5 ISLAMIST INCLUSION AND REGIME PERSISTENCE

The Moroccan Win-Win Situation

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IN THE LAST TWO DECADES many rulers in the Middle East and North Africa have tried to cope with decreasing resources and increasing contestation through political liberalization measures such as a more liberal media landscape, enhanced civil rights, constitutional reforms, the (re)animation of parliaments, and multiparty elections. Such moves were attempts to broaden support in times of protracted economic, social, and legitimatory crises. To this end, several regimes granted Islamist actors the right to participate in elections, either as "independent" candidates or as legalized political parties. However, these experiments were more often aborted or interrupted than continued, demonstrating how reluctant the regimes were to give institutional backing to their most popular and powerful opponents. Although regimes for which a purely repressive strategy is costly might consider the formal or informal inclusion of the Islamist opposition into institutionalized politics, the Algerian case has demonstrated the risks inherent in this option. Moreover, the electoral boycotts of Jordan's Islamic Action Front in 1997 and of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood in 1990 have indicated that a limit exists on what Islamists perceive as acceptable limitations in the electoral game.

Despite the large body of research on Islamism, we still know relatively little about the effects of inclusion both on regime stability and the Islamists, partly because for quite a long time research on Islamist movements was dominated by the "democratization paradigm" (Carothers 2002). Particularly after the electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria (1991), the relationship between "Islam and democracy" or between "Islamists

and democratization" was at the center of most analyses (see, for instance, Abootalebi 2000; Abukhalil 1994; Ahmad and Zartman 1997; Brumberg 1997; Esposito and Voll 1996; Kramer 1997; Krämer 1999). Research on Islamists in the electoral process focused on the question of whether the Islamists' demand for participation was only the strategic choice of antidemocratic movements or whether it reflected a true commitment to democratic values (for this debate, see Ahmad and Zartman 1997; Kramer 1997; Pelletreau et al. 1994). In short, the question was whether the Islamists would play by the rules of a democratic political game.

Regardless of the answers, the methods of investigation in much of this work were analyses of historical and contemporary Islamic states, Islamist discourses, or Koran and Hadith exegeses. This research has generated interesting results about contemporary Islamist discourses and references. One problem, though, is that conclusions were often drawn by establishing a causal link between the actors' ideological background and their behavior—a link that is only presumed; second, the existence of a link remains questionable because it merges two separate levels of analysis—ideas and action. Thus the dilemma that actors face when translating their abstract ideology into concrete programs under conditions of institutional constraints is neglected.[1] An even more serious flaw is the hypothetical nature of the question. None of the polities examined are democratic, nor can we observe anything that could be sensibly labeled democratization (Schlumberger 2000a). Rather, we are witnessing authoritarian resilience, with the centers of political power not being subject to contestation. To date, no Islamist party has been legalized in states where its goals could be achieved through competitive elections, and it is unlikely that this will happen soon. In short, the question of the compatibility of Islamist ideologies with a democratic polity is at present irrelevant for furthering our understanding of authoritarian rule in the Middle East.

By contrast, our understanding *can* be furthered by empirical studies that view political liberalization and the political inclusion of Islamists as attempts by the ruling elites to enhance their capability to contain and moderate dissent. As Anderson (1997, 20) put it: "In intent and content [such reforms are] designed not to inaugurate a system of uncertain outcomes—democracy—but to solidify the base of the elite in power."

Departing from this perspective, in this chapter I seek to contribute to the debate on the ingredients of authoritarian resilience by exploring the

dynamics of the apparently "successful" Moroccan case of the inclusion of the Movement of Unity and Reform, or rather the Party for Justice and Development (PJD). This example is a rare case of protracted inclusion. The regime has not banned the party, nor has the party confronted the regime openly by denouncing its practices or resorting to electoral boycott. This suggests that both actors currently perceive inclusion as beneficial, which is noteworthy because, as Albrecht explicates (Chapter 4), the inclusion of oppositional actors in authoritarian regimes involves a series of dilemmas for both the rulers and the opposition.

The rulers, aiming at stabilization, face the problem that electoral competition by a strong oppositional actor could destabilize the balance of forces within political institutions and consequently the political system as a whole. Although the direct threat posed by a successful Islamist party is potentially smaller for monarchs than for presidents (Albrecht and Wegner 2006; Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002, 351–356), an important pillar of political rule in Middle Eastern monarchies is the division and fragmentation of political forces, which facilitates control and manipulation (see Lust-Okar's Chapter 3; cf. also Richards and Waterbury 1996, 297–298). Rulers must also take into account that legality, formal organizational structures, and legitimate institutional activity diminish a group's costs of mobilization and collective action (Offe 1990; Scott 1990, 129; Tilly 1978, 167).[2]

For the Islamists problems arise from two sides. Like other opposition parties in authoritarian regimes, Islamists must make concessions to the regime to avoid repression, but simultaneously they must not fundamentally alienate their supporters. Like other parties whose discourse is geared toward fundamental societal and political change, Islamists face the dilemma of how to reconcile their role as institutional insiders with their role as credible critics of these same institutions, their actors, and policies (Offe 1990; Tilly 1978, 168).

The responses to these dilemmas tell us much about the immanence of an "Islamist threat" to a particular regime. In general, the more the Islamists are willing to compromise on their ideology (i.e., to subject it to the regime's logic) and the less they manage to balance their insider position with the discourse of an outsider, the more inclusion works as a means for stabilizing the authoritarian status quo. The key question, therefore, is which threshold the Islamists set for themselves, that is, which compromises are still acceptable in exchange for being integrated into the political game.

In what follows I examine the Moroccan Islamists' responses to these dilemmas by examining the initial setup and evolution of their threshold of compromise, the development of organizational capacities, and their strategies for broadening and maintaining support. I pay particular attention to the constraints and opportunities that influence the Islamists' choices.

THE MOVEMENT OF UNITY AND REFORM AND THE PARTY FOR JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP?

Any party's room to maneuver is constrained by the organizational circumstances of its founding, that is, its "genetic model" (Panebianco 1988, 50–53). If a party—as is the case with the PJD—is founded by a social movement organization, the most significant feature of such a party is its initial dependence on the resources of the founding organization. To the extent that the party remains dependent on the support of this organization, its margins for bargaining in the political arena will be constrained and it will be forced to express the opinions of the founding organization.

The Origins of the Party for Justice and Development

The PJD emerged from one of the two major currents within the Moroccan Islamist movement, the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR). The MUR and its predecessor organizations are linked to the Islamic Youth Association, an organization with a revolutionary agenda founded in 1970. When the Islamic Youth Association was banned in 1976, its followers split into three different factions. The majority regrouped as The Islamic Group, founded in 1981 by Mohamed Yatim, Abdallah Baha, and Abdelilah Benkirane, all of whom are currently members of the PJD's highest party committee, the General Secretariat. They developed a reformist (rather than revolutionary) vision and, in 1989 and 1992, applied for the legalization of a political party. Although the palace rejected their plea, it tolerated their integration into one of the numerous dormant Moroccan parties, the Mouvement Populaire Constitutionnel et Démocratique (MPCD, renamed the PJD in 1998).[3] In 1992 Islamist leaders began to revive and found new local and provincial party bureaus. In an extraordinary congress in 1996 Islamists were appointed to the party's General Secretariat.

Although the Islamists joined an already existing party, the party was initially dependent on the MUR. In 1992 the MPCD's organizational body was limited to its president's villa; local and provincial branches existed only on

paper. In the campaign before the 1997 parliamentary elections, the party depended almost entirely on the MUR's propagandistic resources. When in 1999 the party held its first regular congress since the Islamists' integration, the overwhelming majority of the national, provincial, and local party leaders belonged to the MUR.[4] In short, the party was entirely based on the MUR's organizational structures; loyalties were indirect, with the party depending on the MUR for mobilization, support, financing, and human resources.

Ideological Constraints Posed by
the Movement of Unity and Reform

From the beginning the MUR grappled with the nature of its relationship with the PJD. Between 1998 and 1999 MUR committees hosted numerous debates on the question of a total fusion with the party. This idea was eventually discarded by a vote of the Shura Council, the highest consultative committee to the MUR's Executive Bureau (Raissouni 2002a, 4). In 2000 the Shura Council eventually adopted the *Document of Complementary*, which stated that the two organizations were independent but linked through consultation, cooperation, coordination, and joint objectives and principles. The PJD was defined as a political organization whose task was to deal with the country's political issues and defend the Islamic cause in institutional politics, whereas the MUR was to devote itself to vocation and education (Ayadi 2002). From then on the relationship was labeled a partnership. It is noteworthy that the MUR is not formally represented (e.g., by quotas) in party committees. Although this formal independence surely affects both organizations' future relationship, the MUR's influence has been guaranteed by the party's dependence on its resources and by the representation of MUR leaders in the highest committees of the PJD.

Even after the MUR had officially retreated from active politics, it upheld clear views about the PJD's choices that did not, however, touch on the party's strategy toward the regime. It is not surprising that the MUR approved of the party's legalistic approach, because a likely motivation for the Islamists to engage in official politics was to protect their broader social activities from being outlawed by the regime (Langohr 2001, 594).

MUR interventions were substantial, however, when it came to the articulation of interests that did not collide with regime priorities. In an interview with the party's newspaper, former MUR president Ahmed Raissouni attributed the PJD's electoral success in 2002 to MUR activities and set up

conditions for cabinet participation: He "could not imagine" that the party would join a government that did not unequivocally respect Morocco's Islamic identity. In particular, he advocated that the party should refuse to participate in any government that rejected the establishment of *zakat* (obligatory alms, about 2.5% of a person's wealth) and of interest-free loans (Raissouni 2002b). By publicly linking this reminder (of the PJD's dependence on the MUR) to conditions for the PJD's cabinet participation, Raissouni obviously aimed at delineating ideological boundaries. Thus the party's dependence on MUR support clearly curtailed the margins of ideological compromise and its appetite for office.[5]

INTERACTING WITH THE REGIME: IDENTIFYING THE THRESHOLD OF COMPROMISE

The PJD's interaction with the regime over the last decade reflects a clear preference for compromise over confrontation. Overall, interaction has been characterized by the PJD's high willingness to trade programmatic goals and political strength for long-term inclusion.

Paving the Way for Long-Term Inclusion: Features of a "Constructive" Islamist Party

From the start the PJD's party leaders sought to signal compliance to the regime. An important indicator of this was that the party accepted the principle (set by the regime) of nominating candidates for a limited number of constituencies only ("qualitative" rather than "quantitative" electoral participation, as PJD leaders like to call it). By deliberately limiting their chances to win seats, the PJD signaled clearly that it would not jeopardize the delicate balance of political forces. Initially, this decision resulted from the PJD's limited organizational capacities and the party leadership's attempt to control the party's institutional expansion. However, the most important reason was the fear of being *too* successful in the elections.[6]

Another signal was the party's decision to support the *alternance* government, although it was led by Abderrahmane Youssoufi, the leader of the left-wing Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP). In practical terms the party's critical support meant that it did not receive any portfolio or the right to vote in the governmental council (headed by the prime minister) and the council of ministers (headed by the king). However, it could partake in

the government's consultations, where it voted in favor of most governmental bills. Most notably, the Islamists were supposed to refrain from publicly criticizing the government or mobilizing against it. Notwithstanding the risk of alienating supporters, none of the leaders questioned the appropriateness of this approach. All agreed that it was sensible to display a positive attitude toward the governmental institutions and play a constructive role in the consensual *alternance* at which King Hassan II had aimed.[7]

With the accession of King Mohammed VI to the throne in 1999, an increasing faction within the party felt secure enough to confront the government. Insisting that the PJD's positions had been repeatedly ignored by the government, some party leaders—and especially the intermediate level represented in the National Council—started to mobilize against the strategy of critical support.[8] Two prominent government projects in particular—the reform of the personal status code against which the whole Moroccan Islamist movement had mobilized and a new law on microcredits—aroused the Islamists' discontent. The modernization of the personal status code was portrayed as a threat to the Moroccan Islamic identity and morals, whereas the draft bill on microcredits was seen as yet another indicator of the government's unwillingness to make any concessions to the PJD.[9]

In the seemingly more liberal climate following the death of Hassan II, an increasing faction of the PJD argued that the threshold of compromise should be lowered, and eventually the party's National Council opted for opposition in a close vote. However, two almost equally large factions perceived the situation quite differently. Those in favor of opposing the government feared a loss of support if the PJD remained associated with the policies and output of the *alternance* government. Those in favor of maintaining support for the government feared that going into opposition would increase the party's electoral strength, which they perceived as a danger because they felt that the prevailing "geostrategic conditions where not favorable to an Islamist party becoming the leading political force."[10] However, although the opposition faction had won the vote in the National Council, the subsequent period saw no serious confrontation with the regime. Most important, despite having improved its organizational capacities, the PJD stuck to the limited number of constituencies in the following 2002 elections. Ironically, the PJD's vice general secretary praised these elections as an important step in the Moroccan "democratization process" (*At-Tajdid* 2002, 1 and 3).[11]

MAY 16 AS AN EXTERNAL SHOCK:
THE ANTICIPATORY OBEDIENCE OF AN ISLAMIST PARTY

The PJD's behavior in the aftermath of the Casablanca attacks of May 16, 2003,[12] demonstrated how highly the Islamists valued the benefits of inclusion. The opinion that such benefits outvalued programmatic goals and broader institutional representation were first held by the party leadership, who tightly monitored the strategy in the months after the attacks and subsequently won over the lower echelons of the party hierarchy.

Although the PJD was not openly threatened with reexclusion from the political game, a general climate of anti-Islamism put the party under stress. After May 16, approximately 1,100 terrorist suspects were arrested, and the courts sentenced more than 50 people to lifelong prison terms and another 16 to death. The two national TV stations boycotted the PJD while broadcasting the declarations of solidarity with the families of the victims of all the other Moroccan party leaders and their commitment to the fight against terrorism. The left used the opportunity to launch a harsh campaign against the PJD, holding it morally responsible for the attacks.[13] Some of the demonstrations that the PJD was planning to organize as public statements against terrorism were banned, further contributing to its domestic isolation. Finally, the PJD stepped over formerly established ideological lines by approving the antiterrorist law and the reform of the personal status code.

The PJD's vice secretary general himself declared the approval of the antiterrorist law a "political vote" (*Le Journal Hebdomadaire* 2003). The law defines as a terrorist act any disturbance of the public order; it enables the security forces to hold suspects in custody for twelve days without access to a lawyer and extends the list of crimes punishable by death sentence. Ever since the government had presented the draft bill in February 2003, the PJD had strongly criticized it as an assault on human rights. After May 16, the PJD, needing to show that it stood firmly against terrorism, voted in favor of most articles of the bill and did not propose any amendments.

The amendments to the personal status code proposed by the king in October 2003 came close to the original draft, which the Islamists had then denounced as an attempt by the secularist elites and foreign powers to undermine public morale. Now, both the PJD and the MUR immediately welcomed the law and announced their total support for the accompanying media campaign called for by the king (*At-Tajdid*, October 13, 2003).

In addition to accepting these two key laws, the PJD agreed with the Min-

istry of Interior that it would run in fewer constituencies in the 2003 communal elections. In fact, the percentage of constituencies open to the PJD was reduced to such an extent that the party could have won a maximum of 18 percent of the seats. Furthermore, in big cities the PJD enacted a system of partial coverage, which ensured that it could not even theoretically run for the mayor's office. This triggered small revolts by local party leaders in Tangier and Agadir, but most local leaders understood what was at stake.[14]

Clearly, May 16 came as an external shock to the party. The strategies adopted in this sensitive moment, however, were a logical consequence of previous developments. As one party leader put it: "The principle was [already] there; it was the range of its application that had to change."[15] The acceptance of the leadership's choices by the lower party ranks was demonstrated when the National Council approved new party statutes in 2004 (drafted by the party leadership) that formalized the centralization of power in the hands of the party's General Secretariat. Another case in point was the election of Saadeddine El-Othmani—one of the main architects of the party's post–May 6 strategy—as general secretary in April 2004. The strong support he enjoyed came as a positive surprise to the leadership, who had feared the revenge of the rank and file.[16]

THE PJD BETWEEN INCREASING STRENGTH AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PERILS OF INCLUSION

Although the PJD's direct interaction with the regime clearly reflects the party's weakness vis-à-vis the palace, its organizational development and increasing support show that it has benefited considerably from entering official politics. Investing in organizational development was a deliberate decision by the party leadership. Increased electoral support was primarily attained through a discourse that highlighted proximity to the people and high moral standards; moreover, programmatic fuzziness contributed positively to electoral success. Still, the party's popularity cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, its institutional expansion causes the party leaders some headache. The PJD's shunning from governance at the national level and the wide range of control mechanisms that the leadership installed to keep members of parliament (MPs) on track bear witness to the leadership taking the perils of inclusion seriously.

Increasing Strength

From the start the PJD aimed at developing its organizational capacities and solidifying its structures. Several ancillary organizations were created, such

as an active youth organization, a Commission for Women and the Family, and the Forum du Développement, composed of party members and sympathizers. The party's electoral campaigns have become more sophisticated and coordinated. Furthermore, the PJD has expanded and diversified its sources of income to include membership fees, the reallocation of at least 22 percent of all MPs' and municipal councillors' income to the party, and state subsidies. Its membership has constantly increased over the last decade,[17] although a vanguard concept of membership with high obligations was introduced.[18]

The visible rise of electoral support and its conversion into seats (and in 2003, local offices) add to the increased political strength. The number of PJD MPs grew from 9 (later 14) MPs in 1997 to 42 in 2002 and from 100 municipal councillors in 1997 to 593 in 2003. Although no surveys on who votes for the PJD and why exist, the leadership states that its supporters are composed of three groups. The first group adheres fully to the party's ideology, whereas the second is attracted mainly by the party's fight against corruption and favoritism; the third group comprises protest voters discontented with other parties.[19] If this view holds, then the PJD has successfully diversified its support base, because voters include not only sympathizers of the Islamist movement but also other societal groups that are not necessarily supportive of an Islamist social and political vision in the strict sense of the term.

How did the Islamists gain the support of these different groups? As is the case with most Islamist parties, the PJD's program is fuzzy and still in the making. However, some elements typical of Islamist party programs, such as the promotion of authenticity, morality, interest-free loans, *zakat*, Arabization, and the "liberation of Palestine," have been voiced by PJD members in parliament. Most important, however, the party's increasing support can be attributed to its credible claim of being different from the established political elites.

The poor reputation of political parties and politicians in Morocco results from widespread corruption, the subordination of party goals to personal benefits, and the common transhumance of the MPs (Santucci 2001; Willis 2002). By contrast, the PJD's first parliamentary group (1997–2002) successfully established a reputation as hard-working defenders of the morality of parliamentary life and of the population's interests vis-à-vis a corrupted political elite.[20] Thus, in the words of a PJD MP, the party's "real capital is its sincerity, the integrity of its message and discourse." If the party "lost this virtue, it should be considered a party like the others,"[21] with all the effects on electoral support that this would imply.

Managing the Perils of Inclusion

The party's move into opposition in 2000 and its refusal to join the 2002 cabinet was both motivated by and subsequently amplified the support of the mentioned groups. In the fragmented Moroccan party system, cabinet participation means to cohabitate with at least five other parties. On top of this, the so-called ministers of sovereignty (typically defense, interior, external affairs, religious affairs, and justice) appointed by the king limit party governance to the precarious task of managing social and economic affairs. The loss of popularity that left-wing parties suffered as a result of their responsibility for economic and social policies in the *alternance* government exemplifies these perils. In contrast, an oppositional PJD could not be held accountable for the ongoing socioeconomic grievances of the population.

Remaining in the opposition was thus arguably necessary to maintain electoral support. In addition, the party leaders strongly feared the consequences of the potential "institutional socialization" of their deputies, who had to be kept on track if the party was to protect its political capital. From 1997 to 2002 the parliamentary group was small, and all members—except one—were MUR affiliates, with most of them holding posts in its highest committees. In contrast, out of the forty-two MPs in the 2002–2006 parliamentary group, only twenty-six were clearly affiliated with the MUR and six were members of other Islamist associations. In fact, there has been a strong demand to become a member and especially a candidate for elections.

In some respect, the PJD's success is also its problem. The PJD is now deemed a regular political party that can be used by individuals as a vehicle for achieving office and status. Thus the leadership, obviously concerned about maintaining the party's virtuous image, has designed mechanisms to prevent both the deviation of MPs and the risk of the rank and file perceiving the MPs as benefiting privately from their public office.[22] One major target of the leadership's control strategies are thus the MPs' parliamentary activities. An internal code imposes voting discipline (in the commissions and the General Assembly); it allows the General Secretariat to make binding decisions on the votes of the parliamentary group and to intervene in the appointment of the parliamentary group's key offices. In a more subtle manner control is also exercised through the eleven MPs who are members of the General Secretariat.

A second focus of control is on the MPs' moral appeal. The internal code obliges them to attend all plenary sessions plus those of the parliamentary commissions; moreover, members of the parliamentary group are required to

draft one oral question per week and one written question per month and to propose one bill per legislative year. Finally, the MPs' obligation to return a share of their remuneration to the party helps to create an image of "nonprofit MPs" while boosting the party's finances. In 2003 the leadership set up similar rules for the municipal councillors, who are certainly less in the spotlight than the MPs but still important to a party that capitalizes as much on morality as the PJD does. One municipal councillor observed that the PJD "was like a white leaf, thus a black stain would be seen immediately."[23] Until now, the PJD has managed remarkably well to reconcile its position as an institutional insider with an antiestablishment aura: Both the internal and the public image of the PJD's MPs are almost spotless.

Deviations

Governmental responsibility is probably the PJD's greatest future challenge and the most likely to prompt conflicts. After the 2003 communal elections the party leadership decided to enter into local governance as much as possible, again a post–May 16 political decision intended to prove that the PJD was not by definition a party of refusal. It also wanted to demonstrate that its presence in the city halls would not scare off investors and tourists.[24] Having opted for participation in (local) government, the party then had to show that it could contribute to a good management of the cities and achieve some tangible improvements.

The case of PJD member Mohamed El-Madani, vice-mayor of Rabat at the time of this writing, illustrates the friction between efficiency and ideological purity. El-Madani is a technocrat in the party's Forum du Développement who was parachuted by the leadership into the second rank of an electoral list in 2003. One of the biggest projects he initiated after taking office was a social housing scheme financed through loans with an interest rate of 7 percent. Acknowledging contradictions with the Islamist struggle against usury, he argued that "having one's principles was not sufficient to establish a budget. The citizens judge your efficacy."[25] The down-to-earth approach of such technocrats has strong potential to work in the party's favor, because it positively affects the way in which both the electorate and the political establishment perceive the PJD. Pragmatists, however, are unpopular among the party base, and it remains to be seen if and how this dilemma can be resolved.

Furthermore, the MPs' socialization within the political system led to the first signs of deviation from the party's principles. Less than two years after the

new parliamentary group took office, the MPs' willingness to comply with the party's explicit rules was decreasing, particularly in two areas. First, there was an apparent reluctance to carry out the high level of active work demanded from the MPs. Although most oral questions in parliament are asked by PJD MPs, the MPs' determination to draft bills or hand in written questions was much lower.[26] Second, MPs are obviously reluctant to reallocate the required 22 percent of their salary back to the party. By the end of 2003 about twenty MPs had payment arrears.[27]

Moreover, there is a "gray zone" where there is a slow but considerable convergence between the behavior of PJD MPs and that of the established political elite. Apart from the fight against clientelism and favoritism, proximity to the ordinary people is one of the PJD's key promises. MPs thus have to take the contact with the voters seriously and are constantly confronted with requests, such as promoting someone's career, organizing legal recognition or financing for organizations, accelerating administrative processes, or intervening in lawsuits. Only the last type of demand is explicitly rejected by the members of the General Secretariat. In the other cases the MPs seem to be trapped by their promise of proximity and the logic of the system. Ultimately, this means that MPs are increasingly using their privileged position to distribute favors. Hence, although in the first two legislative periods their accessibility surely increased their electoral appeal, in the long run this may as well reproduce exactly the type of system-endemic favoritism the party claims to be fighting.

ISLAMIST INCLUSION AND REGIME STABILITY: LESSONS FROM MOROCCO

What do the Islamists' responses to the dilemma of political inclusion tell us about the stability of monarchical rule in Morocco? Seen from the perspective of interaction with the palace, the regime's preferences clearly dominate. The palace has managed to include one current of the Islamist opposition into formal politics without being confronted by this new actor from within. Conveniently, this move also improved the regime's scores for "free and fair" elections. The underlying motive of the Islamists' behavior has been to avoid any repressive backlash; whenever promotion of social or political change conflicted with the desire to avoid repression, programmatic issues were dropped and anxiety for the party's legal status always gained the upper hand. The literature on Western social movements and political parties tends

to look at the adaptation of newly included actors or at the dismissal of party goals in favor of organizational survival as a process occurring *against* the intentions of collective actors (Offe 1990; Panebianco 1988). In the Moroccan setting, however, this is a deliberate strategy. Because compliance with the regime's rules is a prerequisite for inclusion, it is not surprising that the PJD initially chose a cautious strategy. The fact that it has maintained this strategy ever since, culminating in an attitude of anticipatory obedience after May 16, shows that the PJD considers the palace to stand on firm grounds, which in turn is a strong indicator of the stability of authoritarian rule in Morocco.

Yet the Islamists' abidance by the rules of the palace has not diminished their public appeal. On the contrary, they have been able to broaden electoral support well beyond their core followers. The reproduction of a historical model of a party's control over its parliamentary representatives to forestall corruption has so far worked effectively. Despite the party members' decreasing affiliation with the MUR, the PJD is still perceived as the clean party living up to its moral message.

Ironically, the restrictive quota imposed on PJD candidates by the palace contributes to maintaining the Islamists' appeal. First, it helps to sustain the image of the PJD as an oppressed group. Second, the party has managed to avoid an alienation of both its Islamist core voters and its protest voters, whom it might lose if it assumed responsibility in national governance. Thus the qualitative approach to elections suited both the party and the palace.

Currently, no relevant opposition group vigorously pushes for substantial constitutional reforms in Morocco. The Islamists abstain from such claims because they fear that this could trigger repression when the party is developing its organizational capacities and political influence. That the traditional secular opposition has dropped former claims for further constitutional reform can at least be attributed in part to the PJD's presence in the electoral game. Were elections democratic, the PJD's political influence would today outweigh theirs. Thus the other opposition parties prefer a strong monarch to protect *their* interests. In this respect the inclusion of the Islamists appears like a remake of the encouragement of Islamist activities in universities in the 1970s to counterbalance the left. The result of the new institutional version is that both Islamists and secularists focus on the respective other in their political struggle, that is, the political competitor on the same level. This leaves the center of political power uncontested and even regarded as a necessary guarantor of political stability.

The Moroccan case, therefore, shows that the inclusion of the Islamist opposition can benefit both the regime and the Islamists, at least for a certain period of time. The smoothness of the Moroccan inclusivist experience, however, is also related to case-specific factors, such as the design of the polity's institutional arrangements and a multiparty system that precedes the inclusion of the Islamists. In general, the case of the PJD shows how highly Islamists esteem the benefits of inclusion and how legality and less repression are strong incentives to seek compromise and become more pragmatic—an argument known from the literature on the institutional integration of nineteenth-century labor movements (Goldstein 1983, 340–342). For Latin America, Mainwaring (2003, 8–12) has argued that the central objective of legal parties in authoritarian regimes is the prevention of reexclusion and repressive backlashes, which outweighs the active pursuit of programmatic goals. It is thus not unlikely that Islamists in other states would accept limitations in the Moroccan sense in exchange for decreasing repression. Such a scenario is even more plausible given that Islamists have for several decades been the prime victims of human rights violations (Fuller 1997, 151), a situation that has probably deteriorated since the beginning of the war on terror.[28]

Yet the long-term contributions for regime maintenance depend not only on active compliance with the rules set by the regimes but also ultimately on whether included Islamists are successfully co-opted. Inclusion may facilitate the control over the Islamists, enhance domestic legitimacy, and enable regimes to look better in Freedom House ratings. The Moroccan case suggests that such a situation can be sustained over a substantial period of time. A genuine long-term contribution to authoritarian resilience, however, depends much on whether inclusion also harms the Islamists' credibility by converging too much with the norms of the institutional environment or by bearing some responsibility for policies.