0523 (0.0930)	0.0140 (0.107)	-0.316** (0.111)
Female	0.0112 (0.0838)	-0.0456 (0.0790)	0.398*** (0.0961)	0.422*** (0.102)
_cons	5.080*** (0.0947)	6.341*** (0.0882)	3.574*** (0.104)	4.462*** (0.108)
<i>N</i>	1296	1296	1032	1025

*Note:* All variables are standardized. Living Standards is the standardized mean of education, employment, and perceived social status. Distrust in Politicians is the mean of of Trust in politicians, beliefs that leaders care about community, and beliefs that leaders care about individual

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Standard errors in parentheses.