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Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes

The Party of Justice and Development in Morocco

Eva Wegner

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For Miquel

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Abbreviations

AL	Alliance of Liberties (Alliance des libertés)
CAM	Committee for Action in Morocco (Comité d'action marocaine)
CNI	National Congress Party (Congrès national ittihadi)
FC	Civic Forces (Forces citoyennes)
FD	Forum of Development (Forum du développement, of PJD)
FDIC	Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions (Front pour la défense des institutions constitutionnelles)
FFD	Front of Democratic Forces (Front des forces démocratiques)
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front (Front islamique du salut, al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li-l-Inqadh [Algeria])
IAF	Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami [Jordan])
ISM	OIslamist social movement organization
MDS	Democratic and Social Movement (Mouvement démocratique et social)
MENA	Middle East(ern) and North Africa(n)
MNDS	National Democratic and Social Movement (Mouvement national démocratique et social)
MNP	National Popular Movement (Mouvement national populaire)
MP	member of Parliament
MPCD	Popular Constitutional Democratic Movement (Mouvement populaire constitutionnel démocratique)
MUR	Movement of Unity and Reform (Harakat al-Tawhid wa al-Islah)
OADP	Organization of Action for Democracy and the People (Organisation de l'action pour la démocratie et du peuple)

PA	Action Party (Parti de l'action)
PADS	Party of the Democratic Socialist Vanguard (Parti de l'avant-garde démocratique socialiste)
PCM	Moroccan Communist Party (Parti Communiste marocain)
PDI	Democratic Party for Independence (Parti démocratique pour l'indépendance)
PED	Party of Environment and Development (Parti de l'environnement et du développement)
P(G)SU	United (Left) Socialist Party (Parti [gauche] socialiste unifié)
PJD	Party of Justice and Development (Parti de la justice et du développement)
PLS	Party for the Socialist Liberation (Parti de la libération socialiste)
PML	Liberal Moroccan Party (Parti marocain libéral)
PND	National-Democrat Party (Parti national-démocrate)
PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du progrès et du socialisme)
PRD	Party of Reform and Development (Parti de la réforme et du développement)
PRE	Party of Renewal and Equality (Parti du renouveau et de l'equité)
PSD	Social Democrat Party (Parti social et démocratique)
PT	Labour Party (Parti travailliste)
RNI	National Rally of Independents (Rassemblement national des indépendants)
SA	Pstructural adjustment program
UC	Constitutional Union (Union constitutionnelle)
UD	Democratic Union (Union démocratique)
UMD	Moroccan Union for Democracy (Union marocaine pour la démocratie)
UNFP	National Union of Popular Forces (Union nationale des forces populaires)
USFP	Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union socialiste des forces populaires)

Preface

THIS STUDY BEGAN as a comparative project about the institutional integration of two social movements, the Islamist one in Morocco and the environmentalist one in Germany. In the back of my mind, I had the idea that ideology—religious or environmentalist—ultimately should not matter that much when a social movement organization enters into formal politics. After quite some work in this direction, I had to drop the comparison. It was not because the two movements' extreme ideological divergence made them an unfruitful comparison. To the contrary, the Moroccan Islamists and the German environmentalists shared many features in their integration process, such as the broadening of support through a pragmatist approach and the betrayal of movement principles.

What turned out to be incomparable were not characteristics of the movement organizations or parties, but characteristics of the political environment: democracy in Germany, autocracy in Morocco. As I went on with my field research, it became clear that a large share of Islamist party decisions in Morocco were driven by the latter authoritarian political environment. Accepting or rejecting a law: What's the king's position? Choosing the number of electoral districts to cover: Will the political elites feel threatened? Designing the relationship between party and movement organization: What's the best way of decreasing our vulnerability to repression? And so on. In short, only below a certain threshold did the Islamists feel free to choose their mobilization strategy. Perhaps the leaders of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development was an overcautious one, yet what matters is the fact that they had to consider an actor that is simply not there in a democracy, a veto player that can outlaw them if they cross a "red line" whose coordinates are not even fully known to opposition groups. It is for this reason that this study is not a comparison of environmentalist and Islamist

groups going into politics, but a study about the dilemmas that opposition parties must deal with in authoritarian regimes.

I wrote this book in various places where I received both institutional and personal support. I thank my supervisor, Stefano Bartolini, at the European University Institute in Florence. I also thank Michael Willis at Oxford University, who generously shared his knowledge of the Party of Justice and Development and helped me to establish my first contacts with the party. I am grateful to Muriel Asseburg at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, where I did my research on Jordan, for her support and her critical readings of my papers. I wrote most of the book at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University, where Ellen Lust encouraged me throughout my research, and I made the last corrections at the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit at the University of Cape Town. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the German Academic Exchange Council, the Thyssen Foundation, and the European University Institute. At Syracuse University Press, Glenn Wright and Annelise Finnegan generously extended their support. Annie Barva copyedited the manuscript.

I thank participants for their comments at the following workshops and panels where I presented my research at various stages: "Dynamics of Stability: Middle Eastern Political Regimes Between Functional Adaptation and Authoritarian Resilience," at the Fifth Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence, Italy, March 24–28, 2004; "Post–Cold War Democratization in the Muslim World: Domestic, Regional, and Global Trends," at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Granada, Spain, April 14–19, 2005; "Political Opposition in the Middle East: Between Confrontation and Cooperation," at the World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies, Amman, Jordan, June 11–16, 2006; "Europe's Legacy: From Colonialism to Democracy Promotion," Odense, Denmark, April 20–22, 2007; "Emerging Actors and Changing Societies in Southern Mediterranean Area," EuroMeSCo seminar, Torino, Italy, September 21–22, 2007; "The Challenge of Islamists for EU and US Policies: Conflict, Stability, and Reform," a Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik–United States Institute of Peace Workshop, Berlin, September 27–28, 2007; "Spaces for Change? Decentralization, Participation, and Local Governance in MENA," at the Tenth Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence, Italy, March 25–28, 2009.

I thank collectively all the people who have helped me do field research in Morocco and Jordan—from those who provided me with the first telephone numbers I needed to those who made my life there much nicer. I also thank all my interviewees—Islamists and non-Islamists. They may not always agree with my interpretation, but I hope they feel that their answers to my questions have been correctly reproduced.

Many thanks go also to my parents. Even if they were sometimes not really happy with the places I was going to, they never stopped encouraging and helping me. And, as is convention, the person one owes the most to goes last: Miquel, to whom I dedicate this book, has supported me (in both the English and the French meanings of the term) from almost the beginning and surely until the end over many periods of doubt and confusion. If today I am writing a preface to a book, it is thanks to him.

Introduction

The Framework of the Study

THE ISLAMIST PARTY OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT (PJD, Parti de la justice et du développement) was the projected winner of the Moroccan parliamentary elections in 2007. In the months before the elections, the Islamists were highly scrutinized. Whereas some feared the policies of an Islamist government—the Spanish newspaper *El País,* for example, put photographs of fully veiled women next to an article on the forthcoming elections—others reassuringly reported on how "moderate" the PJD was.

The PJD did not win the elections; it actually lost votes compared to its results in 2002. Two months later I was in Rabat, talking to PJD leaders about the electoral results. What had gone wrong? The outcome was first unsurprisingly blamed on electoral fraud. The king ultimately had not wanted an Islamist prime minister, and other parties had been buying votes. When I pushed them a bit more, they admitted that other factors were involved. The PJD had not mobilized the street for its positions—for example, against an unpopular increase of the value-added tax—for fear of provoking the regime. Moreover, the party had lost the support of its Islamist founding organization, which in previous elections had campaigned vigorously for it. There had also been some discontent among party members about the procedures to nominate the candidates for the elections.

These events provide a good illustration of this study's perspective. In the end, the relevant questions to ask regarding the 2007 legislative elections were not which policies a PJD-led government would pursue, but which strategies the party had pursued in the years before the elections and why. The episode also points at some important factors to consider in the analysis: the interactions with

the authoritarian regime, the relation with the Islamist social movement, and the evolution of the PJD's organization.

What electoral mobilization choices do Islamist opposition parties make? How do they relate to authoritarian incumbents? Which key factors influence these parties' choices and thus their evolution? This book seeks to contribute to answering these questions by studying the Moroccan PJD. The case study covers the period from 1992 to 2007. The book traces and explains the PJD's choices through an analysis of organizational, ideological, and institutional constraints. It adopts a simple but novel perspective on Islamist parties as opposition in electoral authoritarian regimes, whose main difference with other oppositional actors in such regimes is their origin from and linkage to a powerful social movement. The study is based on field research in Morocco in 2003–2004 and 2007, and it uses both qualitative and quantitative data.

A typical and legitimate critique of scholarship on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is that it is atheoretical and cut off from major trends of political science research (see Anderson 1999, 2006). This study attempts to avoid this problem by placing the Moroccan case in an explicit heuristic model based on a broader literature on opposition, electoral authoritarian regimes, political parties, and social movements. Moreover—beyond the interpretation of the Moroccan case—I also hope to contribute to our knowledge about other Islamist parties and more generally about opposition strategies in authoritarian regimes.[1] The last chapter thus compares key choices made by the PJD with those made by another Islamist party, the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF, Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami) in the framework of the heuristic model.

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY, ISLAMISTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

How scholars and the media framed the PJD's potential victory in the 2007 elections reflected the focus of almost two decades of research and debates around

1. See McKeown 2004, Platt 1999, Snow and Trom 2002, and Stake 2000 for recent discussions of case studies and theory building. In general, recent discussions of case-study research have a more process-oriented and realistic view of research than earlier ones, emphasizing the constant interactions between foreknowledge, empirical findings, and theory building.

Islamist electoral participation: What exactly is the ideology of Islamist political parties? Is it compatible with democracy? Can Islamists moderate, and if so, which factors are conducive to their doing so? The origin of these questions lies in the electoral landslide of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li-l-Inqadh or Front islamique du salut) and the subsequent military coup in 1992 and civil war. Ever since then, there has been an extended and heated scholarly discussion about Islamist groups' participation in elections. The Algerian instance was not the first case of Islamist electoral participation in the Arab world, but the degree of political liberalization was much higher in Algeria than it had been, for instance, in Egypt, where members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) had contested the 1984 and 1987 parliamentary elections. Constitutional reforms in Algeria provided the basis for the formation of a democratically elected government. The FIS had already secured an absolute majority of seats (182 out of 323) in the first round of the elections.[2] The Islamists would thus have had a crucial role in designing the future shape of policies and political institutions in Algeria. In this context, the FIS's religious references and the antidemocratic statements made by some of its leaders culminated in the question of whether Islam and democracy or Islamist parties and democratization could be compatible. After the elections had been canceled, the FIS banned, its leadership jailed, and Islamist groups started to commit atrocities against civilians, the question about the Islamists' real agenda was answered for many.[3]

The focus on the compatibility between Islamist opposition groups and democratization was reinforced by a strong pressure on many MENA regimes to open up the political sphere and by many Islamist organizations' quest to get legalized and to participate in elections. Since the early 1980s, social, economic, and legitimacy crises had gained in scope. Social pressure was strongly expressed through bread riots in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Jordan

2. This landslide was due in part to the ruling elites' miscalculation regarding support for the ruling party. The electoral law, favoring enormously the biggest party (single-member districts with runoff) was designed on the assumption that it would ensure the dominance of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN, Front de libération nationale) (Lust and Jamal 2002, 359–60).

3. For different perspectives on the Algerian case, see Hafez 2004, Heristchi 2004, Kalyvas 2000, Maghraoui 1992, Schemm 1995, and Takeyh 2003.

(cf. Sadiki 2000, 80). External constraints—economic but also to some extent political (regarding good governance)—intensified these domestic problems. Because other major opposition groups with a large support base were absent, Islamist social movement organizations (ISMOs) became the principal transporters of organized extrainstitutional protest and the major challengers to the ruling elites.

Pressures to implement changes were especially acute for the rulers of resource-scarce MENA states. Many of them resorted to standard political liberalization measures: an increase in press freedom and civil rights, the liberation of political prisoners, constitutional reforms, the holding of elections, the (re)animation of Parliament, and the inclusion of formerly excluded actors in state political institutions. During this period, Islamist movements increasingly claimed legal recognition as political parties and participation in the political process. From the rulers' side, formal or informal inclusion became a more prominent way of relating to their most vital opposition during the 1980s and 1990s. It was clear that relatively free elections were likely to channel a large share of votes to the Islamists in most states. The debates on Islamist actors' potential to be integrated in a democratic game—and to respect the rules of this game in the long run—thus went far beyond the Algerian case.

There is fierce disagreement about the existence of such potential.[4] The contributions to this debate are essentially situated between two poles. On one side, the argument is that the Islamists' demands for inclusion and their appraisal of pluralism, democracy, and human rights are merely the latest strategy of an antidemocratic movement that will eventually not respect the cornerstones of the democratic process that brought them to power. Islamist electoral participation would therefore be an experience of "one man, one vote, once." A statement made by the Egyptian secularist Farag Foda illustrates this view: "I don't care whether they put me on a camel [i.e., contesting elections] or in an airplane [i.e., Islamic revolution]. At the end of the trip is always the Islamic dictatorship" (quoted in

4. This literature is very vast. For an illustration of the debate, see, for instance, Ahmad and Zartman 1997; Kramer 1997; Pelletreau, Pipes, and Esposito 1994. Individual contributions include Denoeux 2002; Esposito 1997; Esposito and Voll 1996; Ghadbian 1997; Karam 1997; Kramer 1993; Krämer 1993, 1995, 1999; and Miller 1993.

Hesse 1998, 170).[5] Islamists may pursue different strategies at a different pace, but they all ultimately serve the same goal. On the other side of the debate, scholars argue that many Islamist movements have evolved toward an acceptance of pluralism (Wickham 2004), that electoral participation can bring about a "habituation process of democracy" (Ahmad and Zartman 1997, 72), and that the Islamic concept of *shura* (consultation) is similar to democracy. This second position is often combined with the view that risk-free democracy does not exist (e.g., Esposito 1994, 22–24).

Regardless of the sympathy one may have for either of the two appraisals, a serious problem of this literature is the question in itself. With the exception of Turkey, the political environment of Islamist political parties in the MENA is not democracy but autocracy. Political liberalization and Islamist inclusion, where it occurred, in the 1980s and 1990s were attempts to secure the political and economic elites' power base under conditions where regimes were unable to afford the costs of a dominantly repressive strategy. The aim was to enhance the authoritarian regimes' capacity to contain and moderate dissent. As Lisa Anderson has argued, "In none of the cases of political liberalization did regimes intend to actually confront competitors for power: In both intent and content, these reforms where designed not to inaugurate a system of uncertain outcomes—democracy—but to solidify the base of the elite in power, making possible increased domestic extraction" (1997, 20). A more "democratic" image deriving from decreasing repression helped to enhance not only domestic but also international legitimacy, the latter being important for regimes that depend to some extent on foreign aid and investment.[6] In short, the political liberalization measures of the late 1980s and early 1990s did not lead to democratization, but to the persistence of authoritarian rule in MENA states (see, among many other sources, Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Anderson 2006; Bellin 2004; Penner-Angrist and Pripstein-Posusney 2005; Schlumberger 2007).

5. Translations of non-English material are my own throughout the book unless otherwise indicated.

6. Alain Roussillon suggests that regimes may actually consider Islamic movements' participant strategies as more threatening than radical strategies because overt repression is then more difficult to legitimate (2001, 107).

In the absence of democratic political structures or democratization, the debate about the Islamists' potential to accommodate to democracy remained largely theoretical. Unsurprisingly, the examples referred to in the debates do not come from Middle Eastern states: advocates of Islamist exclusion point at the experience of the German National Socialist Workers Party, arguing—somewhat simplistically—that it came to power via the electoral route. The proponents of political inclusion point to the experience of French and Italian Communist parties after World War II, which—in spite of advocating class revolution—proved to be responsible electoral competitors (Anderson 1997, 18).

Middle Eastern sources of evidence in the debate have essentially consisted of Islamist discourses or the religious sources of their ideology.[7] Beyond the mere polemic, these types of sources have produced very interesting accounts of the Islamists' contemporary discourse and basic references. Here, however, lies the second flaw of this literature. Discourse analysis or Qur'an exegeses cannot illuminate whether Islamists may be democrats or not. Ideas and action are two different entities, and one can sensibly assume that actors face considerable problems if they are to transform ideology into practice within institutional constraints. As Angelo Panebianco argues, the presumption of a causal link between official party goals (ideology) and party behavior leads to a dead end in research: "If we consider it sufficient to rely upon the definitions that actors or institutions proffer of their own goals, we will never be able to go beyond simple descriptions of their ideological self-representations" (1988, 4–5).[8]

Indeed, the literature's more recent turn to empirical studies of Islamist electoral participation departs from an exclusive focus on discourse and offers relevant insights on the evolution of Islamist movements and parties after being included. An important strand of this scholarship focuses on a particular aspect of Islamist (party) evolution and party choices: the relationship of inclusion and moderation, the latter typically defined as becoming "truly committed to

7. As François Burgat and William Dowell ([1993] 1997, 6) and John Esposito (1990, 9) point out, an additional source of evidence has been the "expertise" of secular-oriented Muslim scholars and the "secular" power holders without much regard to their political interests.

8. Joachim Raschke argues that even the goals of totalitarian ideologies can change according to the circumstances. Moreover, the coherence between ideology and goals is variable and depends, among other factors, on which groups are targeted for mobilization (1987, 166–69).

democratic and pluralist practices" (Schwedler 2006, 149).[9] In a study of Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen, Jillian Schwedler (2006) asks how Islamists are ideologically affected by participation in pluralistic processes and what prompts ideational change. Janine Clark looks at the rationale behind the Jordanian IAF's cooperation with ideologically opposed parties to explain the link between "cooperation, moderation and democratization" (2004a, 7; see also Clark 2006). Such studies bring in new variables that affect Islamist goals, such as institutional constraints and opportunities as well as organizational features.

Nevertheless, to the extent that scholars aim to detect ideational change in discourses and writings, the point remains that ideas and action are separate entities and that a change in ideas does not necessarily imply that future action will concur and vice versa. The point also remains that democracy or democratization are not features of most Islamist parties' environments. Although the political environment is more readily considered in more recent scholarship, the focus is strongly on the new characteristics of that environment brought about by political liberalization. The emphasis is on the effects of increasing pluralism, political organization, and parliamentary representation for opposition parties. Many scholars do acknowledge the function and intent of political liberalization as means of authoritarian regime stability, but they tend to neglect the extent to which authoritarianism and repression may affect Islamist choices.[10] In his study of the Jordanian case, Glenn Robinson, for instance, concludes that his findings go against "the usual arguments about Islamist movements being the greatest threat against democratic transitions in the Middle East" because "Islamists have proved themselves to be capable democrats, obeying the rules of

9. Not fully explicitly but unmistakably, many studies assume that Islamist moderation will make democratization in the MENA more likely (for an illustration, see Clark 2006; Schwedler 2006, chap. 1, and 2007). However, as Nancy Bermeo (1997) has shown, even during an actually occurring transition process, moderation is not a necessary condition for the success of a democratic transition.

10. Repression is likely to affect, among other things, the cost and benefits of allying with ideologically opposed parties, an indicator often used for Islamist moderation. Clark (2004a, 2006) and Schwedler (2007) use this indicator. Carry Wickham (2004) also uses Islamists' attitude toward other actors as an indicator of their moderation but differs in her explicit consideration of the impact of repression on moderation.

the political game" (1997, 386–87). These rules, however, are made by the palace in Jordan.

The predominant research focus on the Islamists' potential to adapt to a democratic system—in practice or by a change in their beliefs—is too narrow. It leaves out a whole set of choices, evolutions, and questions relevant to the study of opposition parties in authoritarian regimes. The overview of the largely differing experiences of Islamist electoral participation in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan in table 1 hints at alternative questions, some of which this book seeks to address: Why have Islamist groups increased their electoral scores in some cases, either slowly or quickly, but others have seen unchanging or even decreased scores? In other words, why has the electoral mobilization of Islamist parties been more successful in some countries than in others? Is it because there

TABLE 1
ISLAMISTS' ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN EGYPT, JORDAN, MOROCCO, AND ALGERIA

	Egypt	*Jordan*	*Morocco*	*Algeria*
No. of national elections with Islamists' participation	5	4	3	4
Percentage of seats, including "Independents"	1984: ~1.8[a] 1987: ~8.0[b] 1995: 0.2 2002: 3.8 2005: 19.5	1989: 32.5 1993: 22.5 2003: 15.4 2007: 5.5	1997: 4.3 2002: 12.9 2007: 14.2	1991: cancelled 1997: 27.0 2002: 21.0 2007: 15.6
Interruption in participation	Yes: Boycott, 1990 Repression, 1995	Yes: Boycott, 1997	No	Yes: Party Ban, 1992

[a] Sana Abed-Kotob (1995, 328) and Najib Ghadbian (1997, 104) attribute eight seats to the Muslim Brotherhood but disagree on the total amount of seats in the assembly (360 and 448, respectively). According to Gehad Auda (1994), the alliance of which the Muslim Brotherhood was part (the Wafd) won 58 seats in 1984, out of which 12 went to the brotherhood.

[b] According to Abed-Kotob (1995, 328), the Muslim Brotherhood won 36 seats; according to Ghadbian (1997, 91), 37; according to Laura Guazzone (1995, 17), 38.

Sources: Abed-Kotob 1995; Clark 2004a; Ghadbian 1997; Guazzone 1995; Hamladji 2002; Mufti 1999; Ryan and Schwedler 2004; and http://www.electionworld.com.

is less electoral fraud or because the Islamists have more fully broadened their support in these countries?

Why have Islamists boycotted elections in some countries but participated in all the elections they were allowed to in other countries? In other words, why have Islamist parties in some cases considered electoral participation too costly or believed that boycotts would benefit their cause more? In sum, a study about Islamist electoral participation should start with an appreciation of the associated costs and benefits of such participation and the different actors' agendas.

DILEMMAS FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Most political systems in the MENA are "hybrid" or "electoral authoritarian" regimes. They combine democratic and authoritarian elements and so are deliberately "pseudo-democratic" (Diamond 2002, 23–24),[11] hoping to capitalize on electoral legitimacy while remaining in power. In these regimes, opposition parties are supposed to lose elections (Schedler 2006, 14), and they do. Thus, the environment in which Islamists are contesting elections features not only the electoral and parliamentary arenas, but, very important, the "veto player" who shapes the rules of the game, can resort to pre-electoral, electoral, and post-electoral fraud and has the power to reexclude opposition parties (Mainwaring 2003, 8–12). Indeed, "limited inclusion" allows for Islamist participation in elections, but it does so under conditions designed to ensure that such groups are prevented from achieving dominance (Hudson 1994, 6). When Islamist parties have won too many seats in elections or opposed regime preferences too strongly, MENA regimes have aborted inclusion (for instance, Tunisia and Algeria in the early 1990s) or adopted new electoral laws designed to decrease Islamist electoral scores (for instance, Jordan and Morocco) or generally increased repression toward Islamists groups during and outside election times (for instance, Egypt and Jordan).

Electoral authoritarian regimes are typically further divided into two subcategories: competitive authoritarianism and hegemonic electoral authoritarianism.

11. The latter category is not new, but the historical hybrids limited franchise.

The distinction between these two regime types is to the present not fully developed.[12] From opposition parties' point of view, the main differences appear to be the degree of repression—competitive regimes are supposedly closer to a score of 4.0, and hegemonic regimes closer to a score of 6.0 on the Freedom House scale (Diamond 2002)—and the degree of competitiveness in elections—in hegemonic regimes, ruling parties "win" almost all the seats, whereas in competitive ones they merely win. MENA countries are most often found in the hegemonic category (Diamond 2002, 31).[13]

To the present, the main focus of research on electoral authoritarianism is the competitive cases. However, opposition parties' key dilemma, as laid out by this strand of research, holds also for electoral participation in hegemonic regimes—if not more so. As Andreas Schedler points out, in electoral authoritarian regimes "electoral contests are profoundly ambiguous for opposition parties" (2006, 14). "If they enter the game they legitimate it. If they stay outside, they miss an opportunity for accumulating strength and opening up spaces of liberty and plurality" (2002, 114). In the next few sections, I elaborate on this dilemma for the case of (Islamist) opposition parties in hegemonic regimes.

Costs and Benefits of Electoral Participation in Authoritarian Regimes

Opposition parties need to take into consideration at least four costs of participation in official politics. The first is the previously mentioned legitimization of the current regime. The second is the potentially demoralizing and demobilizing effect of participation in elections that cannot be won. As noted, electoral institutions are shaped to the heavy advantage of the incumbents. Electoral results thus naturally demonstrate the ruling parties' "strength" and the opposition's

12. The emphasis is rather on delimiting the borders between competitive electoral authoritarianism and electoral democracy (see the contributions in the special issue *Elections Without Democracy* of the *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (April 2002).

13. In 2002, only Lebanon, Yemen, and Iran were competitive authoritarian regimes. Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt were classified as hegemonic regimes. The remaining Middle Eastern regimes (Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) were closed autocracies.

"weakness" (Schedler 2006, 14). The third cost, more an issue in hegemonic regimes that are more repressive than in competitive regimes, is that by enrolling in a formal organization, members of formerly illegal groups make themselves known to the authorities, a high risk if a new wave of repression were to come. Formal organizations (and their memberships) are easier for the state to monitor than underground ones or nonformal collective action (see the discussion on this point in Piven and Cloward 1992, 319–20). Finally, compliance with the regime may be necessary to prevent repression and reexclusion, but it may also fundamentally alienate supporters. As Charles Tilly puts it, "There lies the eternal dilemma of the militant group which finds a protective cleft in the legal system: solidarity resistance with a chance of destruction, or adaptation with a chance of absorption or dissolution" (1978, 168)On the positive side, participation in elections and legal politics also has benefits for opposition groups. First of all, contesting elections forces a regime into fraud and thus exposes the fact that the regime's "grip to power is based on manipulation rather than [on] popular consent" (Schedler 2006, 14). Second, the resource-mobilization paradigm in social movement research stresses that legality, formal organization, and "legitimate" institutional activity lower a group's costs of mobilization and collective action (Scott 1990, 129; Tilly 1978, 167). It has been shown that the gap between active involvement and only ideological support of social movements may reach about 70 percent (Kriesi 1992b, 26). In authoritarian regimes, this gap is most likely even larger given the higher risks of active participation. As a consequence, important benefits for social movement organizations that become political parties are that ideological support can be transformed into votes and that sympathizers might be generally more willing to become activists under more secure conditions. In the case of Islamist groups, gaining legality may moreover be an incentive in itself for already involved activists. The legal status of political parties is a potential shelter from repression for illegal Islamist groups, such as Morocco's Justice and Charity (al-'Adl wa al-Ihsan) or Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR, Harakat al-Tawhid wa al-Islah) or Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood.[14] Scholars have indeed stressed Islamists' long exposure to state

14. A notable exception is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which was legal decades before political parties were (re)legalized in Jordan and was the organization that founded the IAF.

repression in the forms of jail, torture, execution, and forced exile as a motivation for their electoral participation (Fuller 1997, 151; Ghadbian 1997, 74–75). Finally, electoral participation provides access to new resources and potentially a more direct influence on policy. The adoption of "institutional modes of politics" enables social movement parties to benefit from, among other things, the special status of political parties (for example with respect to financing) or from party competition, which might force other competitors to redesign their products (Offe 1990). Even if the potential gains in the parliamentary arena are smaller or different in authoritarian regimes, parliamentary institutions, regardless of type, are not meaningless. Parliamentary representation in authoritarian regimes offers some direct or indirect impact on policies, the possibility to promulgate one's message inside Parliament and through the media, and benefits related to larger distribution of one's clientele and, of course, to office. That Islamists think in these terms is shown, for instance, by members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood who have emphasized as a key motivation for electoral participation that it would enable them to reach out to the masses and gain their support (Abed-Kotob 1995, 331).

Opposition Strategies for Winning Elections

Once opposition groups have taken the fundamental decision to participate in elections and are authorized to do so, they have to choose an approach for winning elections. Most important, they have to consider two things when making their choices: first, how their actions affect the regimes and, second, how their actions affect their support base. Elections in electoral authoritarian regimes have been characterized as "nested games" (Schedler 2002) in which opposition parties have to play a "dual game" (Mainwaring 2003). As both Andreas Schedler and Scott Mainwaring point out, the electoral level and the regime level are strongly intertwined, and the gains that opposition parties seek at either of these levels influence and are influenced by the strategic choices at the other level. Generally speaking, opposition parties in electoral authoritarian systems have to gain strong electoral support to promote institutional reforms, but they also have to force reforms on the regime level to make elections meaningful. Thus, opposition parties have to choose how to deal with each of the two levels and how much resources and emphasis to devote to either of the two—an assessment that

may evolve over time as the gains and costs associated with different strategies become apparent.

Unless opposition parties are pure antiregime actors—in which case Islamist organizations would not be tolerated in elections—or become pure "patronage-seekers" (Eisenstadt 2004, 8) content with their niche in a clientelistic system—in which case they cease to be opposition parties—they will be constantly involved in both the electoral game and the regime game. However, for analytical purposes we can distinguish two stylized responses by included parties to the participation dilemma. First, parties may privilege the regime game, exerting a strong and persistent pressure on the rules of the game instead of "wasting" resources and risking credibility among their core constituency by taking elections too seriously. The aims are to increase the pressure for political reforms that make the rules more favorable to the opposition as a whole and to remain a distinctive and credible opposition. Typical features of such a strategy are critiques of biased electoral laws, of electoral manipulation more generally, and of restrictions on political mobilization as well as electoral boycotts intended to deny the regime the legitimacy of the opposition parties' participation. Scholars of electoral authoritarian regimes have argued that such protests and boycotts are opposition parties' strongest weapons (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002). Indeed, the electoral boycotts by the Jordanian IAF in 1997 and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 1990 demonstrate that there is a limit to what regimes can impose as acceptable conditions of participation, a point at which a majority of Islamist leaders consider the benefits related to electoral participation to insufficiently balance the costs.

The shortcomings of this strategy, though, are at least twofold: a too critical stance toward a regime may trigger repression and perhaps even reexclusion; also, an audience—domestic or international—receptive to these critiques is not always present, and regimes often successfully discredit opposition critiques or boycotts. As Schedler notes, incumbents "routinely discredit criticism of prevailing conditions of electoral competition by alleging that opposition parties boycott or protest elections only because they [the parties themselves] are unpopular as well as undemocratic. By attributing opposition grievances to undemocratic attitudes rather than undemocratic conditions, they try to strip the game of its nested nature, converting it to a simple one-level game" (2002, 118). In the MENA, this discrediting strategy works rather well and is often combined with

branding the Islamist opposition as terrorist organizations or as being affiliated with terrorist organizations.[15] The usual supporters of the "democratic alternative" to autocracies have in the past been unlikely to make a point about an election's being flawed if an Islamist party has pulled out in protest of the contest's conditions.

The second possible response to the participation dilemma is to privilege the electoral game and try to capitalize on the propaganda opportunities offered by electoral participation. Opposition parties can aim to use elections and Parliament to cultivate and increase their electoral base and then hope that in the future increased strength will allow them either to win elections "by accident" or to reach a power-sharing agreement with the regime party or, in the case of monarchies, to negotiate a stronger role for the representative political institutions and the palace's retreat from executive and legislative power.

The success of such a strategy, however, is also not secure. Even an increase in electoral strength is not easily converted into more seats in view of the high intervention by regimes in the electoral outcomes. And too high a degree of compliance with elites who are perceived as ineffective, corrupt, and illegitimate bears the risk of damaging the credibility of an opposition party's claim to represent a distinguishable political alternative. Being too closely associated with policies and political elites that have little support within the population and that are indeed often the target of the Islamists' critique may eventually harm the support Islamists have both among their core base and among the populace in general. Finally, even if Islamist parties are included in government, vast and crucial policy areas remain out of reach and under the rulers' direct control. Such limits on policy-implementation capacity increase the risk of failure in the eyes of supporters (Mainwaring 2003, 18).

Therefore, both of these responses to the participation dilemma have traps that are not easily appreciated in advance, and it is not straightforward as to

15. This was the case, for example, in Egypt, where a law was passed in the early 1990s that made membership in any organization defined as terrorist a crime punishable by death (Ghadbian 1997, 100). The government then branded the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, accused it of seeking to overthrow the regime, and claimed that the brotherhood and underground terrorist groups were "two faces of the same coin" (Wickham 2002, 201).

which circumstances indicate that an opposition party should favor one response over the other or how it might combine them successfully. The literature on electoral authoritarian regimes has been more concerned with the study of regime strategies and regime elites and has considered the opposition strategies and choices very much in the participation/boycott dichotomy. The literature offers no obvious answers as to how an opposition party approaches the dilemma posed by electoral participation in hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes. Schedler argues that an "easy exit route" out of the participation–legitimation dilemma is to adopt a mixed strategy that gives equal consideration to the two games: participate energetically in elections and protest fraud afterward (2002, 117). In this way, opposition parties can benefit from participation—improve their electoral competitiveness—but through protest afterward can maintain their credibility and improve the conditions of the electoral contest. However, this argument appears rather close to a strategy that privileges electoral participation and faces that strategy's credibility problems. It also raises the question of why many opposition parties struggle with this dilemma and end up either as antiregime actors or as co-opted participants in an authoritarian system.

How a particular opposition party calculates the (often uncertain) costs and benefits of different strategies and which factors intervene in that calculation are to the present not well understood. This study aims to contribute to greater understanding of these issues by studying systematically the case of an Islamist opposition party, the Moroccan PJD. In the next section, I develop a heuristic model of factors shaping Islamist party strategies toward the regime and in elections. The goal of this model is not to predict the use of these strategies, but to address what is behind them by identifying the relevant factors and interactions. When appropriate, I speculate about how these factors may influence party choices. In the remaining chapters, I use this model to study the case of the PJD, and then I reevaluate the model in the last chapter.

A HEURISTIC MODEL OF ISLAMIST PARTY CHOICES

Figure 1 depicts schematically the factors likely to affect Islamist parties' choices in the regime game (changing the rules) and in the electoral game (maintaining and gaining support). The main focus is on choices related to the participation



1. Heuristic model of party choices. *Solid line:* direct influence; *dotted line:* indirect influence.

problem, but broader choices regarding how the party relates to political institutions and political elites may also be considered.[16]

Influencing the party are, on the one hand, two standard factors in studies of political parties, organizational development and institutional constraints, and, on the other, a factor that is a peculiarity of Islamist parties: the link with at least one ISMO. As shown in figure 1, the direction of the influence is not necessarily one way or only between each factor and party choices. For example, institutions influence the party and are, as discussed earlier, something the party wants to influence and change; they can also affect the relationship the party has (can

16. For simplicity, I refer to both as party choices unless a particular type of choice is of interest.

have) with its founding organization. Moreover, these interactions are not static, and a factor's impact may change over time.

Organizational Development

Organizational development—the degree of institutionalization as well as the party's rules, membership evolution, and the members' preferences—has a strong bearing on party choice. This factor is depicted in figure 1 by the solid arrow pointing from "organizational development" to "party choices." I call this factor "organizational development" rather than "party organization" because Islamist party organizations, when legalized, start from zero regarding their rules, bodies, and membership. Hence, party organization per se will not constrain party choices in the beginning. Except for having to conform to a country's legal provisions for political parties, party leaders initially have considerable freedom of action for choosing the organization's internal rules and design of its bodies, deciding how much to invest in the party and what approach to take toward membership recruitment.[17] All of these choices have trade-offs. Organizational growth and institutionalization increase a party's strength and make it more likely to survive crises (Gaxie 1977; Gunther and Hopkin 2002; Panebianco 1988). But institutionalization also constrains the leadership's decisions. A large membership similarly increases a party's legitimacy and mobilization capacity, but, to the extent that the membership has voice, it may also reduce the leadership's margin of action.

Whether party organization constrains choices in the future or not thus depends on party institutionalization and the party's approach to membership. Institutionalization has been defined as the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability (Huntington 1968, 12): an institutionalized party has developed an organizational identity and boundaries with the environment. Among the key dimensions of party institutionalization are

17. The literature on party organization has labeled this starting point a "system of solidarity" (Panebianco 1988, 20). This system is characterized by its members' homogeneity and equality, with the shared goal being the realization of the common cause. At this moment, ideology is manifest, and they act according to a "logic of constituency representation" (Kitschelt 1989, 41); that is, at this moment an Islamist party represents the Islamist movements' demands.

structural coherence and organizational complexity (Huntington 1968, 12–24; Panebianco 1988, 58–59).[18] Both independently have an impact on party choices.

Structural coherence implies the homogeneity of organizational structures on the same hierarchical level and the formalization of procedures—in other words, that explicit rules are developed *and applied* for a category of problems and procedures (see Rucht, Blattert, and Rink 1997, 55–56). Explicit and enforced rules obviously greatly limit the potential of ad hoc decisions by party leaders and of sudden changes. As to organizational complexity, it has been argued that the more hierarchical levels and party offices are created, the greater becomes the number of individuals whose interests are tied to the organization (Gaxie 1977, 134). A growing and more complex organization hosts a variety of actors with potentially diverging goals, whose participation is motivated by different types of incentives and whose joint interest increasingly becomes the organization's survival. This growing complexity in turn implies that the organization will tend to adopt a strategy of adaptation to the environment because "it has too much to lose by adopting an aggressive and adventurous policy" (Panebianco 1988, 19). As a consequence, a higher degree of organizational complexity may induce more compromise with the regime than a lower degree will.

The second organizational issue with a bearing on party choices is the membership's voice and composition. Enrolling and maintaining party members will be a programmatic constraint to the extent that a party wants to have active and committed members. In this case, it has to offer them an influence on the party program, on the nomination of candidates, and on the election of internal leaders.

If party members are given some voice, what type of approach are they going to favor? Because party members are motivated primarily by their support for party ideals, the more voice they have, the more likely the party is to stick to ideologically pure policies (for a discussion of this point, see Scarrow 1996, 12–13, 41). Although this argument is not uncontested, it is likely to hold for a committed core membership of Islamist parties. These members will care strongly about the party's credibility and are thus likely to be critical if the party takes a too electoralist,

18. Both are internal dimensions of institutionalization. External dimensions are adaptability and autonomy (Huntington 1968, 12–24).

catch-all stance. Newly recruited members, in turn, may be less committed to the core agenda.

The dotted arrow linking organizational development and party choices in figure 1 points in the other direction, indicating that the party's strategy is likely to affect organizational development: if the party aims to broaden its support base, its organization may take a different form than if it privileges the regime game. For the regime game, charismatic, outspoken leaders that protest fraud, manipulation, and repression are a more relevant tool than organizational resources. In contrast, for successful electoral mobilization, investment in outreach through the creation of party bureaus or ancillary framing organizations is important. Moreover, in political contexts where grassroots credibility is crucial, investing in a large but committed membership can be more rewarding, although the organizational weakness of many opposition parties in authoritarian regimes precisely suggests that building a strong and solid organization is difficult and costly in these environments.

In sum, the way in which party organization is set up and evolves over time plays a considerable role in shaping the relationship of opposition parties with state political institutions; the strategy pursued in these institutions may in turn impel leaders to favor a certain type of organizational development.

Relationship with Social Movement Organizations

The party's relationship with ISMOs is the second factor with a strong bearing on party choices and evolution. According to the literature on party organizations, the organizational characteristics of party origins—a party's "genetic model"[19]—constitute specific resources and constraints for its modes of action. Islamist political parties emerge from a wider social movement composed of a broad variety of organizations with differing methods of action. More specifically, Islamist parties are often founded by a consolidated ISMO—as is the case for the Moroccan PJD (founded by the Reform and Renewal Organization [Jama'at al-Islah wa al-Tajdid]) and the Jordanian IAF (founded by the Muslim Brotherhood).[20] Other

19. See Panebianco 1988, 50–53, for the concept of the genetic model.

20. The founding coalition of the Jordanian IAF also included Islamists who were not members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The majority of these Islamists left the party in the early to mid-1990s,

Islamist parties, such as the Algerian FIS or the Yemeni Islah Party (al-Tajammu' al-Yamani li-l-Islah), were not created by one consolidated organization, but rather by a variety of such organizations.[21] Whatever the case, most Islamist parties rely on external organizations when they are created.

The foundation by an "external sponsor" implies that the locus of party choices may not be the party itself, but an institutional outsider, the ISMO. To the extent that the party depends on the ISMO's financial, propagandistic, legitimacy, and human resources for electoral mobilization and support, it has to give voice to the ISMO's interests.

The ISMO's impact on the party's itinerary will depend on the party's degree of formal and informal dependency on the ISMO. The founding organization's influence on party choices is highest if the formal boundaries are blurred. The historical example of the British Labour Party, founded by such an "external sponsor," demonstrates that a formalized representation of the founding organization can shift party policies, change the different party bodies' prerogatives, and change the dominant coalition's profile even several decades after party foundation.[22] The external organization's influence is most obvious if the party's statutes bestow it with a formal majority in party committees that have the prerogatives for determining policy choices, revising the party's statutes, electing the party's administrative and governing body, and sponsoring candidates for parliamentary elections.[23] If, in addition, individual membership in the party does not exist—that is, either the party is simply formed of the collective membership of the founding organization, or membership is conditional on membership in

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many in protest against the Muslim Brotherhood's domination of the party. For the history of the IAF, see Schwedler 2006.

21. For Algeria, see Hafez 2004 and Heristchi 2004; for Yemen, see Browers 2007.

22. Lewis Minkin and Patrick Seyd argue that a left-wing shift in the unions in the late 1960s brought about the compositional shift of the Labour Party's executive in the 1970s and an intraorganizational effort to make the parliamentary party again accountable to the extraparliamentary party. The unresponsiveness to the union's demands created an increasing hostility between the Labour government and the unions. As a consequence, the trade unions used their formal rights to bring about changes inside the party (1977, 120).

23. For the British Labour Party case, see Minkin and Seyd 1977, 104–22.

the founding organization—autonomy is virtually impossible.[24] If a party is formally autonomous, however, the ISMO's ability to influence it is contingent on the party's independent mobilization resources (shown in figure 1 by the arrows linking "organizational development" and "Islamist founding organization").

The ISMO, already having minimal autonomy, must be viewed as a distinctive actor that does not take the party's decisions but seeks to influence those decisions in various ways. Importantly, the ISMO's and the party's priorities can evolve in different and possibly conflicting directions.

Because the party is a direct product of one movement organization or several, one can assume that the party and the ISMO initially share similar interests. From the ISMO's point of view, however, the party will never be more than a means to an end—an instrument designed for a special field of social action. To the ISMO, the electoral and parliamentary struggle is only one element of the general political and social activity. The party, in contrast, operates under the constraints of official politics and thus is subject to a variety of new influences, explicit and implicit behavioral norms, and requirements to achieve its goals. Discussing social movement organizations' relationship with political parties, Michael Hanagan notes that "changing strategies entails forging new identities and, in this way, affects the very interest criteria for making strategic decisions" (1998, 7). In this process, the party may become more willing to reform or trade central programmatic points, whereas the ISMO sees such reformation or trade as a betrayal of the common cause and stresses the centrality of the movement's demands.[25] Whatever the ISMO's interests turn out to be, we can thus assume

24. Also for the British Labour Party, Maurice Duverger notes that between 1900 and 1918 no private membership was possible outside the ranks of the trade unions and other socialist groups and that before 1913 these groups in fact had no option of refusing that a part of their union subscription fee was transferred to the party. It was not until after 1918, when the Labour Party allowed for individual membership in the party, that a direct party community started to develop (1963, 8–10).

25. Social movement activists who oppose an engagement in institutional politics often state the loss of identity, autonomy, and distinctiveness; the potential corruption of parliamentary representatives; and the compromise of movement demands as arguments against participation in institutional politics (Offe 1990).

that it will contain a (possibly increasing) share of members that critically monitor and try to influence the party's choices.

A classic conflict between party and movement organization can flow from an electoralist stance by the party.[26] Broadening the support base can require the softening of ideology and a rather pragmatic or at least flexible stance toward it. A vote-maximization strategy, for instance, may require some concretization or even revision of the Islamist ideology because voters might be less enthusiastic than the core group about the restrictive morals promoted by the Islamists or might simply expect more concrete answers as to how the Islamists will solve the voters' grievances. Moreover, a regime may have policy preferences that contradict both the Islamist party's and the ISMO's preferences, but a party fearing repression may nevertheless endorse the regime's preferences in Parliament.

At the same time, a strong focus on the regime's rules and on a critique of the regime in order to increase the chances of political success may conflict with a

26. The literature on social movements and political parties offers plenty of examples of political parties that ended up "betraying" the movement's principles if these principles stood in the way of electoral performance or office. The history of the western European socialist and Communist parties are a case in point. The contemporary cases of parliamentary inclusion of the so-called new social movements have newly exemplified some of the problems relating to the transformation from movement (organization) to political party. According to early accounts of the German Green Party, parliamentary activity brought to the surface the contradictions in ideological orientation as well as divergent priorities within agenda and strategy—all of which remained hidden or were unproblematic at the movement level. A second problem was the impossibility of translating utopian concepts into a policy agenda. From this inability followed a typical conflict between more reformist and more ideological party members—tellingly referred to as "realists" and "fundamentalists," respectively—over the strategy to be adopted. A third problem was the tension between maintaining the support of the broader movement by adopting rules that reflected the movement goals (i.e., principle of rotation, prohibition to accumulate power and offices, the forcing of MPs to channel most of their salary to the party for grassroots initiatives) and dealing with the practicability of these rules in the parliamentary arena (see Papadakis 1984, 174–177; Stöss 1987). These problems were hotly debated in the first years of the Green Party's parliamentary experience and were eventually solved in favor of a pragmatic, reformist approach (Kuechler and Dalton 1990). Other environmentalist parties but also right-wing parties in western Europe have been keen—in spite of such parties' antielitist and oppositional discourse—to join government on the local, regional, and national level. For the right-wing and populist parties in western Europe, see Betz and Immerfall 1998; for the Green parties, see Kitschelt 1989.

short-run movement interest in security. ISMOs that have powerful social service networks may want to avoid confrontation with the regime and thus a too openly oppositional stance (Langohr 2001, 594). Because it is likely that both the ISMO and the party will be targeted by a repressive response from the authorities, the ISMO with such networks would be critical of the party's confrontational stance toward the regime.

Institutional Constraints

Institutional constraints are the third key factor influencing party choices. For political parties, institutional constraints are usually defined as "those relatively stable factors which structure party arenas and consequently influence their organizations" (Panebianco 1988, 311 n. 9). In other words, institutional constraints are the rules of the game, both at the procedural level and at the systemic (regime) level. These rules influence the party because they determine the costs and benefits associated with certain strategies. Relevant institutional constraints are typically (i.e., in democratic systems) constitutional provisions concerning the structure of government (parliamentary or presidential) or electoral and party laws. These constraints determine, for example, whether rule is exerted in a coalition of parties or whether there is space for "niche" parties. Such standard institutional constraints also variously influence parties competing in electoral authoritarian regimes—for example, in their choices regarding electoral or governmental alliances with other parties or regarding electoral strategies. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, allied with other opposition parties in the 1980s in order to get into Parliament (Lust and Jamal 2002), and the Jordanian IAF has since 1993 been competing under a complicated electoral law that requires a high level of organizational sophistication (see Mufti 1999).

At the same time, additional institutional constraints must be considered when studying party choices in electoral authoritarian regimes. First, the type of authoritarian regime matters for party choices. In competitive regimes, winning an election is much more likely than in hegemonic ones. Thus, a strategy focusing on broadening electoral support may appear more rewarding in competitive regimes. For the MENA, it has also been shown that the difference between monarchies and republics impacts on how the regimes handle Islamist parties and influences the parties' mobilization choices (Albrecht and Wegner

2006; Pellicer and Wegner 2008). Monarchs are not directly involved in the political competition and can present themselves as the supreme arbiter of competing political forces, whereas the Arab republics' ruling parties play on the same level and have to contest the newcomers in the elections directly (Lust and Jamal 2002, 351–56).[27] Second, going beyond the distinction of regime types, Ellen Lust (2005) has shown that the "structures of contestation" play a key role in shaping the opposition's expectations and the likelihood it will mobilize during an economic crisis.

A third key peculiarity of electoral authoritarian regimes is that institutional constraints are unstable in them. Such constraints are an "actor" in the form of the incumbent regime. This actor not only produces "unpredictable changes in the definition of what is permitted" (Anderson 1997, 19) but also increases parties' mobilization costs by increasing repression or by creating divided "structures of contestation," thus making mobilization and cooperation with excluded groups more costly (Lust 2005). This actor also typically has the power to change procedures (i.e., to change the "standard" institutional constraints). Islamist parties in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan experienced in one decade sometimes drastic changes in electoral laws and political party laws. Such changes represent just one way in which the regime influences institutional constraints and thus shapes party choices.

At the same time, as the arrow pointing from party choices to institutional constraints in figure 1 indicates, institutional constraints are, of course, something the opposition party aims to influence. Pressuring for changes in the electoral, media, or assembly laws and in the constitution in order to make these formal rules more favorable to the opposition is part of the party's goals. It is one of the games the party has to play if contesting elections is ever going to be more than window dressing or patronage seeking.

27. These regimes also differ in their preferences for different electoral rules and forms of inclusion. Ellen Lust and Amaney Jamal (2002) have shown that single-party regimes in the MENA opt for electoral rules that favor the biggest party (i.e., in theory the ruling party), whereas the monarchies aim at fragmenting the political landscape. As to the form of inclusion, of the cases discussed in this chapter, the two monarchies (Morocco and Jordan) legalized Islamist parties, whereas two out of three states with a ruling party (Egypt and Tunisia) only tolerated independent candidates in elections.

Three factors are thus crucial for shaping Islamist party choices: institutional constraints, the relationship with the founding organization, and party development. Because both procedural and regime institutional constraints are country specific, chapter 1 studies Moroccan politics specifically—its actors, rules of the game, the margin for opposition parties. Chapter 2 then studies two extrainstitutional constraints on the PJD: the institutionalization process, including membership development of its organization, and the evolution of its relationship with its founding organization, MUR). In the subsequent chapters, I analyze the answers the PJD found to the dilemmas posed by electoral participation in a hegemonic electoral authoritarian system by examining its choices vis-à-vis the regime (chapter 3) and the strategies it adopted in the parliamentary and electoral arena (chapter 4). The concluding chapter reassesses the utility of the heuristic model presented here by comparing key choices made by the Moroccan and the Jordanian Islamist parties.

DATA SOURCES

This book is based on data collected through field research in Morocco in 2003, 2004, and 2007. The sources include interviews; parliamentary, party, and movement documents; observations of electoral rallies; and data on party membership and its electoral candidates.

The majority of the interviewees were PJD members at all layers of the organizational pyramid, PJD members of Parliament (MPs), and MUR members. I quote their accounts anonymously according to the reference numbers assigned to them (see appendix C).[28] Most interviews were semistructured. The number of interviews is too small for carrying out quantitative analyses, so I use the interviews mainly as individual sources. However, I explored sufficient data to see general trends.[29]

28. Appendix C indicates the interviewees'(sometimes multiple) functions in the party and in the MUR as well as the date of the interview.

29. I also carried out a number of "key informant" interviews with members of the PJD's General Secretariat on party financing and the activities of the Forum for Development (Forum du développement), an ancillary organization of the PJD for sympathizing cadres; with the respective coordinators of the 2003 communal elections and the 2004 party congress; with members of two

The study also relies on two types of quantitative data. First, it uses data from a questionnaire I distributed to the PJD's deputies at the party's National Congress in April 2004. The questionnaire covered the deputies' socioeconomic profile and their political involvement. The number of respondents was 152. A table with an overview of their profiles is provided in appendix A. Second, the study relies on data on the PJD's electoral candidates for the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections. The 2002 data were published by the MUR's newspaper *al-Tajdid* (Renewal) throughout the electoral campaign and cover the candidates' socioeconomic profile, their affiliations with other organizations, the party offices they held, and other characteristics. The number of candidates is 194. The 2007 data were provided by the party and cover only the candidates' level of education and profession.

In addition, I also drew on the Islamist press, party statutes and regulations, reports from the party congresses, and electoral platforms. I used the non-Islamist Moroccan press only for interviews of party leaders and to account for press campaigns against the PJD—not for "facts." This restriction follows from the Moroccan press's bias and unreliability. Most newspapers are affiliated with political parties or to the palace, so the so-called independent press tends to represent the respective editor's view on the PJD.[30]

It has been said about social movements that they are reluctant—especially in tense periods—toward penetration from academics and might not be willing to allow them interviews or access to documents or meetings. Hanspeter Kriesi (1992a) has referred to this reluctance as the "rebellion of the research objects." It is also the case if one looks at politically "difficult" organizations. As Guy Birenbaum has noted about his fieldwork on the French extreme right Front National Party, "Gathering data is obviously an especially difficult enterprise if one is interested in an organization considered and approached by competing organizations and commentators as illegitimate. Accordingly, the organization

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major competing parties; and with journalists for *al-Tajdid,* the MUR newspaper. In social movement research, key informant interviews are used to gain access to insider knowledge of a social movement.

30. For these newspapers, I relied mainly on the daily press review by the French embassy in Morocco, which includes more than twenty-five daily and weekly Moroccan newspapers. Articles from the French embassy press review are the sources with Internet Web sites in the references.

is reticent to furnish information that could be used against it" (1999, 133–34). Such organizations, possibly more than others, also aim to manipulate outside observers (researchers and journalists alike) with the type of information they provide as a means of improving their public image.

Islamist parties clearly fall in the category of organizations that many domestic and foreign elites view as illegitimate. Moreover, in contrast to the actors considered in Kriesi's or Birenbaum's research, they are political activists in an authoritarian regime; many activists of the Moroccan PJD are or have been members of tolerated but illegal organizations and may thus believe that information they provide may be used against them.

These issues had relevant implications for my data. One implication was that my sample of interviewees is to a certain extent biased. It was not possible to obtain interview appointments without "recommendation" by a party leader or an MP. Talking to people without "recommendation" was possible only during my attendance at party rallies for the 2003 communal elections and at the party congress in 2004. These discussions were rather informal but helped me to draw a broader picture.

A second issue that had implications for my data was the impact that the Islamist terrorist attacks in Casablanca on May 16, 2003, had on the party. Because the attacks led to a political campaign against the PJD, to its temporary exclusion from the national media, and for a moment to the possibility of a party ban, they intensified the Islamists' reluctance to furnish information they considered problematic.[31] Some interviewees therefore blocked more sensitive questions, in particular about their relationship with the party's ISMO, and avoided critical comments about the regime. Therefore, I had to examine these issues—less problematic in the first exploratory interviews in February–March 2003 and again in my last field trip in 2007—more indirectly through the Islamist press and key informant interviews.

31. On May 16, 2003, five simultaneous suicide bombings in Casablanca killed thirty-three victims and twelve suicide-bombers and injured more than one hundred others. Morocco has since engaged in a security crackdown that has prompted criticism from press freedom and human rights organizations.

Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes

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Political Institutions, Political Parties, and the Islamist Movement in Morocco

THE RULE of the Moroccan Alaoui dynasty survived colonialism (French protectorate from 1912 to 1956) and subsequent independence. Its legitimacy is based on traditional, religious, and modern sources. The dynasty came to power in the seventeenth century, and it claims traditional religious legitimization with the title "Commander of the Faithful" and lineage with Prophet Muhammad. Scholars thus argue that there is a "century-old bond" and an "extraordinary religious and charismatic link between ruler and ruled" (Hermassi and Vanderwalle 1993, 21–23). Nevertheless, the Moroccan monarchy as a historically defined political construct depends on popular acceptance of its traditions and its durability (Leveau 1997, 97). As a consequence, the palace has aimed at modern legitimacy by building representative institutions and using Parliament and political parties as instruments of elite control and renewal and as early-warning systems of trends in support and dissatisfaction.[1]

The palace has also promoted strongly the image of the supreme—and indispensable—arbiter of the political game. As Hassan II declared famously in a press conference in 1962, "The Constitution makes of Us an arbiter. . . . I am certain that many have said 'The powers of the King are enormous.' . . . I would say to them, to take a very simple example: 'Imagine two football teams on a field, take away from the referee the power to whistle out and expulse a player,

1. On the ways in which political parties in the Maghreb serve their regimes to stay in power, see Willis 2002b and Zartman 1988.

and then gentlemen, play'" (quoted in Waterbury 1970, 146). Put more explicitly, the "manipulated" (Zartman 1988, 64) or "controlled" (Santucci 2001) pluralism of organized political forces in Morocco has been an important element of political power there. The rules of the game that prevail today are thus not some transcendental given (as the monarchy likes to portray it), but to a large extent an outcome of Hassan II's divide-and-rule politics, skillful conversion of symbolic into real power, and, of course, repression.[2]

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Decades of political pluralism and relatively developed political parties are a remarkable, distinctive feature of the Moroccan political system compared to those of other MENA regimes. Before the Islamists joined the electoral arena in the 1990s, two types of political parties had developed. The first consists of the so-called opposition parties. They have—despite considerable ideological differences—two shared features. Their roots and references lie in the nationalist movement's struggle for independence, and until the 1990s they had a conflictual relationship with the monarchy. The most important proponents of this party type are the conservative Istiqlal (Independence) Party[3] and the leftist Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP, Union socialiste des forces

2. During the protectorate, administrative institutions and infrastructure were greatly enlarged, helping to control territory and society after independence. As M. E. Combs-Schilling puts it aptly, "For centuries, the monarchy had been replete with meaning but weak in apparatus; the French colonial government had been replete with apparatus but weak in meaning. Post-colonial Morocco combined them" (1989, 292).

3. The Istiqlal Party was founded in 1944. It emerged out of the Committee for Action in Morocco (Comité d'action marocaine), an organization created in 1934 by a dozen nationalists. By 1943, the committee had about three thousand members. The Istiqlal soon evolved into a mass party with local cells, regional committees, a solid structure of framing and social mobilization (charity, journals, free schools), the instruction and political education of its members, and dues-paying membership. Between 1947 and 1951, the membership increased from fifteen thousand to one hundred thousand. By 1956, it had some two million supporters out of a total population of ten million. Moreover, it was supported by the country's only trade union, which had half a million members by 1956. Membership in the Istiqlal remained limited to the urban areas, with only 25 percent of its

populaires).[4] Since 1998, these parties have been in government and by the late 2000s had largely lost their credibility as opposition forces and agents of change. The USFP, as the more programmatic of the two parties, suffered a dramatic electoral decline.

The second type of political party encompasses pro-palace parties, in Morocco usually referred to as *les partis de l'administration,* the most important being the Popular Movement (Mouvement populaire), the National Rally of Independents (RNI, Rassemblement national des indépendants), and the Constitutional Union (UC, Union constitutionnelle). This type in part represents actors with a different socioeconomic profile, standing for different elements of the regime coalition—rural notables, a traditional merchant elite, and, more recently, modern businessmen. The most decisive feature of this type's political platform has been unconditional support for the king's political initiatives. The monarchy is, however, not directly associated with any of these parties. It has never made its fate depend on them and has withdrawn "electoral support" or promoted splits if these parties have become too strong or autonomous (Willis 2002b, 8). In different constellations, these palace parties have held the majority in all legislatures until 1997. (See figure 2 for an overview of party foundations and splits.[5])

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members being from the rural population (which constituted 80 percent of the total population in the 1950s) (Santucci 2001, 20–25).

4. Until 1992, this party was called the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP, Union nationale des forces populaires). In 1972, the UNFP split over the question of whether any collaboration with the regime was conceivable, and the more accommodationist faction prevailed. The third partner in the opposition group is the Communist Party. It was founded in the Spanish-controlled territories of Morocco. Today, it runs under the name Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du progrès et du socialisme).

5. There is only a little information exists about the number of adherents to Moroccan parties or about the state and sources of their financing, and there is likewise little analysis of their internal structures. Moreover, it is difficult to identify "facts" in accounts on political parties in Morocco. Depending on the publication, such information as the year of party formation, the name of the party leader, and the characterization of the party orientation varies, sometimes considerably.



2. Genealogy of most important Moroccan political parties until 1997 elections. *Arrows:* party splits; *years in brackets:* change of party leader; *Y/N:* if a party ran in the elections. See the list of abbreviations at the beginning of the book. *Sources:* Based on Bendourou 2000, Daoud 1997, and Santucci 2001.

From Independence to the 1990s

The evolution of political institutions and political parties in Morocco can be divided into about four different periods. The main discriminating element of these different periods is the king's handling of Parliament and oppositional actors. The first period ranged from independence in 1956 to emergency rule in 1965. During this period, Mohammed V (d. 1961) and then Hassan II (d. 1999) managed to play off their main political rival, the nationalist movement. The second period covers the years of emergency rule until 1977, during which the supposedly "democratic and constitutional monarchy" (Moroccan Constitution, Art. 1) was in fact absolute. The third period, from 1977 to 1992, was characterized by the king's aim to achieve institutional stability through a combination of political opening and repression. The fourth period, from 1992 until the so-called *alternance* in 1998, was marked by the king's explicit goal to integrate the former opposition into government. Overall, the king's strategies, aiming to implant and consolidate the monarchy's political leadership, were rather successful. The opposition parties, oscillating between "proximity" and "relative dissidence" to the palace (Tozy 1999a, 20–21), were weakened not only by the relative advantages that the monarchy had in this struggle, but also by their own internal dissent, which the king encouraged and exploited skillfully.

At the wake of independence in 1956, two political forces had, by their active or symbolic role in the struggle for independence, acquired a capacity to impose their conception of the appropriate design of the Moroccan state: the king and the Istiqlal. Jean-Claude Santucci describes their relationship as one of associate rivals (2001, 26). Both had relied on each other during the anticolonial struggle but had quite different conceptions of the postindependence political order. The king aimed to reestablish the monarchy's political leadership. In contrast, Istiqlal leaders hoped for leadership by their party, claiming that it represented within its organization all segments of society. In this concept, the monarchy would have been reduced to a symbolic institution. However, the king was able to impose his vision via a constitution that was tailored to his preferences (Santucci 2001, 26).[6]

6. The king appointed all the members of the Constitutional Assembly established in 1960. Moreover, he had the power to veto the assembly's by-laws and the text in general before submitting

This first postindependence constitution was inspired largely by the French Constitution of the Fifth Republic. It provided an appropriate base for legitimizing some of the king's broad powers—such as the right to dissolve Parliament, the right to declare a state of emergency, and the right to revise the Constitution by directly submitting proposed amendments to a national referendum—as well as the elected government's responsibility to the king. To counter the Istiqlal's aspirations, the Constitution explicitly prohibited a "single party."

The six years that passed before the Constitution's was adopted by referendum gave Mohammed V and his son Hassan enough time to achieve control over the armed forces, to establish a network of local clients for assuring the control of the countryside, and to reorganize the political party landscape via the creation of a pro-palace front. The Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions (FDIC, Front pour la défense des institutions constitutionnelles) consisted of the Popular Movement, founded in 1958, a Berber party of landowners and notables; the Democratic Party for Independence (PDI, Parti démocratique pour l'indépendance), founded in 1946; and some individual monarchists. Support from the administration and the police allowed the FDIC to secure sixty-nine seats in the first parliamentary elections. Istiqlal and its left-wing split, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP, Union nationale des forces populaires), however, conjointly reached the same number of deputies, with forty-one and twenty-eight seats, respectively. The opposition used its strong position to question not only governmental policies, but also the very legitimacy of the regime. The reaction was a campaign of harassment that culminated in the arrest of most of the UNFP's leadership. Urban revolts in 1965 caused by severe economic crisis then provided a pretext to suspend Parliament and to declare emergency law.

From 1965 to 1970, Hassan II governed and legislated personally. His rule was based on the military and on a vast clientelist network. During these years, the regime became more and more inflexible, arbitrary, and corrupt. The opposition parties were hit by waves of repression and excluded from public office.[7] In

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it to popular referendum (Bendourou 2000, 54). Local elections in 1960 had shown that the opposition would dominate an elected Constitutional Assembly—as the palace and the Istiqlal foresaw.

7. The exiled leader of the UNFP, Mehdi Ben Barka, was kidnapped and assassinated in France, and numerous party leaders and activists were again arrested. The Istiqlal Party press was banned.

1970, the state of emergency was temporarily lifted, and a new constitution was adopted by popular referendum. The opposition parties boycotted the referendum because they considered the Constitution a regression with respect to the 1962 provisions.[8]

In 1971 and 1972, two attempted military coups illustrated the regime's vulnerability and the necessity of broadening the basis of rule. In 1975, the appropriation of Western Sahara through the Green March provided overwhelming popular support to the monarch. This popularity opened the possibility of a reanimation of parliamentary life and a safe integration of the opposition. Istiqlal and USFP (a recent split from the UNFP) were permitted to resume their activities, and the Moroccan Communist Party (Parti Communiste marocain) was legalized. All three had strongly supported the Green March.

The 1977 parliamentary elections were won by a new political force, candidates without party affiliation, who merged into a new party after the elections. This new palace party, RNI, was led by the king's brother-in-law, Ahmed Osman. The king desired a government of "national unity," which was formed out of the RNI, the Popular Movement, and the Istiqlal, the latter breaking with the "national front" it had formed with the Left in 1970 in order to coordinate activities and claims. Fearing isolation and renewed repression, the USFP decided to play the role of loyal opposition. As the USFP leader explained, the party was willing to abandon the "revolutionary option" for the role of a constitutional and constructive opposition (Santucci 2001, 42).

Parliament was incapable of dealing with major conflicts such as the food riots of 1981 in Casablanca, in response to which the security forces caused hundreds of deaths. At the same time, there were fierce debates about the government's economic policies (Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg 1999, 115).[9] The

8. According to the new Constitution, only one-third of the MPs were to be directly elected; the rest were to be elected indirectly by municipal councils, professional chambers, and trade unions.

9. During this period, relations between USFP and Istiqlal worsened because the latter supported the imprisonment of USFP leaders and the banning of its press, measures that the king had taken after the USFP MPs refused to return to Parliament in 1981, whose extension of mandate via referendum they considered illegitimate. Hassan II, believing that his Parliament needed an opposition, promoted the split of one of the palace parties, the RNI. The new party, the National-Democrat Party (PND, Parti national-démocrate) stayed in government; the RNI took over the opposition role.

costly war in the Western Sahara ($1 billion per year on average in the 1970s and 1980s), the drop in the price of phosphates, a high trade deficit, and a rising foreign debt ($8,475 billion in 1980) had forced the government to adopt a structural adjustment program (SAP) in 1983. The SAP imposed the elimination of food subsidies; the freezing of wages, public hiring, and investment; the devaluation of the currency; the deregulation of interest rates and of most prices for agricultural products; and the liberalization of foreign trade. Among the consequences was a rise in prices of basic goods (wheat prices, for example, increased by 87 percent between 1982 and 1985), a decline in real wages, and a rise in unemployment. In the same period, an increased urban migration fed an explosive concentration of people in the *bidonvilles* (shantytowns) of Casablanca, Fes, Tangier, Marrakech, and Rabat.

New riots in 1984 made it clear that the economic and social crisis was about to harm the regime's legitimacy. The crowds seized arms from the military and police forces and chanted slogans against the king. As Jim Paul commented at the time, "For the first time since Morocco's independence, the King seemed to have lost his position 'above' politics, and people were daring to attack him directly" (1984, 6; see also Seddon 1984). In this context, the relevance of Parliament as a locus of political debate increased. The opposition became more confident in voicing criticism about the cabinet's policies and in pressing for greater governmental accountability and transparency (Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg 1999, 115). It forced important modifications of the privatization bill introduced by the government and presented a no-confidence motion in 1990. Albeit defeated, this initiative even gained some votes from members of the governmental parties (Daoud 1997, 105). Nevertheless, nothing of substance changed until the early 1990s. A government of palace parties enshrined royal initiatives and choices in economic policy and diplomacy; since 1984, this government had been led by yet another new palace party, the UC, which had been created by Prime Minister Ma'ti Bouabid just before the elections that year.[10]

10. The UC's mission was to integrate the postindependence generation around a credo of economic liberalism. Bouabid is an illustrative case for individual co-optation in Morocco. A leading member of the UNFP, he was appointed minister of justice in the 1977 government of national unity, even though the UNFP had boycotted the elections. In March 1979, he was appointed prime

Political Liberalization in Morocco

In the medium run, the forces of social change and constant economic crisis implied that political stability was no longer obtainable by the usual means. Demographic growth, urbanization, education, and poverty in combination with the constraints of SAPs made it impossible to meet popular demands. Overall, the palace responded to these challenges with an implementation of political liberalization measures: the increase of press freedom and public liberties, the release of political prisoners, and the opening up of the political sphere.

This process was similar to the one affecting other MENA regimes without large oil reserves during that period, notably Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt. In the 1970s, the Moroccan state had sufficient economic resources (coming from the increase of the phosphate rents) to increase its economic activities and to employ these activities for political purposes. The number of public companies grew from 156 in 1969 to 230 in 1976. Public capital was present in almost all economic activity. Most university graduates were absorbed into the public sector. Social peace was bought largely with subsidies on basic goods. This state involvement in the economy and the labor market accounts for the strong impact the different SAPs had on social and political stability.

The Moroccan economy had remained dependent on the same resources since the 1960s: foreign aid and loans, agriculture, phosphates, tourism, remittances from Moroccans working abroad, and light manufacturing. Different from the 1960s, though, was an ever-increasing dependency on foreign aid. Combined with a new international discourse on the values of "good governance" and democracy after the end of the Cold War, the regime became more vulnerable to mounting critique of its human rights record. This critique hailed from both local and international organizations (Denoeux and Gateau 1995, 31; Waltz 1995, 220) and implied that the margin for meeting protest by simple repressive means was becoming restricted.[11]

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minister. The UNFP subsequently disowned him, but he insisted on maintaining his ties with the party before founding the UC.

11. The quantity of these critiques was remarkably high (cf. Waltz 1995) and even had material implications. In 1992, the European Parliament decided to freeze Morocco's fourth financial protocol on the grounds of human rights abuses (Haddadi 2002, 152–53). In 1990 also, the book

Protest was now strongly articulated by actors that were outside the institutions and established networks. It came from three sides. First, nonorganized actors used riots. In 1990, the handling of large riots, again in the context of a general strike, made it clear that the security forces were not capable of controlling all the cities at the same time (Lust 2005). Second, the late 1980s had seen the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations of all types—working for human rights, women's rights, Berber rights, the environment, employment for university graduates, and the like. Third, in the early 1990s large demonstrations by Islamist groups against the Gulf War revealed their mobilization capacities (Tozy 1999b, 80). All these actors were demonstrating an impressive mobilization potential, either in the street and on campuses or by using external allies (for instance, Moroccan human rights groups' collaboration with Amnesty International) to increase the pressure on the regime. They presented a new type of challenge because their mobilization did not depend on and could thus not be controlled by the unions and political parties (Layachi 1999, 51).[12] Moreover, the succession to the throne could be seen on the horizon. Whether Hassan II's eldest son would have political talents similar to his father's was uncertain, and such skills were even more "existential" with respect to the increasing complexity of the political, economic, social, and international arenas in the 1990s.

This context led the palace to reconsider and eventually to rehabilitate political parties' framing and mediation function (Santucci 2001, 89). The king explicitly stated his objective to come to terms with the oppositional parties (Layachi 1999, 44). Bringing them into government would contribute to calming down external critique, which was necessary to ensure the influx of international capital and to delegate some responsibility for the management of structural adjustment and the population's grievances.

Notre ami le roi (Our Friend, the King) by the French journalist Gilles Perrault appeared. This book, which denounces human rights abuses in Morocco as well as the French support of the regime, had a considerable media echo and is still banned in Morocco.

12. Some of these actors could be co-opted. Examples are the Consultative Human Rights Council (Conseil consultatif des droits de l'homme), in which prominent members of human rights organizations were included (see Waltz 1995) and the National Council for Youth and Future (Conseil national de la jeunesse et de l'avenir), which was supposed to establish strategies against unemployment (Faath 1991).

From 1991 on, the king engaged in consultations with the opposition parties (Youssoufi 1999, 325). The opposition called for far-reaching constitutional changes as a condition of their collaboration.[13] A constitutional reform, unilaterally sketched by the regime in 1992, upgraded Parliament and government but did not implement the opposition's most important demand—the direct election of all MPs.[14] Thus, the opposition refused to support the popular referendum regarding these changes (which was accepted with an alleged turnout and approval rate of around 100 percent) but nevertheless agreed to run in the 1993 elections. These elections, in spite of a reduction in regime interference, followed the usual pattern: the first round of direct elections of two-thirds of the MPs led to a victory of opposition parties, but the result was then "corrected" in the indirect elections of the last third of the MPs.[15] The king nevertheless offered the opposition parties the option to form a coalition with the RNI and, after their initial refusal, further gave them the option to lead this governmental coalition. But no agreement could be reached.[16] Thus, Morocco had yet one more of its technocratic governments, and the social, economic, and political situation worsened.

Constitutional Changes and Old Constraints

Additional constitutional amendments in 1996 eventually implemented the eternal oppositional demand of a universal election of all 325 MPs. The constitutional

13. See the opposition alliance's memorandum in *L'Opinion,* July 8, 1992.

14. The opposition had expected to be consulted about the design of the Constitution, but it was not. Instead, three French professors of public law—Georges Vedel, Michel Rousset, and Yves Gaudemet—drafted the Constitution on the king's behalf.

15. One-third of the MPs was chosen by five electoral colleges, the majority of which leaned toward the regime. The first electoral college consisted of the members of the municipal councils, who elect sixty-nine deputies. Fifteen deputies were selected by the members of the Chambers of Agriculture, ten by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, seven by the Chambers of Crafts, and ten by representatives of the trade unions. All were chosen through proportional list vote.

16. The opposition parties made cabinet participation dependent on the implementation of further constitutional reforms, especially upon the direct election of all MPs and upon the resignation of Minister of Interior Driss Basri, the embodiment of repression, corruption, and electoral manipulations since 1976. Omar Bendourou notes that conflicts within the opposition about which party would provide the prime minister were also behind the failure to reach an agreement (2000, 213).

referendum was the first in Moroccan history to be supported by all political parties. The changes introduced in 1992 had already empowered Parliament and the government's position with respect to the king—essential in the case of a government that was not pro-palace. The most important of these changes were: (1) the government's responsibility toward Parliament (Parliament can reject a government appointed by the king if it does not vote for the prime minister's governmental program; (2) Parliament's right to create commissions of investigation; (3) Parliament's right of initiative for constitutional revision; (4) the prime minister's right to propose the cabinet members; (5) the enlargement of the prime minister's regulatory power; (6) the ministers' duty to answer parliamentary questions within twenty days; (7) the king's duty to promulgate laws adopted by Parliament within thirty days;[17] (8) the elimination of the stipulation that a state of emergency effects the dissolution of Parliament; and (9) the establishment of the Constitutional Council (six of its members being appointed by Parliament, six by the king), which can be seized on request by one-fourth of the MPs.

Other important changes were aimed to increase electoral transparency and to improve all parties' campaigning capabilities. The most important ones were: (1) the setting up of the National Commission to Supervise Elections (Commission nationale de suivi des élections), composed of government representatives and political parties in order to guarantee the transparency of the elections; (2) the purging of the voters' lists;[18] and (3) the establishment of a new electoral code, approved and amended by the National Commission to Supervise Elections, which guaranteed the financing of the parties' electoral campaigns and their access to public radio and television stations (Art. 285–88, 295).[19]

The 1997 elections eventually led to what has come to be known as the *alternance* government, dominated by former opposition parties. King Hassan II

17. A law passed by Parliament takes effect only after it is issued by royal decree *(dahir)*.

18. Zakya Daoud reports that the purging of the electoral lists took seven months. Within an electorate of 9.0 million Moroccans (before the revision), 4.5 million wrong inscriptions were found (1997, 107). After the revision, Morocco had an electorate of almost 13 million.

19. The afforded time varied between twenty and thirty-five minutes for radio and television, respectively. Moreover, television and radio stations had to invite one representative of each party to their broadcasts, and the parties were entitled to choose the rallies that they wanted to be covered by the media.

appointed USFP leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi as prime minister. The international press and several scholars commented on this event as a step within a democratization process (e.g., Leveau 1998; Tozy 1999b) or even as a "maturation process of democratization" (Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg 1999, 130).

The discussed changes were important improvements for opposition forces in Morocco, and the actual occurrence of the *alternance* illustrated that the king saw the necessity to break with previous patterns. However, as Myriam Catusse (2000–2001) rightly points out, whereas democratic elections institutionalize uncertainty, the Moroccan *alternance* was not the outcome of uncertainty, but of certainty. It was wanted and called for by Hassan II.

Even from a constitutional point of view, large constraints remained. The constitutional changes significantly did not include revisions of Article 19, a crucial article for the monarchy's leadership in the Moroccan political system (e.g., Bendourou 2000; El-Mossadeq 1998b; Tozy 1999b). In addition to proclaiming the king the supreme representative of the nation, this article also refers to his religious status as "Commander of the Faithful."[20] As a consequence, the king heads two different communities, a political one and a religious one. Although these attributes might have a merely symbolic value, there is agreement today that his status as supreme religious authority impedes bargaining about a further restriction of his powers (El-Mossadeq 1998b, 16). Article 19 is always referred to when royal decrees intervene directly in the organization of religious life. However, it has also been referred to on other occasions—for example, to legitimate the extensions of Parliament's mandate in 1981 and 1989 (El-Mossadeq 1998a, 89). Moreover, the king's policies and decisions cannot be subject to critique, and his person is "sacred and inviolable" (Art. 23 and 28). MPs can lose their parliamentary immunity for expressing opinions that may be considered disrespectful (Art. 39). Abdessalam Maghraoui notes that in practice deputies abstain altogether from saying anything that can possibly be interpreted as critique (2001, 79).

20. Article 19 reads: "The King, 'Amir al-Mu'minin [Commander of the Faithful], shall be the Supreme Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof. He shall be the guarantor of the perpetuation and the continuity of the State. As Defender of the Faith, He shall ensure the respect for the Constitution. He shall be the Protector of the rights and liberties of the citizens, social groups, and organizations. The King shall be the guarantor of the independence of the Nation and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom within all its rightful boundaries."

A second constitutional impediment to a strong party government is the new upper house (Assembly of Councillors [Majlis al-Mustasharin]), introduced by the 1996 Constitution in order to limit unintended consequences of the extension of the prerogatives of the lower house (Assembly of Representatives of Morocco [Majlis al-Nuwab]). The upper house balances the innovation of a directly elected Parliament through its wide-ranging powers. The 270 members of the upper house are selected like the former indirectly elected MPs, guaranteeing thereby the house's conservative dominance.[21] Among its prerogatives is the motion of nonconfidence if voted by a two-thirds majority (a simple majority in the lower house). It can initiate laws and has the right to create commissions of investigation if—as in the case of the lower house—doing so is supported by half of the members. This upper house is thus a powerful brake to any kind of radical socioeconomic or political changes, even if the Moroccan political system were to become more liberalized than when this chamber was established. Besides this factor, the king has the prerogative to impose a second reading of a bill and subsequently a popular referendum on any bill (Art. 67–69).

The king's de facto authority over the so-called ministries of sovereignty—whose ministers do not respond to Parliament but are instead the king's confidantes—remained untouched.[22] Although the office of prime minister was handed over to the USFP in 1998, the ministers of justice, external affairs, interior, and religious affairs in the *alternance* government were not affiliated with par-

21. Three-fifths (162) are chosen by regional electoral colleges composed of representatives of local councils. The remaining two-fifths are selected in the following way: 81 by regional colleges of delegates of professional unions, and only 27 by a national college of labor union representatives. Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg point out that the Chambers of Agriculture are dominated by rural notables and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry by urban industrialists (1999, 122). Thus, these chambers lean by nature toward the palace parties. Local councils in turn have traditionally been controlled by politicians close to the regime because local elections are dominated by issues of service delivery, and politicians who have good connections with the national authorities are better equipped to deliver these services. In addition, clientelistic linkages are more widespread in the countryside and benefit mostly the pro-palace candidates.

22. This authority is not enshrined in the Constitution. Article 24 of the Moroccan Constitution simply states that the king appoints the prime minister, but he also appoints the other ministers in consultation with the prime minister. Therefore, which ministries are "ministries of sovereignty" is a matter of bargaining power.

ties, but men close to the king.[23] Moreover, the interior minister's prerogatives—although decreasing—remained extremely wide. He was still responsible for the security services, the training and appointment of state officials, the allocation of local and regional budgets, the licensing and banning of associations and political parties, and the organization and supervision of elections. Moreover, the king preserved the right to appoint the secretaries of state of all ministries, all the governors, heads of administrative provinces, directors of public agencies and enterprises, and judges and magistrates. None of these nominations was subject to approval by any other entity (Maghraoui 2002).

Therefore, political liberalization measures notwithstanding, the king remained "the most powerful and most important institution" in Morocco in the 1990s (Layachi 1999, 48). He controlled high politics and had substantial constitutionally granted rights to interfere in the formulation of any other policy. For legal political actors or actors who aim at the legalization of their organizations, the questioning of the monarch's religious legitimacy remained impossible. Although the political liberalization increased the importance of constitutional and legal rules, the regime continued to rely on the whole range of tactics that preempt uncertainty: the use of reserved positions and reserved domains to limit the powers of elective office, the engineering of opposition parties' failure and fragmentation, selective repression, and electoral fraud. In short, Morocco, though liberalized, remained a hegemonic authoritarian regime.

At the same time, the supremacy of the monarchy in the political game is contingent on the absence of a united opposition or of one particularly strong oppositional actor (Ferrié 2002). The king's position "above politics," however well cultivated, cannot be taken for granted. Even if rule does not directly depend on the electoral hegemony of a ruling party, the very fact that the king has kept such tight control over who will be allowed representation in the country's political institutions (and in what proportions) shows that the balance inside these institutions matters. Especially since the 1990s, "liberal" monarchs like the Moroccan one needed to some extent the support of a docile Parliament to endorse their political agenda. It was in this context that the Islamists entered into official politics.

23. The opposition parties had initially claimed the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the Justice Ministry (Ferrié 1998–99, 233).

Benefits and Costs of Electoral Participation

The theoretical costs and benefits of electoral participation awaiting the Islamists mirrored to a large extent those discussed in general in the introduction. After decades of illegality—in between toleration and repression—the increasingly secure legal status that political parties came to enjoy in Morocco would be a major benefit for the Islamists. The function of parties in maintaining the regime's internal and external legitimacy made them a more and more stable shield for social and political activities. Party formation in Morocco included the right to publish a party newspaper, to develop local infrastructure without major harassment, and to create ancillary organizations, but it also promised to allow for a more efficient and less costly framing of society. This promise was enhanced by the new electoral law of 1997, which, by guaranteeing access to the national media, had made electoral campaigns an important forum of publicity for the parties' social and political agenda. The same law also provided for state financing of all successful parties.

Another benefit of electoral participation flowed from easier promulgation of a political agenda. Even the relatively powerless Parliaments of 1977 and 1983 served as a platform allowing political parties to publicize their struggles (Santucci 2001, 39). With the new weekly television broadcasting of parliamentary questions, this tribune function significantly increased in the 1990s. Moreover, some agenda setting for governmental policies was possible from the opposition benches. Party influence was not necessarily linked to cabinet participation but could also be achieved through the mobilization of public opinion on particular issues. As William Zartman has argued, the USFP, without cabinet participation, had a ghost-writer function for royal political programs (1988, 69). In 1998, the appointment of Youssoufi as prime minister then showed that there was a realistic chance for nonpalace parties to lead the government. The palace's retreat from the responsibility for certain policy fields made it theoretically possible for a party government to propose, vote on, and enact legislation—at least below the threshold of the mentioned ministries of sovereignty.

Finally, the potential costs notwithstanding, inclusion into the networks of the political elite also promised the Islamists access to new nonmaterial resources—for example, through contacts with ministers or key personnel in the state administration. Thus, it opened additional possibilities of controlling and

distributing rewards (Faath 1991, 72) and thereby generating support. In sum, forming a political party and contesting elections had the realistic potential to strengthen the Islamists—mainly by decreasing their mobilization costs and giving them access to new resources—and to give them a greater impact on policy.

However, the constitutional and practical restrictions mentioned earlier make impossible any meaningful governance without further changes in rules and practices—that is, without a successful regime game. Opposition parties also face the problem that the credibility costs of electoral participation in Morocco are quite pronounced, especially because of the bad reputation held by politicians, political parties, and Parliament.[24]

As to Parliament, there is a widespread perception of its being an arena for co-optation rather than for political decision making and representation. For decades, it has largely been a sphere for the articulation, competition, and rewarding of social actors and for the integration and co-optation of political adversaries. In the years of continuous dominance by pro-palace parties and technocrats, parliamentary representation has been almost meaningless for furthering political agendas. Most Moroccan prime ministers have not even been affiliated with a political party.[25] In contrast, the royal cabinet and commissions have played and continue to play a crucial role in policymaking. In short, Parliament is viewed largely as a political arena in which power is not at stake (Tozy 1999a, 20).

The degrading of Parliament has fed a lack of programmatic distinctiveness between political parties. The absence of programmatic commitment and party institutionalization is shown by the ubiquitousness of transhumance—that is, floor crossing by MPs (typically to a party in government).[26] The absence of party

24. According to a survey published in 1998 by the Rabat-based newspaper *Le Journal,* only 3.1 percent of Moroccans trusted politicians (cited in Entelis 2002); according to a 2001 survey, 87 percent of Moroccans were not supportive of any political party (see *Aujourd'hui le Maroc,* Nov. 28, 2001).

25. Out of the eighteen prime ministers Morocco has had since independence in 1956, only six have been affiliated with political parties, and in two of these cases the political parties were founded after the elections (Ahmed Osman with RNI and Maʿti Bouabid with UC). None of the ministers of interior has been affiliated with a political party so far.

26. Within three years of the 1997 elections, 102 Moroccan MPs migrated from one party to another (Willis 2002b, 15).

institutionalization is further mirrored in the Moroccan party system's bent toward "scissiparity" (Santucci 2001, 86). The king's sponsoring of new parties and internal rivalries made the number of political parties rise from four in the 1963 elections to sixteen in the 1997 elections.[27] Moreover, political parties' autocratic internal structures have led to a lack of innovation and generational renewal.[28] As to opposition parties more specifically, infighting and co-optation have harmed their credibility to represent a political alternative. Except the rare moments of joint strategies and block formation, the opposition has given the image of being constantly divided, either by the co-optation of individual members and of whole parties or by their fighting over office and leadership of the oppositional alliance.

Overall, political parties in Morocco are perceived as being assemblages of self-interested actors with neither principles nor distinctive identity and as vehicles for the social ascension of individuals into the circles of the political and economic elite rather than as organizations in the service of the common good. Oriented toward the center (the palace) rather than toward the electorate, even the former opposition parties are increasingly associated with the state rather than with society (Santucci 2001, 96–97).[29]

Given these attributes of Parliament and political parties in Morocco, the potential costs of electoral participation are relatively high for new actors whose political and social message is strongly linked to morality, modesty, and sincerity. The very fact that the former opposition parties were not capable of escaping from co-optation illustrates the danger of being absorbed, alienated from the

27. Some of the splits were programmatic, such as the left-wing split from the Istiqlal in 1959 or the division inside the UNFP that led to the founding of the USFP. However, most of the splits are about questions of leadership. Up to the early 2000s, only once had a living party leader been replaced in Morocco, and in that case the new leader was not only the nephew of the party founder, but also the only candidate (Willis 2002b, 13).

28. Michael Willis points out that a key feature of Moroccan political parties is the party leader's central role. Even the highest party committees often play a minor role in decision making. He gives as an example the RNI, where the Executive Committee neither had a say in nor was informed of who would be the RNI ministers in the 1998 government. He also notes the leadership's reluctance to hold party congresses (2002a, 15).

29. Jean-Claude Santucci even discusses the notion of a "cartel party" (see Katz and Mair 1995) to describe Moroccan parties' movement toward the state (2001, 95).

activists, and eventually delegitimized by electoral participation. The spread of nongovernmental organizations that have no affiliation with political parties and that explicitly distance themselves from parties indicates the possibility of losing contact with the social base if an opposition fails to criticize the regime in a credible way.

THE MOROCCAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENT

Moroccan Islamic activism emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a rather narrow student movement. As in other North African countries, the movement is more heterogeneous than in many Mashriq states, where it is often dominated by a particularly powerful group—namely, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan or the Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Hamas in Palestine. The Islamist movements in the Maghreb, including Morocco, have typically been ideologically eclectic—inspired by and drawing on Muslim Brotherhood ideology and combining it with local traditions. The Moroccan Islamist movement, similar to its homologues in other MENA states, was initially encouraged by the regime as a counterweight to the Left on the university campuses, which appeared to be more threatening at that moment (Munson 1991, 341). The Moroccan movement was never fully repressed because it served the regime to put pressure on the secular opposition, but the Islamists' growing strength—domestically and internationally—did trigger harsh repressive responses. Besides repression, the palace also aimed to control the production of religious meaning and to co-opt religious scholars.[30]

Some scholars have argued that the religious basis of monarchic rule sets limits for the Islamists political agenda. The status of "Commander of the Faithful" and "guarantor of the respect of Islam," together with the popular belief in the king's sanctity, has allowed the king to deal more easily with the Islamist movement than the "secular" presidents of other MENA states have been able to

30. In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, Hassan II created the high and regional councils of *'ulama'* (Islamic legal scholars) in order to co-opt them and to control the appointment of mosque preachers. Tozy (1999a) defines the "ideal-type" *'ulama',* from the regime's perspective, as ideologues that abstain from politics. Moreover, the palace started to organize religious colloquiums and summer universities dealing with "religious awakening."

do (see, e.g., Leveau 1997, 97; Voll 1997). Yet although the Moroccan regime can claim that it already is an "Islamic state," there is of course disagreement of what this label should entail, and not all the currents of the Islamist movement accept the monarchic rule's religious legitimacy.

The founding fathers of the PJD came from one of the two major Islamist organizations in Morocco: MUR.[31] The other main organization of national outreach is Justice and Charity, often considered the strongest organization of the Moroccan Islamist movement.[32] Besides these two organizations, the Moroccan Islamist movement has included innumerable local educational, social, and cultural associations, independent preachers, and some small radical groups.

With respect to political strategies and preferences, the MUR has been labeled as "realist" because it has actively pursued its inclusion into the formal political process since the mid-1980s. In contrast, Justice and Charity has been labeled as "idealist" (Rogler 1997). The latter, its striving for legal recognition notwithstanding, has so far rejected the conditions of the electoral game in Morocco. It is politically organized in universities, and its members are represented in unions only. The Moroccan Islamists have not been a united opposition. Henry Munson argues that in unity the Islamists may indeed pose a threat to the regime (1993, 200). However, the Islamists have failed to form durable coalitions to further their demands, although they occasionally join forces around specific topics, write in each other's publications, and have notable contacts between individuals and organizations.[33]

31. As I explain in more detail later, the MUR was itself a merger of different Islamist organizations in 1996. For simplicity, if not referring precisely to one of these predecessor organizations, I employ the label "MUR" to refer to the entirety of all those groups that are now part of the MUR.

32. Although this claim seems to be generally accepted, no research has so far empirically investigated differences in membership or support of any of the two movement organizations, to my knowledge.

33. The Moroccan Islamist movement is less covered in the literature than are the Islamist organizations in Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan. The following sections are based mainly on Burgat 1988; Munson 1986, 1993; Shahin 1998; Tozy 1999a, 1999b. These scholars sometimes contradict each other, especially when it comes to earlier dates.

The Movement of Unity and Reform

From Revolutionary to Reformist Strategies. The MUR came into being in 1996 as a merger of mainly two Islamist organizations: Movement for Reform and Renewal and Rally for the Islamic Future (Rabitat al-Mustaqbal al-Islami). Both can be traced back to the Islamic Youth Association (Jam'iyat al-Shabiba al-Islamiya), which was founded in the early 1970s and legalized in 1972 (Tozy 1999a, 229).[34] (The MUR's complicated genealogy is illustrated in figure 3.)

The founder of the Islamic Youth Association, Abdel Karim Muti', was an inspector of the Ministry of Education who had been influenced by the radical ideas of the second leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb.[35] Just as Qutb viewed the Egyptian society, Muti' considered the Moroccan society to be in a state of pre-Islamic ignorance against which the use of violence was legitimate to achieve an "Islamic state." The Islamic Youth Association had a revolutionary agenda. It advocated a strictly Islamic polity and engaged in violent clashes with leftist movements on the university campuses. It apparently had a dual structure. The legalized, public part was declared a religious and educational association that aimed at offering Islamic education and organizing summer camps and public-health campaigns. This role made it possible to function legally for some time and to recruit and educate members (Shahin 1998, 184–85). Underneath this organization that claimed to be disinterested in politics was a clandestine structure, which Mohamed Tozy describes as a paramilitary organization whose members were predominantly high school students (1999a, 231).

Indeed, although the "realist" label to indicate the MUR's political orientations and strategies seems appropriate for the later period, it does not hold for

34. The dates given for the founding of the Islamic Youth Association range from 1969 to 1972.

35. Sayyed Qutb (1906–66) is considered one of the most influential Islamist theorists and activists in the twentieth century. In the 1950s and 1960s, he became the mastermind behind the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He is especially known for his book *Milestones* in 1964. According to Qutb, the shari'a is supposed to be the sole base of government and social relations in an "Islamic state." Qutb accordingly rejected the extant Arab regimes and promoted not only *da'wa* and exemplary behavior but also violence to achieve the true Islamic society. He was sentenced to death in 1966.



3. MUR genealogy. *Source:* Based on Shahin 1998 and Tozy 1999a.

the organization's beginnings. Islamic Youth has probably been the most radical of the Moroccan Islamist organizations; its revolutionary outlook predominated until the early 1980s. After the implication of some members in the 1975 assassination of Omar Benjelloun, editor of the Socialist Party newspaper and prominent Moroccan Marxist intellectual, the organization was banned and officially dissolved in 1976.[36] Muti' fled the country and was in absentia condemned to a life sentence; the militants of the organization were persecuted. Its followers split into four factions.[37] A minority joined the extremist group al-Jihad. A second group joined Justice and Charity. A third fraction organized in local religious associations.[38] Two of these associations—the Association for Islamic Predication (Jam'iyat al-Da-'wa) at Fes and the Islamic Association (al-Jam'iya al-Islamiya) at

36. Who actually "organized" the murder of Benjelloun is still not clear. Muti' denied any involvement of Islamic Youth in the assassination and claimed that the palace was behind it to eliminate both Benjelloun and himself (Munson 1993, 198).

37. This split did not lead to the disappearance of the Islamic Youth Association, which appears to exist clandestinely still (Burgat 1988, 196–97; Munson 1993, 199)

38. Tozy notes three of these associations in particular: the Association for Islamic Predication at Fes, the Islamic Association at Ksar al-Kabir, and the Islamic Sunrise Association at Rabat (1999a, 232).

Ksar al-Kabir—merged in 1994 and founded the Rally for the Islamic Future, one of the two components that formed the current MUR.

Finally, a last group, in which the majority of the Islamic Youth members reappeared, comprised a substantial part of the present-day party leaders and was initially loyal to Muti' (Tozy 1999a, 93), who from exile tried to maintain the organizational structure and control over the group's activities. His radical anti-regime interventions and publications posed constant problems for the group.[39]

Discontent with Muti''s leadership style and his pronouncements from abroad grew among these "loyalists" and led them to reconsider their policies and strategies. In 1982, a statement was published denouncing Muti''s practices and announcing a total separation from Islamic Youth Association ideas (Shahin 1998, 189). This group eventually founded a new organization, the Islamic Group (al-Jama'a al-Islamiya). Its main initiators—Mohamed Yatim, Abdallah Baha, and Abdelilah Benkirane—later became MPs and members of the PJD General Secretariat.[40] Since the mid-1980s, a reformist vision and a comprehensive approach to society emerged and solidified within this organization (Tozy 1999a, 228–35). It was never legalized, but the authorities tolerated its activities to some degree (for instance, the creation of branches in different parts of the country), while occasionally banning its newspaper.

The Islamic Group amplified its appeasement in 1990 with an explicit recognition of the monarchy's legitimacy. Another element of this appeasement strategy was its change of name into Reform and Renewal in 1992. According to its newspaper, this change was considered necessary in order to eliminate any misperception about a potential claim to exclusive representation of Islam (*al-Raya,* Feb. 2, 1992, cited in Shahin 1998, 190). As Mohamed Yatim explained in *al-Raya* (The Standard) in the same year, their organization had "passed from a project of change from above aiming to found an exemplary Islamic state with all its practical implications (clandestineness, refusal of participation) . . . to adopting a new mentality, positive in its relation with reality" (*al-Raya,* Mar. 23, 1992, cited

39. For instance, in 1981 in his journal *al-Mujahid* (edited in France) Muti' called for an "authentic Islamic revolution" and denounced "American imperialism and . . . its agents represented by the corrupt monarchical regime and those who support it" (quoted in Munson 1993, 198).

40. All three were born in the mid-1950s. They were thus in their late teens when the Islamic Youth Association was active and in their late twenties when they founded the new association.

in Tozy 1999a, 244–45). In other words, they had moved from a project of revolution—now considered too costly because of state repression—to one of reform.

According to the charter published by the Islamic Group in 1989, it had the following key objectives: (1) to renew the understanding of religion, (2) to call for respect of individual rights and public freedoms, (3) to advocate the implementation of the shari'a, (4) to improve Muslims' material and living conditions, (5) to perform charitable work, (6) to achieve a comprehensive cultural renaissance, (7) to work on accomplishing the unity of Muslims, (8) to confront ideologies and ideas that are subversive to Islam, and (9) to raise the Moroccan people's educational and moral level. These objectives were to be attained by individual, public, cultural, social, economic, political, and educational activities (charter cited in Shahin 1998, 189). In practice, although defending religious values and aiming at the Islamization of society, the MUR (even in its early incarnations) has been an ideologically rather flexible group. According to Tozy, the Islamists directed their efforts toward the "invention of an ideological repertoire compatible with the paradigm proposed by the power center to the other political actors" (1999a, 235).

In 1996, Reform and Renewal merged with the Rally for the Islamic Future to form the MUR. The president of the new organization was Ahmed Raissouni, a university professor in Rabat.[41] In a communiqué, it was declared that the MUR's goals were "to enhance religion and to open the field for co-operation, serving through this the reform of society in conformity with Islamic law" and that it would work within the country's constitutional and judicial framework (*al-Sharq al-Awsat,* Sept. 1, 1996).

The MUR—and before it Reform and Renewal—adopted a relatively democratic model of internal organization; according to the MUR, this decision emerged from the negative experience with Muti''s authoritarian leadership (interview no. 10).[42] A peculiar feature—compared to other political organizations in Morocco and other MENA states—is that its president can serve only a maximum of 2 four-year terms, and this rule has been enforced. As a recent fusion of different organizations, the MUR is also less institutionalized and hierarchical than other Islamist

41. Raissouni had previously founded both the Islamic Association of Ksar al-Kabir and the Rally for the Islamic Future (Benhlal 1997).

42. See appendix C for these numbered interviews.

organizations. Its Executive Bureau comprises thirteen members, elected by the Shura Council, which is a consultative assembly to the Executive Bureau that meets once a year to decide on the annual program.[43] It has a National Assembly, which meets every four years in ordinary sessions to elect the president. Its members contribute 2.5 percent of their salary to support the organization (interview no. 3). One can assume that additional funds come from the collection of money in mosques, the selling of publications, and a variety of subassociations.

The MUR is well implanted mainly in big and medium-size cities such as Casablanca, Tangier, Rabat, Fes, Meknes, Oujda, and Agadir. One explanation for the movement's decidedly urban character is that the initial activists were predominantly university students. Even if they were originally migrants from the countryside, they have largely remained in the cities after their studies and consequently concentrated their activities and recruitment there. Their political activism focuses strongly on the trade unions[44] and the national student body. The high illiteracy rate in rural Morocco may be an additional explanation for the limitation of the Islamist movement's appeal to urban areas.[45] As Munson (1993) argues, active support for both the MUR's predecessor organizations and Justice and Charity is restricted mainly to the educated, and only a limited number of independent preachers have reached out to peddlers, shopkeepers, and workers. Islamist activists' comparatively high level of education has also been reported for other countries.[46]

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The Path to Inclusion. Since the mid-1980s, the Islamists have engaged in a discussion on participation in official politics. Having opted in its favor, they have

43. After the fusions, the Executive Bureau was composed of Ahmed Raissouni (president), Abdallah Baha, Ahmed Al Omari, Abdelilah Benkirane, Abdelnacer Tijani, Mohamed Amnas, Mohamed Azeddine Taoufiq, Amine Boukhoubza, Abderazzaq Marouri, Mohamed Hamdaoui, Mohamed Yatim, Ahmed El Mechtali, and Saadeddine El-Othmani (*al-Sharq al-Awsat,* 1 Sept. 1996). Half of this group would become parliamentarians later.

44. More than 70 percent of the respondents to my questionnaire who were MUR members also indicated an affiliation with trade unions (see appendix A).

45. According to official Moroccan statistics, more than 70 percent of the Moroccan rural population were illiterate in the early 1990s (Richards and Waterbury 1998, 113).

46. For Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, see Clark 2004b.

considered different options for its implementation. In 1989 and 1992, they applied for the legalization of the Party of National Renewal (Parti du renouveau national). The by-laws were designed to conform to the Moroccan law on political parties, which prohibits religious parties. They stated that the party would be open to all Moroccans irrespective of their religious affiliation and that the guiding rules of this participation would be respect for democracy, pluralism, the free choice of the people, and the concept of transfer of power. The party cautiously avoided terms such as *shari'a* (religious law) and *da'wa* (mission), and among its ten goals only one referred to the necessity of strengthening the Islamic identity of the Moroccan people. The authorities nevertheless rejected the party's legalization, invoking the prohibition of religious parties (Tozy 1999a, 241).[47] The Rally for the Islamic Future—the second organization forming the future MUR—had also unsuccessfully applied for the legalization of a political party (interview no. 13).

As a consequence of this rejection of legalization, the second-best option was put into practice: to integrate into an already existing party. Having been realistic about the low potential of getting through with their own party project, the Islamists had already started negotiations with other parties—for instance, with Istiqlal, which claims to be based on and defend Islamic values. However, Istiqlal leaders refused to give the Islamists any special status in the party; instead, its leaders suggested that interested MUR members could simply adhere to Istiqlal individually.[48] These terms being unacceptable to the Islamists, in 1992 they reached an agreement with Dr. Abdelkrim El-Khatib, the leader of the Popular Constitutional Democratic Movement (MPCD, Mouvement populaire constitutional démocratique), to integrate into his party. The MPCD, founded by Dr. El-Khatib in 1967 as a split from the Popular Movement (see figure 2), was at this time one of the numerous inactive Moroccan parties.

It was not until 1996 that this 1992 agreement was made official in an extraordinary MPCD party congress through an appointment of Islamist leaders to the

47. Of the thirty-four central-committee members of this party that never came into being, twenty-four were working in the educational sector, among them seven university professors, the rest being secondary-school teachers. They were spread geographically over sixteen different cities, but two-thirds of them lived in Casablanca and Rabat (Tozy 1999a, 241).

48. Interview with an Istiqlal leader, Rabat, Dec. 11, 2003.

party's highest executive committee, the General Secretariat (for more details on party organization, see chapter 2). It was probably not until that year that the palace—after settling the constitutional debate with the opposition parties—became more favorable toward the inclusion of the Islamists (Tozy 1999a, 243).[49] The party congress's final statement declared the party's attachment to the constitutional monarchy as one of the state's main pillars. The document did not mention the integration of the Islamists. Instead, it was stated that the party had originally been founded according to an Islamic orientation but that the historical circumstances had kept it from assuming its role (*al-Sharq al-Awsat,* June 4, 1996).

Until the 1997 parliamentary elections, inclusion of Islamists was precarious. The "new" party did not run in the 1997 communal elections. In fact, the Islamists wanted to participate, but the MPCD's secretary-general, Dr. El-Khatib, vetoed their participation at the last minute. His official explanation was that the party had not been invited to join the National Commission to Supervise Elections. El-Khatib's veto more likely revealed that the MPCD's old guard had not yet made up its mind completely about hosting the Islamists and that the regime had not yet solidified its attitude toward their inclusion (see Tozy 1999a). At that moment, the Islamists did not oppose El-Khatib's veto. They clearly did not want to threaten the experiment. The party was eventually authorized to participate in the 1997 parliamentary elections. It gained nine seats and a total of 264,324 votes—that is 4.14 percent of the valid votes (Daoud 1997, 116).

Justice and Charity: The Main Competitor in the Movement Sector

Like Abdelkrim Muti', Sheikh Abdelsalam Yassine, the founder of Justice and Charity, was an inspector in the Ministry of Education. In contrast to Muti', however, Yassine is not reported to have been absorbed into politics from the left. Instead, he was a member of a Sufi brotherhood but separated from it in the early 1970s. After reading the writings of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood,

49. The green light was given in an interview with a German TV channel on the occasion of the German chancellor's visit to Morocco. The king said about the Islamists that "they are Moroccans. As long as they have not committed . . . a heresy, I will not intervene," and he invited them to "regularize their situation" (quoted in Tozy 1999a, 243).

Hassan al-Banna, Yassine became politically active and in 1974 decided to write his famous open letter "Islam or the Deluge" to the king. In the letter, he harshly criticized the economic and social conditions in Morocco, linked them to the king's wealth,[50] and advocated the return to Islam as the solution to these deficiencies. Munson stresses especially the unprecedented paternalistic and violent language in which Yassine addressed the king (1993, 188). Following this letter, Yassine was committed to a psychiatric hospital. After his release, he continued to promote an Islamic polity but abstained from directly criticizing the king. Between 1979 and 1983, he published an Islamic review, *al-Jamaʿa,* which was occasionally confiscated and eventually banned, as were its successors. In 1984, he was tried again and from 1989 to 2000 was put under house arrest.

In 1981, Yassine began to build up Justice and Charity (Tozy 1999a, 194). Its structure is similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is headed by the supreme guide and a Guidance Bureau composed of six members. The smallest units are cells (families composed of ten members); they form branches (composed of three to ten families), which in turn make up regional councils (composed of the leaders of three to seven branches). The organization has specialized committees for teachers, students, immigrants, and women. The supreme guide appoints all the regional cadres. Justice and Charity's activists, like the MUR's, are mainly students and educated youth (Munson 1993, 191), and its cadres are made up especially of those working in the educational sector. Like the MUR, it is based largely in the big cities, especially Casablanca and Rabat (Shahin 1998, 195), and its principle source of income is its members' contributions. Tozy also mentions income stemming from the selling of books, video and audio tapes, Islamic cloths, and the like (1999a, 212–14). From the beginning, Yassine has sought legal recognition for his association. This recognition, however, has always been denied, and in 1990 the authorities dissolved Justice and Charity and arrested all members of its Guidance Bureau and scores of followers. Since then, it has been an illegal but still very active Islamist organization in Morocco.

In their relations with the regime, the key difference between the MUR and Justice and Charity is that the latter refuses to compromise to an extent that will

50. For example: "Your palaces, your properties, and the opulent class in the land all explain the presence of beggary and misery" (quoted in Munson 1993, 189).

allow it to participate in official politics. According to Yassine, the regime proposed to turn his association into a political party in 1991. However, he refused to make the required concessions, notably to recognize the king as the "Commander of the Faithful" (Burgat 1988, 290).[51] In a 1992 interview, Fathallah Arslane, the spokesperson for Justice and Charity, commented on the MUR's application to be a political party: "They are our brothers, we especially respect their educational program, but we believe that their political itinerary is confused. They were brought to take questionable positions" (quoted in Tozy 1999a, 217). Arsalane reaffirmed this position in a 2000 press conference, stating that the PJD's approach by means of reform from within could only prolong the current style of the political game in Morocco and that therefore the PJD, too, bore responsibility for the state of Moroccan politics (*al-Tajdid,* July 15, 2000).

At the same time, the relationship between the MUR and Justice and Charity has not been characterized by hostility. In the PJD's 1999 National Congress, a representative of Justice and Charity was among those who spoke in the General Assembly. There is periodic cooperation between the two organizations for defending Islamist causes. In these instances, Justice and Charity considers the PJD its "natural ally,"[52] for example, when mobilizing against "occidental interventionism," the war in Iraq, and Israel. Moreover, it has to be made very clear that even if Justice and Charity is less compromising, it nevertheless condemns violence as a means of action.

Islamist Support

As elsewhere, the Moroccan Islamists have gained support by filling the void left by the retreat of the state. Schools and universities have been and still are major targets for Islamist recruitment. The broad framing (successful targeting) of high school students has been possible because the crisis of state finances affected

51. Yassine, after his liberation from house arrest in 2000, reasserted these claims in an interview with the press, adding that he had even been promised a seat in Parliament. However, he reaffirmed his refusal to recognize the king as "Commander of the Faithful" (*Demain Magazine,* July 31, 2000).

52. See *La Nouvelle Tribune,* Mar. 16, 2000, quoting Nadia Yassine, the daughter of Sheikh Yassine.

public education in a moment of demographic growth. Overpopulation of classrooms, decreasing quality of teaching, and the retreat of many teachers provided the possibility to gain support—for example, by offering extra classes. The same is true for other public services, such as health care. Islamist doctors practice in hospitals where other doctors have retreated in favor of private consultation. Besides the MUR and Justice and Charity, there is a large network of charitable associations that link material support to the populace with an Islamist message. It is also reported that Islamist associations are often more efficient than the state in the provision of emergency relief. Justice and Charity also has a loan society and provides employment (Tozy 1999a, 180).

No surveys address systematically and quantitatively the question of who supports any of these organizations—actively or passively. As Tozy notes, Islamist groups are "as active as [they are] badly known" (1999b, 80). For the early 1980s, Munson estimates on the basis of a survey among university students that less than 15 percent of students were actively engaged in an Islamist organization (1986, 271–75). Furthermore, he notes that ideological support for the Islamist movement was much broader, with more than 30 percent of the population favoring "the re-establishment of Islamic law as the sole legal system" (274). For the early 1990s—that is, when the question of Islamist inclusion arose more concretely—Dale Eickelman suggests that Islamist groups "may include some 20% of the Moroccan population" (1994, 257).[53] Of course, this estimate is not based on data, and Eickelman recognizes that the strength of Islamist groups is unknown. However, given that by this time the number of university students had almost tripled since the mid-1980s and that the next generation of Islamist activists had come to the fore, it is sensible to assume that active support had indeed increased strongly within a decade. A public showing of the Islamists' strength at the beginning of the 1990s was made through a demonstration against the Gulf War. Justice and Charity as well as Reform and Renewal supporters were believed to make up 40 to 80 percent of the 300,000 to 700,000 demonstrators (Tozy 1999b, 80). For 1995, Tozy cites an inquiry among student union leaders at Casablanca that revealed that all of them were Islamist

53. Eickelman's assessment is based on an interview with a "senior university official" in 1992 (1994, 271 n. 17).

(1999a, 181–82).[54] Jody Nachtwey and Mark Tessler (1999) cite a survey of one thousand households in Rabat undertaken in 1996–97 that to them indicated that almost half of the respondents (men and women equally) were potentially supportive of Islamist platforms.[55]

Although information on the strength of both active involvement and ideological support for the Islamist movement as a whole (not to speak of particular organizations) is thus vague, two conclusions can be drawn from these data. First, there appears to be a considerable gap between those who are actively involved and those who sympathize with some of the Islamists' general themes but are passive. Considering this gap, having candidates in elections may serve to mobilize precisely those voters who are in principle sensitive to the Islamists' message but who have never become activists. Second, by the early 1990s especially, passive support—the vagueness of the estimates notwithstanding—appeared to include a substantial part of the Moroccan educated (and urban) population. Converting this ideological support into votes in elections at this time—that is, if the Islamists had managed to mobilize up to 50 percent of the urban vote—would have threatened the existence of many Moroccan parties.

54. Without indicating a source, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman even contends that in the 1990s Islamists controlled "nearly all the student unions" in Morocco (1997).

55. As Nachtwey and Tessler acknowledge, the quoted survey has limitations (1999, 60). "Support for Islamist movements and platforms" was measured by constructing an index combining the responses to (1) the degree to which religion should guide administrative and political matters and (2) the extent to which religion should guide administrative and political matters. Such responses may reveal potential support for Islamist movement but are by no means a sufficient condition. For instance, high scores might just as well translate into votes for the Istiqlal.

2

Party Institutionalization and Emancipation from the Islamist Movement

TWO INTERRELATED INFLUENCES affecting Islamist party choices are the party's own organization and its relationship with the ISMO that brought it into being. At the beginning of a party's life, leadership choices are unconstrained. How much this changes depends on the shape and value of the organization's internal rules and bodies, organizational investment, and its approach toward membership recruitment. Taken together, organizational development thus defines the extent and form to which an organization is a constraint on leadership decisions; it also indicates the extent to which the organization is intended to and can be used as a tool to reach out to voters.

The way party organization is set up and evolves over time can take many different forms regarding the degree of institutionalization and party membership. The organizational evolution of an Islamist party can involve the building of a strong and solid organization with a large amount of hierarchical and functional subunits, clearly defined channels of articulation, and decision-making procedures. The party can aim at a mass membership to reach out to new segments of society or to be a vanguard party with a small but committed membership. In both cases, to gain and maintain members requires that they be offered incentives for their participation—for instance, a say in the selection of candidates for public office. However, the development of an Islamist party might also mirror the evolution of other political parties in Morocco, which often remain empty skeletons where organizational units exist only virtually, decisions are taken by a small group of leaders, membership is passive or absent, and party activities are restricted to the two weeks of official electoral campaigning. In that case, party

organization per se would have little impact on the party's course; party decisions would be the outcome of bargaining among key leaders.

Relevant for the party's freedom of action as an organization is also its relationship with its founding organization. This organization "behind" the party has created it to pursue the organization's interests inside and perhaps outside the formal political institutions. What type of influence this ISMO will try to exert obviously depends on its preferences. Yet a likely scenario is that its leaders and activists are more committed to a purist agenda given that they have not become political party members and do not experience institutional constraints and socialization.

How much impact the ISMO can have, be it through direct interference on decision making or through more indirect channels, is strongly linked to aspects of organizational development. Besides some critical initial choices—for instance, to give the party formal autonomy or not—two issues will be crucial in defining the strength of party boundaries vis-à-vis the ISMO. One is the degree of implementation of formal rules inside the party and whether the party organization, not the ISMO, is the locus of legitimate decision making for party concerns. This issue is obviously linked to the process of party institutionalization. The second is the degree of party dependency on external resources for creating support: Does the party have to rely on the ISMO for human and material resources, or can it mobilize by its own means?

My interest here, of course, is the development of the PJD's organization and its relationship with its Islamist founding organization, the MUR, in the past decade. This development involves four core themes: the degree of intraorganizational institutionalization as mirrored in organizational complexity and structural coherence; power relationships in the party; the party's approach to membership; and its emancipation process from its founding organization, the MUR.

PARTY ORGANIZATION

The Setting Up of Party Organization

After having struck the deal in 1992 to integrate the MUR with the dormant MPCD, Islamist leaders toured the country and started to build up or to reanimate

the party's local and provincial units. These so-called federations existed mainly on paper. Although the integration deal did not become official until 1996, the Islamist leadership aimed to make it a fact from early on through a deliberate investment in the party organization. The creation or reanimation of party structures started in the cities, where the Islamists could rely on existing movement structures, mainly in Casablanca, Tangier, Rabat, Fes, and Oujda (interview no. 2). The leadership sometimes also called upon former student leaders to open branches in unexplored cities (interview no. 20).

Integrating with a theoretically existing formal structure, the Islamist leaders joined the top decision-making body of the old MPCD, the General Secretariat. In the extraordinary party congress from June 2 to June 4, 1996, that formalized the deal, Abdelilah Benkirane, Abdallah Baha, Lahsen Daoudi, and Saadeddine El-Othmani were appointed to the General Secretariat. Dr. Abdelkrim El-Khatib, the MPCD's founder and leader remained its secretary-general. In addition, Benabdallah Loukouti and Mohammed Khalidi from the MPCD's old guard kept their office in the General Secretariat.

The original MCPD party by-laws provided little information about the prerogatives of party committees, their composition, and decision-making procedures. They consisted mainly of an enumeration of the different levels of organization.[1] They described party committees' tasks in vague form, but how these committees were to be chosen and how they were to reach decisions remained obscure. In fact, these 1997 by-laws had little relevance. Decisions and appointment of leaders on lower levels were centralized in the hands of the General Secretariat. Decision making in this body was organized according to a "consensual" mode among the Islamists and the MPCD's old guard, even if the Islamists already held a majority. When it came to crucial decisions, however, Dr. El-Khatib, as secretary-general, imposed his position—for instance, in the party's abstention from the June 1997 municipal elections. In the local and provincial executives, where no decisions of national importance were to be taken, the decision making was more truly consensual (interview nos. 17 and 19). But because the leadership on these lower levels was appointed by the General Secretariat, they were accountable to this body, not to the respective lower levels themselves.

1. Published in the party's newspaper *al-'Asr,* Oct. 10, 1997.

In sum, a sort of top-down semiconsensual model linked the party's different bodies, with no articulation given to the base.

As the organization was being set up, it started to take a different shape. The MUR representatives pushed for a democratization of party structures, knowing that doing so would strengthen them with respect to the "old guard" of the MPCD (interview no. 2). Throughout this period, the Islamists were developing the local structures, bringing committees on all levels to life, and enrolling members. On October 6, 1998, the change of name to "Party of Justice and Development" was officially announced.[2] When the PJD held its national congress in November 1999, it claimed to have developed party structures in fifty-one prefectures and provinces, out of a total of sixty-five (*al-Sahifa al-Jadida,* Nov. 26, 1999).[3]

In contrast to the former federations that were closest to a caucus, run by a small group of elites, these new local sections had characteristics of both branches and cells.[4] They were not purely expansive because the quality of the members was more important than their quantity, but they were not secretive either. The local sections performed three major activities: the framing and education of party members; the organization of public conferences and debates on current political topics (ranging from the budget law to the Moroccan personal status code, the Western Sahara, and corruption); and the organization of leisure and charity activities in conjunction with Islamist movement associations—all of which were seen as necessary means for "representing and ultimately governing one day" (interview no. 20).

Before the 1999 party congress, the party held provincial congresses for selecting the delegates and setting up more detailed by-laws.[5] According to the 1999 by-laws and the later 2004 by-laws, the PJD was organized like the administrative map of Morocco—that is, in national, regional, provincial, and

2. Decision taken during the Third National Council at Bouznika, October 3–4, 1998 (see *al-Majlis al-Watani, Sept. 26, 1999, leaflet).*

3. This claim does not imply that the PJD had grassroots structures in every town in these provinces, only that it had developed some structures in each of the provinces.

4. For a discussion of the historical characteristics of caucuses, branches, and cells, see Duverger 1963, 23–36.

5. Undated photocopy, handed to the author by the PJD's national party bureau in February 2003.

local institutions. Compared to 1997, the 1999 by-laws established a more complex organization with an increasing number of party bodies and procedural prescriptions—a trend that was further developed in the 2004 by-laws.

Legislative bodies were set up on all levels: local and provincial congresses and a national party congress (see figure 4 for the PJD's basic organizational scheme). According to the by-laws, the National Congress was the supreme body. Here, all decisions of principle were to be taken. An additional legislative institution was the National Council, a body that had a more limited number of delegates and theoretically fewer prerogatives than the party congress, but that was supposed to meet more often and to assess more continuously the work of the top executive body, the General Secretariat. According to these rules, the base had a fairly high articulation via the party congress and the National Council. The members' rights were enlarged, especially vis-à-vis the General Secretariat, which was previously—even formally—rather autonomous in its decisions. Elected by the National Council and confirmed by the National Congress, the members of the General Secretariat were more accountable to the party membership.

The executive committees were organized in local, provincial, and national secretariats. The local and provincial secretariats supervised and organized the party's activities in the respective constituencies and ensured communication among the different hierarchical levels. The General Secretariat was entrusted with the steering of the ordinary affairs as well as with the administration and supervision of the provincial secretariats. There eventually were institutions that had the duty to coordinate and plan, such as the Regional Coordination Council and the Administrative Commission. Members of these bodies were appointed by the General Secretariat.

Before the April 2004 party congress, the leadership gave the by-laws a thorough revision and further increased the organization's complexity and homogeneity.[6] Several new committees on the regional and provincial level, such as regional congresses, and a new conflict-resolving committee were created; the General Secretariat was functionally divided into three committees (political

6. The 2004 by-laws were adopted by the PJD's National Council on March 21, 2004, and published in the party's newspaper *al-'Asr* on April 9, 2004.



4. PJD basic organizational structure. *Source:* Based on the PJD's 1999 and 2004 by-laws.

affairs, organizational affairs, and sectoral politics). The number of different functional units inside the party increased from eight in 1997 to ten in 1999 to fifteen in 2004. In this process, the description of every committee's tasks also became much more streamlined. For instance, a local secretariat and a regional secretariat would have the same functions, the only difference being the level on which these functions are performed. One can thus speak of a deliberate increase in organizational complexity and homogeneity.

Increasing Formalization and Respect of Formal Rules

Besides the increase in organizational complexity and homogeneity, the leadership also enacted in the 1999 by-laws a first increase in the formalization, amount, and level of detail for procedures. These by-laws specified more clearly the relationships between the different party bodies, their composition, and their prerogatives. Nevertheless, the 1999 description of the function of the General Secretariat as "steering the ordinary affairs" and "organizing the administrative responsibilities" still left ample room for interpretation. The General Secretariat

made use of this margin and cemented its position as the most powerful party committee over the years.

In contrast to this vagueness, the changes that the leadership introduced in the 2004 by-laws rendered the interpretation of the General Secretariat explicit. The General Secretariat became in charge of major tasks such as organizing the electoral participation, supervising other party bodies, and interpreting the party's by-laws. The by-laws enumerated all these new tasks in lengthy lists. The 2004 revision also led to a clearer and more detailed definition of the National Council's prerogatives. Only the prerogatives of the National Congress were not rendered more concrete.

Similar to the ever more detailed prerogatives of most party committees, the procedures for the selection of candidates for parliamentary and local elections also became much more formalized and detailed. For the first parliamentary elections in 1997, no formal nomination procedure was elaborated. For the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections and the 2003 municipal elections, however, increasingly lengthy procedures, approved by the National Council, specified exactly which committee had what influence at which moment of the selection process. The same applies to the selection of party leaders.

But how much did these procedures matter? Overall, their importance certainly increased. On a discourse level, there was after 1999 a much publicized commitment to internal democratic practices, respect of procedures, and their transparency. In the opening session of the 1999 congress, al-Muqri al-Idrissi Abu Zaid, chairman of this session, MP, and member of the General Secretariat, emphasized that a political party that did not respect its own rules could not protest against the state's lack of rule of law.[7] As another party leader put it in 2003, a rule can be more or less good, but the most important thing was that the rules were clear and transparent and applied to everybody (interview no. 1). In a similar fashion, provincial secretaries cited party rules to defend contested decisions vis-à-vis the base—for instance, regarding the selection of electoral candidates.[8]

7. His statement was reprinted in *al-Tajdid* (Dec. 1, 1999), the MUR's newspaper.

8. A provincial secretary explained his reaction to party members' discontent about parachuting a nonaffiliated businessman into the top spot on the electoral list in the following terms: "We told them that according to the procedure that we voted for, the choice of the General Assembly [composed of local party members] is not the end of the story. Our rule states that first it is

At the same time, party bodies' formal power was not always respected, as is exemplified by the party congress held in 2004. The National Congress's formal prerogatives had remained the same since 1999, as mentioned earlier: it was the party's supreme body, responsible for defining its general orientations. However, a comparison of the party congress proceedings in 1999 and those in 2004 shows that no decisions of principle were voted on in 2004. Whereas the 1999 party congress had made a crucial and far-reaching decision to limit the party's coverage of electoral districts, all political discussion about the party's future orientations was banned from the 2004 congress. Such issues were exclusively debated in the National Council, and the energy of the congress delegates was directed to activities in so-called *ateliers* (workshops) about free trade, pensions, social security, and the like. These *ateliers,* however, had no binding output regarding the party's political positions but were intended to be an exchange of ideas or to be oriented toward education and training.[9] Thus, the National Congress's real power was much smaller than its formal power, at least in 2004.

Nevertheless, the commitment to transparency of procedures and to some degree of intraorganizational democracy has been more to the PJD than just lip service. The very fact that the General Secretariat aimed to formalize the extension of its powers instead of keeping them vague as in the 1999 by-laws shows that formal legitimacy and transparency were valued in the PJD. Instead of imposing the leadership decisions or falsifying internal elections, the leadership preferred to invest energy in devising lengthy and complicated but transparent procedures that limited the risk of undesired outcomes. This preference for increasing for-

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the General Assembly, and then it is the General Secretariat, OK? That's our rule. . . . OK, we are unhappy because in the vote of the General Assembly it was Mr. [name omitted] who was first. . . . But our rules explain well the process, so I had to tell them that the General Secretariat has the final say. Here, at [city name omitted], Mr. [name omitted] was among the 10 percent [of the top candidates that the General Secretariat was entitled to change for the 2002 parliamentary elections]" (interview no. 22).

9. Conversation with the coordinator of the party congress, Rabat, Apr. 9, 2004. Moreover, although the by-laws state that the General Secretariat could add up to 5 percent to the total number of delegates, out of the around two thousand party delegates with the right to vote, only fifteen hundred had been selected in the local constituencies and five hundred added by the General Secretariat (interview no. 4).

malization made clear that the leadership considered the commitment to transparency of procedures and to internal democratic structures a necessary burden. This commitment was part of the party's message, identity, and, importantly, political capital with respect to other Moroccan parties.

Evolution of Power Relationships

Changes in selection procedures for electoral candidates and the party leadership are instructive for understanding the evolution of the power relationships among the base, leadership, and deputies. Additional indicators of the deputies' power include restrictions on tenure, their accountability to the extraparliamentary party, and their representation in powerful party committees (see Katz and Mair 1993).

The procedures for nominating electoral candidates are a key component of power relations. They also reflect some characteristics of the PJD organizational evolution. In 1997, when its organizational structures were still in their formative stages and the competences and prerogatives of the different party bodies were only loosely defined, the General Secretariat straightforwardly nominated the candidates. There was no formalized participation of the party base, and the decision was fully centralized. In the 2002 elections, however, the party was in its most democratic state. In these elections, new internal regulations specified that the candidates were to be nominated by the base in a given circumscription. The General Secretariat could change the top candidates of electoral lists in 10 percent of the cases only and not at all if the top candidate in a list had been elected with more than 60 percent of the votes.[10] In general, local decisions were respected in this important issue. Where conflicts with the base arose because the General Secretariat wanted to change the top candidate, concerted efforts were made toward consensual conflict resolution and communication (interview no. 2).

For the selection of candidates for the 2003 municipal elections and the 2007 parliamentary elections, the General Secretariat's intervention took a different

10. These votes were used mostly to secure a seat in Parliament for those members of the General Secretariat who did not have constituencies with strong electoral support.

style. Before the 2003 elections, the General Secretariat introduced a procedure that made those lists drawn by the local assemblies seem to be a suggestion only, a first of three stages in total. This quite complicated procedure aimed at disguising the base's limited choice.[11] The General Secretariat de facto had the power to change the ranking of the candidates, to add candidates, and to withdraw the lists. A similar procedure was applied to candidate selection for the 2007 parliamentary elections.[12] In short, the local party membership's power in the selection of electoral candidates has decreased considerably since 2003.

Changes in the procedures for selecting party leadership show a similar pattern. (An overview of the procedures is shown in table 2.) The 1997 by-laws did not even mention how the secretary-general and his deputy were to be chosen, and the remaining members of the party leadership were supposedly appointed by the political commission. In reality, the party leader, Dr. El-Khatib, with whom the Islamists had made the integration deal, appointed the MUR share of the General Secretariat.

In the 1999 internal elections, the by-laws provided for a direct election of the secretary-general by the National Congress. Members of the General Secretariat were chosen by the National Council, but the National Congress had the power to assent. In reality, the direct election of the secretary-general by the party congress in 1999 was changed to the direct election of his deputy. At that moment, it was too early to hold an election for a secretary-general who might have dethroned Dr. El-Khatib. Nevertheless, in these elections the party base had a true choice, and the Islamist leader Saadeddine El-Othmani was elected as Dr. El-Khatib's deputy.

In 2004, as the PJD was heading toward the first direct election of its secretary-general, it boasted that it was the only Moroccan party in which the base

11. In this procedure, first, an assembly of local members voted for a list comprising more candidates than the final electoral list allowed for. Then a second commission on the provincial level, in which members of the General Secretariat were present, discussed all the lists in the province. A third commission, this time headed by a member of the General Secretariat, then took the final decision concerning the ranking and the composition of the lists.

12. The main difference was that the degree of intervention was quantified and limited to 20 percent and that the leadership made less use of its formal power than it had done in 2003 (interview no. 34).

TABLE 2
CHANGES IN SELECTION PROCEDURES FOR PJD OFFICE: 1997, 1999, 2004

	Secretary-General	*Deputy Secretary-General*	*Members of General Secretariat*
1997	Not elected	Not elected	Appointed by political commission
1999	Elected by National Congress	Not mentioned	Elected by National Council; approved by National Congress
2004	Preselection of three candidates by National Council; election by National Congress	National Council either approves the candidate chosen by the secretary-general or chooses one of two candidates proposed by the secretary-general.	National Council elects 14 out of a list of 21 proposed by the secretary-general.

would have such power. The party, however, had gone through a difficult period in 2003 that had required a high level of compromise from the party's leadership with the regime, and the General Secretariat feared the revenge of the base (see chapter 3).[13] The 2004 by-laws and the internal regulations for the party congress accordingly showed again the leadership's inclination toward complicated procedures that would allow for both voice of the party base and the avoidance of undesirable outcomes.[14] Although in principle all members of the General Secretariat were elected, a pre(s)election process in all these elections limited the available choices considerably by introducing an intermediate step.[15] In the case of the secretary-general, the National Council preselected the acceptable candidates before

13. Conversation with members of the General Secretariat, Rabat, Apr. 8, 2004.

14. The internal regulations for the congress were published in *al-'Asr* (Apr. 9, 2004, 15–16).

15. At that moment, the PJD also still had to consider the founding members of the old MPCD or their sons. Thus, eight members of the General Secretariat were appointed, not elected. The first two special cases were Dr. El-Khatib and Benabdallah Loukouti. As party founders, they were awarded the party presidency of honor and the National Council presidency of honor, respectively, and thus lifetime membership in the General Secretariat (2004 by-laws, §§11–15). Moreover, the General Secretariat could add six other members in order to take on board the MPCD's old, non-Islamist guard, such as Mohammed Khalidi, who was more than unlikely to be elected by the

the congress delegates had their say;[16] in the case of the members of the General Secretariat, the new secretary-general preselected candidates from which the National Council was to choose.[17] In sum, the 1999 by-laws increased the power of the base in the selection of the leadership, but the 2004 by-laws, although not going back to the autocratic procedures of 1997, reversed this trend by introducing some buffers in the selection process and by increasing the power of the newly elected secretary-general.

The General Secretariat's predominance in determining the party's procedures is also visible with respect to other groups and committees in the party. The MPs, as a group, have never been influential. In the party's first years, they were almost identical with the leadership. From the second legislative period starting in 2002 on, the party leadership saw it necessary to control explicitly the now much larger group of MPs. A formal party regulation authorized the General Secretariat, among other things, to decide how the MPs would vote and to intervene in the nomination of the parliamentary group's key offices. Of course, individual MPs might informally have influenced party decisions because their status and their access to information and other resources provided them with alliances inside the party. As a group, however, the PJD's MPs had no influence on important decisions.[18]

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base. After the 2004 congress, a group of the old guard led by Khalidi nevertheless left the PJD and founded a new party.

16. Candidates had to be members of the National Council, and in the first step of selecting candidates for the secretary-general position only members of the National Council could cast ballots. Any candidate who had more than 20 percent of the votes was retained on the list. In a second step, National Council delegates voted for three candidates for the final election.

17. For the position of the deputy secretary-general, the secretary-general proposed a single candidate, and only if this candidate failed to get the majority of the votes would he propose a second candidate. In the latter case, the candidate receiving the greater number of votes would be appointed. For the remaining fourteen seats of the General Secretariat, the secretary-general proposed twenty-one candidates from which the National Council could choose.

18. MPs suffered an additional loss in power in 2004. Until the revision of the by-laws, they were by virtue of their office members of the National Council and of the party congress. Since then, MPs were granted automatic membership only in the regional and provincial congresses. Moreover, the power of the regional, provincial, and local executives was enlarged with respect to the party's deputies on all the levels. The by-laws explicitly conferred these secretariats the right of supervision of the deputies.

The National Council's role has been more ambiguous. Its statuary prerogatives are leadership control and initiative (see figure 4). In practice, the National Council has been an important committee to the extent that its support has to be won for implementing positions. There is only one clear-cut instance in party history where the council imposed its vote against the General Secretariat's preferred choice: the withdrawal of the party's support of the government in 2000 (see chapter 3). Yet the National Council has rarely pushed its own propositions. It also appears that the General Secretariat has increasingly used the National Council to legitimate decisions already taken and has sometimes held votes without giving National Council members time to develop counterpropositions (interview no. 17). The National Council also revealed its weakness by its approval of the 2003 nomination procedure of electoral candidates and of the revision of the by-laws in March 2004. These by-laws extended the power of the National Council but formalized a much larger extension of the General Secretariat's prerogatives.[19]

Overall, the party leadership, on the one hand, became increasingly suspicious of the outcome of the popular vote but, on the other, was committed to "democratic" party structures and procedural transparency in its discourse. At stake, as a party leader stressed, was finding an equilibrium between "the interests of the party" and "the interests of the activists" (interview no. 1). This attitude toward the party base was strongly related to the difficult political decisions the PJD had to take in 2003—a period in which the PJD leadership increasingly came to view its members as "programmatic liabilities."

PARTY MEMBERSHIP: CONCEPT, COMPOSITION, AND EVOLUTION

Not much is known about party membership in Morocco. When asked about their membership, palace parties such as the UC and the RNI refer to their

19. In particular, the National Council's new prerogatives to approve or reject the party's annual budget and to ratify and amend the by-laws (§§23 and 71) were much more explicit instruments to challenge the General Secretariat's decisions than the vague "control" of the General Secretariat conferred on the National Council by the 1999 by-laws.

electorate or to the people attending electoral meetings, whereas the Istiqlal states that it has between 70,000 and 150,000 members, and the USFP claims between 90,000 and 120,000 members (Santucci 2005). Besides the vagueness of these numbers, the latter two parties do not indicate whether these people are formally enrolled members or merely sympathizers (Santucci 2005, 47). In general, it is argued that Moroccan parties have recruitment problems and that active involvement in political parties is decreasing (Axtmann 2003; Santucci 2001, 2005; Willis 2002a, 2002b).

In what way did the PJD try to be different from the other Moroccan parties? What type of members did it aim to recruit, and what trade-offs were involved in recruiting different types of party members? What did it mean to be a member in the PJD, from both the party's perspective and the members' perspective?

The analysis of party membership in this section is based on the party's by-laws, the accounts given in the interviews, and quantitative data.[20] The data come mainly from my sample of the PJD's delegates at the 2004 party congress, and I therefore limit my discussion of their incentives for joining the party to the period until that congress. The sample of congress delegates is obviously not representative of overall membership: congress participants are a particular type of member, surely the most active share of a party's membership.[21] In full acknowledgment of the limits of these data, I argue that they can nevertheless shed some light on tendencies and trends in the membership's overall composition for two reasons. First, the PJD appears to have a rather small membership. Although it was impossible to get precise figures on the membership from the party's national office because no one had a clear idea of how many members the PJD actually had at this time or was willing to provide this information, the figures mentioned by the party leaders in 2003 varied from 10,000 to 12,000. A congress composed of 2,000 delegates thus makes up more than 15 percent of the party. Second, participation in the party's 2004 National Congress was not limited to members holding party office. Even if the local leadership (members of the local party bureaus) and the intermediate leadership (members of the National Council or of regional and provincial bureaus) make up for almost half of my sample, simple members

20. A table summarizing these data is provided in appendix A.

21. For simplicity, I sometimes refer to the congress delegate sample as the "membership."

account for one-third of it. In addition, a large share of the around 15 percent who did not reply to the question regarding total membership were likely to be members because the questionnaire asked them to indicate the party office they held: those claiming not to have an "office" were most likely simple members.

Approach to Membership

Recruiting party members is a conscious decision made by party leaders: it implies investing organizational resources that might be spent otherwise (Bartolini 1983, 207–8). Member privileges and obligations and the degree of inclusiveness can thus provide an idea of what goals a party aims to achieve through membership recruitment and, vice versa, what motivates those who join the party.

Party members can be both a liability and a resource. Members can be a programmatic liability because they "tend to support vote-losing policies" and a material liability because enrolling and maintaining members are costly (Scarrow 1996, 40–41). At the same time, there are several potential benefits from membership recruitment. Susan Scarrow lists the following benefits attached to different degrees of member involvement: legitimacy (in the case of mass parties), direct electoral benefits (they vote more regularly), outreach (declarations of support for the party), and financial benefits (subscription fees) through passive members (1996, 41–45). Labor (in and outside campaigns), linkage (information about grassroots opinion), innovation (through new ideas), and personnel benefits require more active members. The more active members a party wants, the more incentives for their participation it has to provide, usually by increasing the privileges of membership in the party. Privileges refer, of course, to party members' power to influence the party's program and the selection of leaders and candidates. In addition to member privileges, a party's degree of inclusiveness—the obligations imposed on members plus how difficult it is to enter the party (Scarrow 1996, 30)—can shed light on a party's approach to membership.

As discussed earlier, the PJD of the late 1990s and the early 2000s was a party where members held "medium privileges."[22] Even if, objectively, PJD members'

22. For a discussion of "extreme cases" of privileges and obligations in parties, see Scarrow 1996, 16–18.

power decreased from 2003 on, they still maintained more influence than did members of other Moroccan parties, and PJD members mentioned this as a reason for joining the party. The PJD's congress delegates pointed to the internal structures as exceptionally democratic and transparent, a perception surely related to the absence of privileges for members in other Moroccan parties.[23] Indeed, the election of the secretary-general by the congress delegates and the comparatively large influence members had on the selection of electoral candidates should be noted as specific characteristics in the context of Moroccan political parties in this period, in which a change of leadership had so far occurred mainly at the leader's death and electoral candidates were selected mostly by the party leadership.

As to the PJD's degree of inclusiveness, from a formal point of view membership in the party has been open to any Moroccan citizen from the very beginning. As the party by-laws prescribe, any citizen who accepts the party's principles and goals can adhere. In the Moroccan context, however, openness of membership is a requirement for party legalization, and, indeed, behind the formal openness the PJD has a strict concept of membership and controlled adherence. It imposes obligations on its members and makes a clear distinction between members and sympathizers.

In the beginning, the leaders opted consciously for an activist type of member who would be involved in party work on a very regular basis (interview no. 14). Leaders clearly cared about the coherence of membership, its attachment to the Islamist project, and its activism. They wanted to be the "locomotive of a political, social, and cultural current" (interview no. 14).[24] Formal enrollment and a financial subscription were required of members.[25] The 1999 by-laws designated two steps for enrollment: initial adherence as a "participating member," with the possibility of being upgraded to a "working member" after one year. In contrast to the working members, participating members did not have access to any party legislative or executive body (§3).[26] With the setting up of two types

23. Conversations with congress delegates, Rabat, Apr. 8–11, 2004.

24. In this respect, the PJD's small but carefully scrutinized membership is thus different from the less-engaged membership of a larger party.

25. Members also had to pay to attend the National Congress.

26. The by-laws do not contain any details about the basis on which the party can refuse to accept someone as a member or about possible channels through which someone whose application was rejected can make an appeal.

of membership, the party aimed to monitor membership evolution closely. The first- and second-class membership was used for the evaluation of an adherent's efforts: "A member, that's someone that you have—I wouldn't say examined—but that you have had the opportunity to evaluate as a function of the tasks that have been confided to him, as a function of his participation, of different things" (interview no. 20). Moreover, local sections could not simply select a member; the admission of someone as "participating member" required the approval of a provincial secretariat, whereas the upgrade to the status of a working member had to be approved by the General Secretariat.[27]

In the party's early years, the actual control of adherence was stronger than prescribed in the by-laws. The practice was that two people had to stand warrant for someone who wanted to become a member (interview no. 22). The applicant alternatively could get a letter of recommendation from "the associations" (i.e., Islamist organizations). With the demand for adherence increasing alongside the PJD's growing electoral success, local party bureaus tried to counter the problem of not knowing an applicant by gathering information on his reputation—that is, by asking about him in his neighborhood (interview no. 25). Thus, the party hoped to build up a clear picture of the background of those eventually admitted as members.

Why did PJD opt for such a concept of membership? The PJD leaders had initially contemplated the idea of aiming at a large membership. Indeed, one should assume that involving more people actively would be an objective of Islamists permitted to set up a legal organization. The leadership discarded a mass-party approach, however, and opted for a vanguard-party concept with high obligations on membership for three main reasons: to decrease the risk of infiltration; to make sure that PJD members were sympathy generators among the population and to avoid damaging its reputation should activists not correspond to the image of morality it wants to communicate (interview no. 14); and to avoid weakening programmatic integrity through rapid expansion of the membership with people not attached to the party's project.[28]

27. By 2003, the General Secretariat had delegated this power to the provincial secretariats.

28. Interestingly, this argument corresponds to one made by Samuel Huntington (1968, 22–23). Angelo Panebianco, although challenging the size–cohesion link, argues that more important

It appears, however, that organizational needs led to a relatively rapid change in the party's approach to membership. The PJD's territorial and institutional expansion forced it to fill positions in the party and in the electoral lists with newcomers.[29]

Quick promotion into party office and electoral lists became possible. Among the party congress delegates, around one-fourth of the newcomers (that is, those joining after 2000) were already in intermediate leadership positions (members of the party's National Council or of provincial or regional bureaus), and another one-fourth held local leadership positions (members of local party bureaus).[30] As to electoral candidacy, the PJD promoted very recent members in the 2003 municipal elections. According to my data, more than 20 percent of those who had entered the party a mere couple of months before the elections—and therefore had surely not gone through different stages of membership—were already nominated as electoral candidates in 2003. And of those who entered the PJD between 2000 and 2002, more than 60 percent made it onto an electoral list.[31]

The newcomers' candidature resulted either from their own initiative or from the party leadership's initiative. In contrast to the rules applying in the Islamist movement and apparently also to the initial practice in the PJD, candidates could nominate themselves beginning in 2002—a first move to relax the concept of a nonindividualist approach to office. In addition, party leaders sometimes pro-

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than the link's reality is the fact that the leaders themselves believe in it and act accordingly (1988, 186–87).

29. Besides the small size of the MUR's pool of activists itself, the party's limited human resources are also the consequence of MUR activists' reluctance to shift to official politics. For instance, one interviewee reported that he had to set up his local branch with only seventeen members, the only ones from the pool of local MUR members willing to shift to official politics (interview no. 15).

30. Even if these functions were not remunerated, there may be some benefits related to membership in local or provincial secretariats, such as status, the use of party bureau infrastructure, and close contact with MPs and party leaders, who have access to resources and patronage.

31. Moreover, among those successful in the 2003 communal elections, an almost equal proportion came from each of the first three groups of party members (1992–96, 1997–99, 2000–2002), even with a lower proportion of adherents between 1997 and 1999 than of newcomers from 2000 onward. Appendix A provides this information for only two groups, those who joined until 1999 and those who joined after 1999. More detailed data are available from the author upon request.

posed or imposed the nomination of a newcomer when the candidate had local influence, good relations with the authorities, or special professional skills. As the party saw it, some of its members were not necessarily "the best" (interview no. 20). For the 2003 elections, such parachuting of newcomers was especially common if candidates were seen as competent for local governance (interview no. 13). In fact, "competent candidates" did not even have to be party members if they were "honest, hard-working people, cadres . . . that [had] a certain profile" (interview no. 20). They were deemed to have too high a standing to require them to climb up through the party hierarchy before becoming a candidate (interview no. 3).[32] It is not clear just how compatible these high-profile newcomers were with the party's ideology. For instance, one of these cadres, once in office, drafted a project for social housing to be financed through loans with an interest rate of 7 percent. Acknowledging this project's contradictions with the Islamist claim against usury, he stated: "Mon stylo ne freine pas [My pen does not slow down], and I don't even realize; for me, that's fine" (interview no. 6). To him, financing was a necessary condition, knowing that otherwise the project would not materialize at all. It was, however, in strong contradiction to the policies promoted by the MUR and to some extent by the PJD itself, which had run a strong campaign against a microcredit project because the credit was to be lent at interest.

To be sure, the recruitment of candidates from a separate class than the party's rank and file had come to an almost complete halt by 2007. Although the General Secretariat introduced a couple of lawyers and economists in the lists, this intervention was relatively small (interview nos. 33 and 34). The practice was ultimately incompatible with the party's need of members for active electoral mobilization.

Nevertheless, the latest revision of the by-laws in 2004 indicates that a reassessment of the party's degree of inclusiveness had taken place more generally. Although the two-class membership was retained, section 8, dealing with the prerequisites of the working membership, states that someone can become a

32. This incorporation of cadres into the party corresponds to what Panebianco calls the "horizontal integration of elites." "People enter the party at high levels from the outside environments in which they already occupy elite positions, i.e. they convert other resources into political resources" (1988, 62). In the PJD's case, most of these new elites came from the Forum for Development.

working member without going through the participating membership if the appropriate party institutions (which ones are not mentioned) decide so. Moreover, participating members are entitled to participate in the local congresses. In less than a decade, the PJD had thus evolved from a vanguard party to a more inclusive one.

Party Members

A relevant peculiarity of the PJD regarding membership has been its success in attracting young party members. This aspect distinguishes the PJD considerably from other Moroccan parties, whose lack of internal generational mobility is often reported in the literature (e.g., Axtmann 2003, 13; Santucci 2001, 94). These other parties, although aware of the crucial electorate the young constitute in Morocco, have failed to attract the generation between ages twenty and forty (Willis 2002a, 19). According to the data from the 2004 party congress questionnaire, around 20 percent of the respondents were younger than thirty, and two-thirds were younger than forty. That young people joined a political party was significant in a society where this generation is either depoliticized or politically active in nonpartisan civil society organizations.

One reason for the PJD's success in attracting young people may be that the PJD has been willing to promote them to public office: around 40 percent of its candidates in the 2002 elections were—at that moment—younger than forty years old.[33] Table 3 shows the age distribution of the elected PJD MPs as compared to the age of all Moroccan MPs in 2002. Although the share of those in their thirties is smaller among those actually elected in 2002, this group still constituted almost one-quarter of the PJD's MPs at this time, the biggest group being in their forties. In contrast, around 45 percent of all MPs were older than fifty, whereas only 12 percent were in their thirties. Compared to the rest of the Moroccan MPs elected in 2002, the PJD's MPs were thus considerably younger. The proffering of

33. The profiles of the PJD's 2002 electoral candidates is summarized in appendix B. I lack similar data for other Moroccan political parties. However, in the Popular Movement's heads of list in 2002 ($n = 91$), only 10 percent were younger than forty; see http://www.harakamp.org.ma/fichiers/candidats_loc.htm.

opportunities for young people was in fact a conscious decision by the leadership, intended to attract young people and to promote the generational renewal of both the party and the parliamentary group in order to prevent the party from losing touch with younger generations (interview no. 10).

For young Moroccans without connections to the elite, the PJD thus to some extent has provided a career opportunity. For instance, a female candidate in the 2003 elections—with a law degree but unemployed—explained that she was motivated to get involved in the party because of the PJD's nonelitist approach in comparison with other parties. One did not need to "have a name" or to represent something in order to be accepted and promoted in the PJD. All that mattered were goodwill and competence (interview no. 30).

A second key characteristic of the surveyed PJD members is their high level of education. Among the 2004 congress deputies, around 70 percent held a university degree, thus mirroring the profile of the Moroccan Islamist movement as a movement of the educated. This figure suggests that the profile extends to the party's membership. A look into the 2004 membership's occupations further shows that more than 50 percent of them were civil servants, the largest share being those working in the educational sector—most frequently as secondary teachers. This employment in the educational sector in turn may have facilitated

TABLE 3
AGE OF PJD MPS AND ALL MOROCCAN MPS, 2002

Age	*PJD MPs (%)*	*Moroccan MPs (%)*
30–39	23.8	11.7
40–49	61.9	40.3
50–59	14.3	30.8
60+	0.0	13.5
Unknown	0.0	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Age of PJD MPs from information given in *al-Tajdid* compiled by author. The age of all Moroccan MPs was originally published on the government Web site for the 2002 elections, www.elections2002.ma. The site is no longer available. An article by the official news agency MAP that gives the information is reproduced at http://www.bladi.net/le-profil-des-nouveaux-elus-et-projection-des-resultats.html.

recruitment among the young. Some PJD members were employees in state ministries. The large proportion of state employees suggests that the PJD was at this time—at least concerning its membership—not a party of excluded Moroccans.

Furthermore, the congress delegates surveyed were very involved in broader social and political activities. They were to a large extent affiliated with other social and political organizations. More than 50 percent of the respondents held a labor union membership card, and more than 80 percent were active in social or cultural associations.[34] The strong involvement in other organizations suggests that the PJD members were generally active citizens even before becoming party members, but that they were apparently not motivated to join other Moroccan parties. Membership and activism in nonpartisan organizations, such as in the student or labor union and the creation of social and cultural associations, were means of legal political and social action and of promoting their vision about society and the political order.

Membership Evolution: Did the PJD Change?

The initial wave of adherence to the PJD took place between 1992 and 1999, when movement members engaged in the "renovation" and creation of party federations. Until 1997, party membership was almost confined to the Islamist leadership level; then, between 1997 and the National Congress in 1999, MUR members who had neither been involved in the negotiations with the regime nor been assigned the task of founding local sections were enrolled in the party—pushed by the Islamist leadership: "We had to make people join" (interview no. 2). One can therefore assume that a major proportion of those MUR members initially interested and willing to engage in party politics joined the party in that period.

In this context, it is interesting to look at the 2004 sample by moment of adherence, divided into two groups. A first group reflects the more exclusive

34. Note, however, that the respondents had a very broad definition of social and cultural associations. For example, one interviewee mentioned that he was in an association of parents of high school students and then ticked "yes" in response to the question about affiliation with social or cultural associations.

period when membership was reserved to movement members (until 1999), and a second group shows a period when adherence was still monitored, but, as discussed earlier, membership criteria started to soften (2000–2004). In my sample, the newcomers account for more than one-third of the respondents. Considering that the sample consists of congress delegates only, among whom long-standing members should be especially represented, the high proportion of newcomers suggests that the softening of membership criteria actually had numerical effects. How did this second generation of PJD members differ from the first?

A first observation to be made is that the PJD increasingly attracted female members. According to my sample, women tended to adhere later than men did. In the founding generation, women constituted only a very small proportion of the membership. In the generation of newcomers, though, women constituted around one-fourth of the party members. This change may be related to the PJD's comparatively open position toward the participation of women in public life. In contrast to some Islamist movements and parties in other MENA states where gender segregation is part of the program (for instance, the Jordanian IAF), the Moroccan Islamists do not have restrictive attitudes toward gender mixing and female public activities.[35]

To the contrary, the PJD promoted and practiced the participation of women in political life both inside the party and in public office. The MUR leadership also defended this position from the outset to "fellow Islamists" in other MENA states.[36] As early as the 1999 party congress, the General Secretariat introduced a quota of 15 percent female delegates (interview no. 1). Since that congress,

35. The IAF also has women in high decision-making bodies and more women than any other party in Jordan (Clark and Schwedler 2003, 293). Nevertheless, in contrast to the PJD, no women work at the IAF office, and there is no woman in the party executive. In addition, the IAF confines the activities of women in the party to a separate organization. Interview with the head of the IAF's women's section, Amman, June 15, 2007.

36. See Raissouni's interview with *al-'Asr,* Oct. 7, 2002: "I remember the year 1997, when I was visiting an Arab country at the moment when we were about to contest elections in Morocco. One of my fellow brothers of the Islamist movement in that country asked me whether we were going to field female candidates. I answered him yes, and he said: 'Do you have a fatwa that legitimizes this?' I said: 'We will bring women to candidature, and the one who has a fatwa that prohibits this should bring it, and at that moment we are going to discuss it.' We have settled the debate for these issues. We brought women to candidature for the 1997 elections and also in the last ones."

there has been one female member in the General Secretariat, and since the 2004 congress, two. Moreover, in addition to those elected via the national list of women candidates (the Moroccan electoral law for the 2002 elections stipulated a 10 percent quota of female MPs to be elected from a separate list), two female PJD MPs were elected via the local lists to the 2002 Parliament. In 2003, female candidates—with and without the party leadership's intervention—won seats in municipal councils. In these elections, the PJD had the third-largest number of successful female candidates (after the USFP and the Istiqlal), even though it covered only 16 percent of the electoral districts.

A second observation about the two generations of members concerns the changes in the degree of affiliation to labor unions. More than 70 percent of the first generation of party activists had a labor union membership card, but only around 35 percent of those who joined the party after the 1999 congress did. In contrast, a decline in affiliation with "social and cultural associations" was negligible. The high degree of the first generation's affiliation with labor unions can be explained in part by the former exclusion of Islamists from party politics. It further suggests that those MUR members who shifted to the PJD were also those who were previously politically active. The different profile of the second generation of party members, in turn, suggests that after 2000 the PJD became attractive even for people who were not previously involved in other types of institutional politics.

A third observation concerns changes regarding the degree of activism in the Islamist movement. As discussed in more detail in the following section, the MUR remained a provider of new members. However, there were also newcomers who had not previously been active in the Islamist movement. Most of this group were probably people who had sympathized with the movement but not been active in it. For instance, one of the new party members explained that he had never been an Islamist movement activist. Instead, he described himself as a "consumer." In the movement, they had taught him how to pray, but he had not carried on the call (interview no. 5). This example suggests that one portion of the new party members had previously been exposed to the activities of the Islamist movement but were reluctant to engage actively in it. That the party's new members do not consist merely of the next generation of Islamist activists in the strict sense is to some extent confirmed by the absence of a correlation between the moment of party adherence and the age of the respondents in my sample. New



5. Age of PJD members by adherence. *Solid line:* first-generation members (1992–1999); *dotted line:* second-generation members (2000–2004).

party members are not substantially younger than those who adhered earlier. As shown in figure 5, the age distribution of the two generations is similar.

Taken together, the relaxation of the PJD's membership concept and the changing profile of members suggest that increasing mobilization capacities and legitimacy through membership expansion were party objectives. Although the party leadership monitored the process closely, the steady increase in membership testifies to the PJD's ambition to be more than just a vanguard of the Islamist movement, but a party that reaches out to other segments of Moroccan society. Membership expansion through non-Islamists, however, may also generate problems—precisely for the reasons that initially induced the leadership to go for the vanguard concept. Although the overwhelming majority of newcomers were probably truly sympathetic to the party's message before they joined, one may assume that they are less committed given that they did not become actively engaged under more perilous conditions.[37] The problem, then, is that these new members may also be more easily corrupted when exposed to the centripetal

37. Carrie Wickham argues in her work on Islamist mobilization in Egypt that the religious dimension of ideology helped activists to overcome "the paralyzing fear that inhibits protest in

forces of institutional norms. This was at least the perception of the party's leaders, who, besides deciding to run reputation checks on potential members and exerting strong control over the party's deputies, saw it as necessary to set up an educational program for those new members whose morality was not assured by socialization in an Islamist movement organization (interview no. 3).

THE PJD AND THE MUR: FROM INFORMAL DEPENDENCY TO FORCED AUTONOMY

The PJD's relationship with its founding organization, the MUR, is a significant factor for the party's choices. The formal aspects of the relationship, the party's independent resources, and the profile of its members, MPs, and leaders shed light on the degree of control the MUR had over the party's strategies in the political institutions both early on and later.

Starting Configuration

The PJD started as a peculiar type of indirect party. MUR leaders initially became members of the party's General Secretariat through appointment by Dr. El-Khatib, the party founder and secretary-general. The agreement between Dr. El-Khatib and the MUR provided for the Islamists' joining the party on an individual basis: MUR members were not forced to join the party, nor did the MUR fuse with the party.

The formal aspects of the relationship were subject to a lengthy discussion inside the MUR up to 2000. Between 1998 and 1999, its committees debated a total fusion with the party. This idea was eventually discarded in a vote by the Shura Council, the highest consultative committee to the MUR's Executive Bureau (*al-Tajdid,* special issue, Dec. 2002). In 2000, the Shura Council adopted the "document of complementarity" that described how the MUR viewed the division of labor: the PJD was defined as a political organization dealing with all political issues of the country and defending Islamic causes in state institutions, whereas

authoritarian settings" (2002, 171). In the reverse, this would mean that those who feared to engage in an illegal organization would be less ideologically driven than those who did engage.

the MUR was defined solely as an organization for vocation/mission *(da'wa)* and education. The two organizations were supposedly independent, though linked by "consultation, cooperation, and coordination and their joint objectives and principles." From then on, the relation was labeled a "partnership."[38]

Hence, from a prescriptive point of view, boundaries were defined relatively early and explicitly. The MUR did not gain formalized representation in party committees or any other formal channel for intervening in the design of the party program or in the nomination of candidates for elections in the national or party institutions. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, membership in the PJD was formally open from the very beginning. These steps were relevant because they meant that there were no direct mechanisms to intervene into party decisions or to revert emancipation or internal reform processes. As I discuss in more detail in chapter 5, the Muslim Brotherhood's formal control of the Jordanian IAF accounts at least in part for the instability of the IAF's decisions because they get "corrected" by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Nevertheless, the official formal separation of the PJD and the MUR does not appropriately capture the party's space to take autonomous decisions. During the first years, the informal boundaries were extremely porous. Even if the MUR had integrated a theoretically existing organization, the party clearly depended on the MUR's structures. The party shared many local offices with the MUR (interview no. 16). The overwhelming majority of the party's original national, provincial, and local party leaders and members came from the MUR—in spite of the fact that only around 15 percent of the MUR's members decided to engage directly in party politics.[39] The party leadership—with the exception of some of the party's old guard (Dr. El-Khatib and his entourage)—was composed of historical MUR leaders, such as Abdelilah Benkirane and Mohamed Yatim. The party—as an institution—had not yet acquired legitimacy for decision making. The way in which the MUR leaders entered the party's General Secretariat illus-

38. For the content of the "document of complementarity," see *al-Tajdid, special issue, Dec. 2002.*

39. The interviews indicate that the initial share of MUR affiliates was between 70 and 90 percent of the overall party membership. I suggest that the higher figure is more realistic, especially among the basic members and the local and provincial secretaries. The original party's founding generation or their sons were represented mainly in the General Secretariat via quotas.

trates this point well. The legitimacy of these appointments was based, on the one hand, on Dr. El-Khatib's charismatic authority and, on the other, on these individuals' being leaders of an external organization, the MUR.

As mentioned earlier, the party played no role in the selection of candidates for the 1997 parliamentary elections. And the campaign for these elections was essentially carried out by the MUR: the media coverage was performed by its newspaper *al-Raya,* its activists mobilized voters by going from door to door, and the MUR gave a formal endorsement. Between 1997 and 2002, virtually all PJD MPs were MUR members. Moreover, this first parliamentary group with fourteen MPs[40] was dominated by members of the MUR's first and second most important committees: the Executive Bureau and the Shura Council.

During the first years, the PJD's leadership and deputies came from the MUR, and most members and deputies' organization loyalty was likely to go to the MUR. Moreover, the party's organizational body was based on the MUR's structures, and it depended on external resources for mobilization, support, and human resources. Not surprisingly, because of this relationship, no conflicts occurred between the two organizations regarding choices of electoral strategy or vis-à-vis the regime.

Party Investment in Mobilization Resources

This picture changed slightly in the wake of the 2002 parliamentary elections. Party leaders had deliberately invested in the party's organization since the 1999 National Congress. The independent resources at the party's disposal effectively increased, including ancillary organizations, a party newspaper, and financial and human resources.

The ancillary organizations founded by the PJD consisted of a youth organization, a women's organization, and the Forum for Development—the party's "intelligentsia" (interview no. 2)—whose tasks were to develop party policies, support the parliamentary group, and give technical and political training to the

40. The initial figure after the parliamentary elections was nine. After two defections from other parties (one of them being a MUR member) and by-elections in 1999 and 2000, the group eventually comprised fourteen MPs.

party's deputies.[41] Whereas the Forum for Development was conceived to capture a new group, high-profile cadres, the other two organizations can be regarded as parallel, if not competing, organizations to the MUR: its youth organization and its (much more powerful) Organization for the Renewal of Women's Awareness (Munadamat Tajdid al-Wa'i al-Nisa'i).[42] The founding of these PJD organizations is instructive regarding the party's self-perception vis-à-vis the MUR. Had the party viewed itself merely as the movement's politico-institutional branch, such organizations would not have been created—or would exist only on paper—because it would have considered cultural and social work to be the MUR's domain.

The PJD also created its own newspaper, *al-'Asr* (Time) in 1997.[43] Moreover, the party aimed to generate new sources of income through membership subscription fees and mandatory financial contributions from its deputies.[44] The latter had to allocate at least 22 percent of their salary to the party. Out of this amount, half went to the national party headquarters and the other half to the party branch of the donating MP's electoral district.[45] The party received external financial aid in the form of the government reimbursement of the 1997 election campaign fees.

Membership expansion and diversification were additional ways for the party to increase its resources. As discussed in the previous section, the PJD did indeed successfully expand. Trends regarding diversification can be seen in the

41. The women's organization was not very active, but the youth organization set up many conferences, debates, and leisure activities at the national and local levels. It has its own by-laws and internal elections. The Forum for Development was organized along the lines of the parliamentary commissions and is headed by a member of the General Secretariat. Its functions are to draft bills and amendments and to train deputies for their task, not unlike the study or research bureaus of Communist parties (Duverger 1963, 200). In contrast to those parties, the Forum for Development does not provide doctrinal training. Such training is performed by the local bureaus.

42. The organization is headed by Bassima Hakkaoui, who became a member of the PJD's General Secretariat in 1999 and an MP in 2002.

43. *Al-'Asr had a smaller readership than the MUR's al-Tajdid* and was published only weekly.

44. The subscription fee was collected once a year. It was two hundred dirham (approximately twenty-five US dollars) for working members and one hundred dirham (approximately thirteen US dollars) for participating members.

45. For the districts without a deputy in Parliament, the national party bureau provided funding.

profile of the 2002 electoral candidates because they reflect the membership composition to some extent.[46] Indeed, many of the PJD's electoral candidates in 2002 were not affiliated with the MUR (see table 4). Only 56 of the party's 194 electoral candidates (excluding the national list of female candidates) indicated affiliation with the MUR. More candidates were possibly MUR members—"possibly" because some individuals might not have wanted to indicate their affiliation with the MUR, which was still an illegal organization at this point. There were indeed some cases in which the top PJD candidate was known to be a MUR member, but this membership was not indicated in the profile *al-Tajdid* published, and it was thus unclear whether other candidates in that district had chosen not to provide this information either. The information provided for candidates placed on the lower ranks of the list was also sometimes limited to their picture and profession. These two groups—candidates who it was believed might not want to divulge their possible MUR membership and those from districts that did not provide any information about affiliations—are summarized in the category "affiliation unknown" in table 4.

Yet another fifty-one candidates indicated an affiliation to various other Islamist "cultural" associations and forty-four candidates apparently had no link whatsoever with the Islamist movement. Had the party base in 2002 been strictly composed of MUR members or been unequivocally loyal to the MUR, it is unlikely that they would have selected movement outsiders to represent them in Parliament to such a large extent. Moreover, a decline in affiliation with the MUR also matches the qualitative evidence discussed in the previous section according to which the PJD increasingly recruited from sympathizers to (not activists of) the Islamist movement. Outside recruitment obviously does not imply that the PJD had started to dislike MUR members. Rather, it is an indication of the MUR's limited organizational base—smaller by far than, for example, the Jordanian or the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—and of the fact that only a limited number of MUR members was interested in official politics.

46. Electoral candidates are a special category, but the 2002 candidates were chosen predominately (more than 90 percent) by the party base and were mostly party members. Thus, even if their profile cannot reflect the composition of the entire membership, it clearly reflects the members' preferences at that point in time.

TABLE 4
AFFILIATION OF PJD ELECTORAL CANDIDATES, 2002

Affiliation	*Count*
MUR	56
Other Islamist Associations	51
Affiliation Unknown	28
No Affiliation with Islamist Movement	44

Note: "Other Islamist Associations" include the Moroccan Association for the Study and Research in Islamic Economy, the Association for the Spread of the Holy Qur'an, the Rally for Islamic Traditions, and the Association for the Cultural Renaissance. This category accounts for active involvement in the Islamist cultural project (see Wiktorowicz and Taji-Farouki 2000) even if individuals are not affiliated with the MUR itself.

Source: From information given in *al-Tajdid* compiled by the author.

Nevertheless, the MUR's role as provider of votes remained crucial in the 2002 elections: on the one hand by conducting the campaign itself and on the other by lending credibility to the party through its endorsement and joint activities. The MUR's active support in the electoral campaign was certainly very visible. The media campaign was still performed mainly by the MUR's newspaper (formerly *al-Raya,* now called *al-Tajdid*), which published the electoral program, detailed profiles of the candidates, interviews with the top candidates, summaries of the PJD's parliamentary activities from 1997 to 2002, interviews with the PJD's MPs, statistics on PJD candidates' (high) level of education, and scores of favorable articles on the party. As in 1997, all MUR members were pushed to campaign for the party (*al-'Asr,* Oct. 7, 2002).

The MUR's endorsement and the joint social activities of the two organizations that lent the party grassroots credibility were equally important. The good reputation and credibility of the PJD and its candidates came at least partially from the MUR—or from the candidates' own activities in the MUR. As one MUR-affiliated electoral candidate put it, "Let's not forget that we have been doing grassroots work, on the cultural level especially, but also at the social level. All this benefited the party. [The voters] say: 'We know these people and their work, they are good people, we know their ideas and their behavior,

and, well, now they offer us a political work, then why vote for someone else'" (interview no. 8)

MUR Pressure for Islamist Policies

The PJD did surprisingly well in the 2002 elections, unexpectedly becoming the third-largest party in the Moroccan Parliament. The profile of the forty-two members of its new parliamentary group was rather different from the profile of its first group, which had been composed of veteran leaders of the Islamist movement. Although these veterans were still part of the new group, and the majority of the MPs was still MUR members, some MPs were not affiliated to the MUR, but rather to various other Islamist associations, and some had no affiliation at all with the Islamist movement (see table 5).

In view of the PJD's good showing at the ballot box, only nine seats less than the victorious USFP, a debate about cabinet participation arose quickly. This debate caused concern inside the MUR to such an extent that the MUR's president, Ahmed Raissouni (1998–2003), gave an interview in which he linked a public reminder regarding the PJD's dependency on MUR to advice about acceptable and unacceptable conditions for the party to join a government coalition. In his view, the party's success was "due to the cultural, social and propagandist assets of the movement" and to the fact that "all the members of the movement were pushed to militate in favor of the PJD's candidates," and, finally, he said, the PJD's "reputation . . . and its popularity [were] the fruit of this movement [the

TABLE 5
AFFILIATION OF PJD MPS, 2002–2007

Affiliation	*Count*
MUR	22
Other Islamist Associations	6
No Affiliation with Islamist Associations	8
No Affiliation Indicated	2

Source: From information given in *al-Tajdid* compiled by the author.

MUR], which directed all its efforts and its activities toward this party." A few lines later he made clear why the MUR was making such an effort: "If we support the Party of Justice and Development . . . , we defend through this channel the principles and opinions of the movement." In addition, although saying that he did not speak "in the name of the party" and acknowledging that the constraints of governmental alliances made a full implementation of the party's program impossible, Raissouni issued conditions for cabinet participation. He "could not imagine" that the party would participate in a government that did not defend the country's Islamic identity or the reinforcement of the Arabic language. In particular, he stated that the party should refuse participation in a government that rejects the establishment of Zakat (alms giving) and of loans without interest (*al-'Asr,* Oct. 7, 2002).The PJD did not join the 2002 cabinet, in part because of the MUR and in part for other reasons that I discuss in subsequent chapters. More important here is what this episode tells about the relationship between the two organizations at that moment in time. First, the incident reveals that the MUR came to view itself as the guardian of Islamic principles vis-à-vis a PJD that apparently needed a reminder of what these principles were. Second, the fact that this reminder had to be made publicly and had to be formulated as a threat—making explicit why the MUR supported the party—shows clearly that by 2002 there was no behind-the-scenes full control of the party.

Increasing Ambiguity

The whole Moroccan Islamist movement came under pressure and very close scrutiny after the Casablanca terrorist attacks of May 16, 2003. The ensuing anti-Islamist climate was even more worrying for the PJD than for the MUR because the party's electoral strength had caused some anxiety among the political elites. Some of these elites now seized the opportunity and called for outlawing the PJD.[47] In this context, the PJD wanted to put more distance between itself and the Islamist movement, including the MUR. It felt that this link made it more vulnerable to attacks by political elites that the party was nothing more than a Trojan horse for a radical Islamist movement.

47. I discuss the impact of May 16, 2003, on the party in more detail in chapter 3.

In 2003 and thereafter, the distance between the two organizations increased, as did the ambivalence in their relationship, stemming from their own deliberate efforts, party institutionalization, and an acceleration of previous developments. This distance eventually led to the MUR's withdrawal of support to the party.

A deliberate aim to increase the distance between the two organizations in the aftermath of the Casablanca attacks was the choice of electoral candidates and the campaign for the municipal elections in the autumn of 2003. The party's tendency to go for non-MUR-affiliated electoral candidates increased substantially in these elections. As mentioned previously, the General Secretariat intervened thoroughly in the selection of the first third of the electoral lists in 2003. MUR affiliation had no positive impact on these nominations. The General Secretariat scanned the lists for people with links to dubious Islamist groups—fearing that these people would serve as a pretext for outlawing the party—and intervened in favor of candidates who were seen as ideologically flexible and competent. During the campaign, there was a stronger party involvement and control than previously. The PJD's national office aimed to coordinate and standardize the campaign.[48] It provided financial aid and videotapes with a summary of the party's history to the local offices (interview no. 13) This video astonishingly showed the history of the old MPCD party, thus stressing the party's "age" and deemphasizing the Islamists' "new" role in it. A key element of the electoral meetings were lengthy PowerPoint presentations of the candidates that highlighted their educational and occupational profile. Moreover, *al-'Asr*'s role in the 2003 electoral campaign became more substantial, aiming at a style of coverage similar to *al-Tajdid*'s for the previous elections.[49] These changes did not mean that the MUR's support became irrelevant. PJD interviewees themselves stressed that the electoral support of the PJD was strongly due to "proximity" with an electorate that usually experienced its political elites as distant and self-interested. The party also continued to cooperate with the MUR regarding leisure and charity activities, such as the organization of lent-breaking meals for poor families dur-

48. Long before the campaign local coordinators had been invited to the national office to discuss the campaign.

49. Some of the electoral rallies I observed were attended by MUR representatives. In none of these rallies, however, were they invited to speak.

ing Ramadan or the organization of youth camps during the holidays. The PJD did not reach an organizational stage at which it could sustain these activities without the MUR. Nevertheless, it visibly strove to gain more control over the content and form of its campaign.

In the 2003 campaign and more generally in the following years, there was also a tendency to deliberately drop or deemphasize religious references or Islamist themes such as authenticity and morality. The dominant group in the General Secretariat was strongly preoccupied with the PJD's external image and aimed to orient the party toward more practical matters. In that vein, themes such as "development" and efficient administration were highlighted, and many of its municipal councillors supported or enacted unideological policies.

There was also a renewed emphasis on a clearer separation. The trigger was another press interview of Ahmed Raissouni. He seemed to question Mohammed VI's competence to fulfill his role as "Commander of the Faithful,"[50] an unacceptable statement in Morocco because this role is a key pillar of regime legitimacy. Rather unfortunate for the PJD, he commented in the same interview on party affairs in a fashion that made him appear to be one of its decision makers—stating, for instance, that "we are not ready to govern with the USFP" (*Aujourd'hui le Maroc,* May 12, 2003). This statement earned him his forced resignation from the MUR presidency and both private and public rebukes from PJD leaders against such intervention in party affairs.[51] As part of this separation, more PJD leaders also felt it prudent to renounce their offices in the MUR.[52]

50. Mohamed Tozy believes that Raissouni was "trapped" and that he was speaking in a more philosophical way about the institution of the "Commander of the Faithful" and never intended to be confrontational (personal conversation, Rabat, Dec. 2003). It is noteworthy that no one from the PJD leadership came to Raissouni's defense.

51. Abdelilah Benkirane raised publicly the need to devise mechanisms for a clearer separation of the two organizations and stated that it was a "mistake" for MUR leaders who were not party leaders to speak in the name of the party (*La Vie Économique, June 16, 2003).*

52. This trend had already started in 2002, but it was probably reinforced by May 16, 2003. Until the MUR's congress in December 2002, seven members of the PJD's General Secretariat were also members of the MUR's Executive Bureau. After this congress, double membership in the two highest committees of the two organizations decreased to four individuals. Only the two veteran MUR leaders, Abdelilah Benkirane and Mohamed Yatim, kept their offices in both the party executive and the MUR executive—until 2007, when even they renounced their MUR leadership.

These resignations were probably born out of political constraints and did not necessarily say much about the real influence of MUR positions or these leaders' organizational loyalty. Indeed, all the initial architects of the political inclusion of the Islamist movement into the political institutions remained in office in the PJD's General Secretariat.[53] Yet these leaders no longer held office in the party simply because they had been appointed in their function as MUR leaders. Their legitimacy now formally emanated from being elected by the party members in the National Congress and the National Council, and they were accountable to party institutions. It is also remarkable that giving up office for the sake of cosmetic distance was a one-way process only: PJD leaders chose to give up their MUR leadership, but none of the MUR leaders gave up his PJD leadership. This process suggests that by 2003–2004 in the core leaders' minds, holding a party office had acquired more value than holding a MUR office.[54]

Another "migration process" from the MUR to the party was taking place at the lower echelons and contributed to increasing the party's independent human resources. This migration occurred, first, from a purely numerical point of view—that is, more MUR members joined the party beyond those who had initially opted for it. A party leader estimated in 2003 that the share of MUR members who decided to go for party politics had increased to about 25 percent (interview no. 7). Such MUR members conceived of this move as a conscious decision to engage in political action (interview no. 21). Second, a qualitative migration was also taking place. Some MUR members who had adhered to the party in the early 1990s had initially continued their work in the MUR, but the party's increasing size and electoral success came to absorb all their energy (interview nos. 17 and 18).

53. In the autumn of 2003, some party leaders either still expressed—at least implicitly—a stronger loyalty to the MUR and assessed party activities and decisions on the basis of whether they were beneficial for the MUR (interview no. 8) or expressed a sort of stated separation of loyalties where the rationale of action was seen as depending on the respective organizational context (interview no. 10).

54. One member of the General Secretariat who had given up his MUR office made this valuation very explicit by treating his MUR affiliation as being similar to his affiliation with a labor union and his presidency of a study association, stating: "I am a member of many things" (interview no. 13). In this case, opinions were shaped by what was seen as being the best option for the party.

For the PJD, the situation was not that uncomfortable. It had enhanced its independent organizational capacities, put some distance between itself and the MUR, and appeared to absorb an increasing share of the MUR's human resources. In addition, it could rely on the MUR for generating electoral support but not take the MUR's ideological opinions and policy advice too much into consideration.

The MUR's Withdrawal

Importantly, however, the PJD was not the only organization in which the merits of distance were discussed. MUR leaders became aware of the party's exposure to pressures and campaigns that spilled by association over to the MUR (interview no. 7). They also felt increasingly that they had lost track of their initial social and cultural project. As one MUR leader put it, "In the past ten years, we have invested too much in the party even though in our concept, our line of reasoning, this is only one part of our activities. We don't want to focus too much on the political aspects; us as a cultural, educational association, we prefer to concentrate on the educational and *da'wi* [missionary] issues" (interview no. 8). Politics were increasingly viewed as a "perturbation" of that work, as a "difficult partner" that, moreover, had a "dangerous force of enticement" (interview no. 7)—the latter comment being a clear hint of the quantitative and qualitative membership migration from the MUR to the PJD.

At the same time, considering all the resources the MUR had invested in the PJD, it obviously wanted the party to defend an Islamist program. As one of these leaders stressed, otherwise arguing that the party should open up to other "social classes and people," the party should follow "the same line, the same cultural line, the same political line, the same approach to societal questions [as the MUR]. It is not necessarily with our members or with our association that we will put into practice our political goals. If there is a party that tries to make concrete what we think and the society that we aim at, that's good" (interview no. 8). This obviously twisted statement captures well the problem the MUR increasingly faced in its relationship with the party. It had invested a great deal of resources into the party but had not installed any formal mechanism of control. MUR kept losing members to the PJD, which appeared to increase its strength and visibility

even if it was under pressure from the regime and elites of other parties. The MUR's advice and threats were increasingly ignored by a party leadership that viewed those MUR members who did not want to enter politics as idealist and aloof (interview no. 10).

The outcome of this debate was the MUR's disengagement in 2007, when it cut its support to the PJD. In the run-up to the 2007 parliamentary elections, there was no MUR media campaign or door-to-door campaigning for the PJD. The MUR even refused to endorse the PJD officially and forbade its preachers from advocating the PJD in their sermons. To make its disengagement even more visible, the MUR forbade its own leadership to run in elections.

The official reasons given for this decision was that it ensured the separation between "religion and politics." It was hoped that neither the MUR nor the PJD could be accused of abusing religion for political ends. Moreover, the MUR wanted to invest its resources in what its leadership saw as more rewarding activities (interview no. 32). In fact, MUR and party leaders portrayed the MUR's disengagement as if it had been planned since the very beginning. Yet the totality of this withdrawal, which perhaps cost the PJD its widely expected electoral victory in 2007, suggests otherwise. There is a difference between not sending members to campaign—costly from a resource point of view—and refusing even to endorse a party in the newspaper. It is thus more likely that the MUR's alienation from the PJD had increased rapidly and strongly, that the MUR had been discontent with the PJD's political line, and that because the MUR had failed to make the PJD stick to MUR's ideological line, it accordingly withdrew its support.[55] Indeed, one party leader admitted that the MUR felt constrained by its link with the PJD. It wanted to be free to criticize policies that the PJD would not or could not criticize without facing pressure or without having to worry about its acceptability to the political class (interview no. 33). In sum, the MUR did not want to retreat from politics; it wanted another type of policies than the PJD was offering by 2007. Only a decade after the Islamists' entry into official politics, the party was thus forced into autonomy. In the future, the MUR will trade any support it offers—of the PJD or another party—only for a clear benefit to itself (interview no. 32).

55. For a formalization of this argument, see Pellicer and Wegner 2008.

CONCLUSION

Organizational development has been relevant for the Moroccan Islamists in the process of their formal inclusion in the political institutions. Beyond the constant revision and fine-tuning of procedures, the PJD has invested much labor and material resources in its organization over the past decade by holding party congresses regularly, multiplying party bodies, creating new sections, enrolling and educating new members, and founding ancillary organizations in order to frame society. These investments demonstrate the leadership's aspiration to build a strong and solid organization that can compete with other Moroccan parties and that is more likely to cope successfully with the challenges stemming from participation in authoritarian regimes.

As will become clear in the subsequent chapters, these investments have paid off for the PJD but have also come with some trade-offs and unintended consequences. Among the gains are the stability and legitimacy of the organization and relatively committed members. Indeed, a common cause of defections from a party or of party splits in authoritarian regimes is disagreement over the acceptable degree of compromise with the regime. In the PJD's case, the increase in organizational complexity and coherence stabilized the organization: it tied the interests of the leaders on all levels of the organizational hierarchy to the organization's survival and contributed to the perception that difficult choices and compromises were the outcome of both necessity and legitimate decision-making procedures. Indeed, in the most difficult year of the party's history so far, 2003, the party faced only minor revolts by local leaders in Tangier and Agadir and managed to retain even these people. The party's success in gaining and maintaining members has contributed to its distinctiveness vis-à-vis other Moroccan parties, which often have to hire youth for their electoral campaigns. In contrast, PJD members have participated not only in electoral campaigns, but also in support-enhancing activities throughout the year.

It is at this juncture, however, that the trade-offs from organizational investment and institutionalization began. Both created a desire for organizational survival among leaders at various echelons of the organization that was to some extent independent of policy gains. In contrast, members could not be satisfied by the PJD's meager achievements. The party's manifold compromises were, as one party leader put it, not always "well understood" by the members,

who lacked the "national perspective" (interview no. 10). To maintain its members' continuous commitment and at the same time to implement these compromises, the leadership then devised excessive regulations that somewhat balanced the need to foresee the results of internal votes and the need to give the base a voice. Up to 2007, this method worked well; the PJD membership was not discouraged by or even fully aware of its own loss in power. In 2007, however, the discontent created by the procedure for nominating the electoral candidates was high enough to prevent party leaders from exploiting fully their formal power in the nomination process out of fear of demotivating the members (interview no. 34). The renewed appreciation of the party's membership and commitment to its involvement were surely related to the MUR's retreat from campaigning and support-enhancing activities.

Finally, organizational investment and party institutionalization also had the partly unintended consequence of facilitating the PJD's emancipation process from the MUR and ultimately the latter's withdrawal. The two organizations had initially converged in their desire to gain strong electoral support. The MUR ran two energetic electoral campaigns for the PJD that demonstrated that it took the electoral arena seriously. It wanted to show to the populace and even more to the political class how great the force of persuasion in the Islamist ideology/agenda was. Later, however, the MUR came to view itself as the guardian of Islamist ideological principles and the PJD as too pragmatic, uncritical, and, perhaps, office oriented. Hence, it attempted to bring the PJD back in line with its ideologies. At this point, the PJD's previous investment and unfolding institutionalization process began to matter. First, the increase in its own resources increased the party's margin of action. Although the PJD surely did not invest in independent mobilization resources with the view of confronting the MUR in mind, it could afford to resist the MUR's policy and strategic recommendations more easily once it had acquired these resources. Party institutionalization, on its part, appears to have tied loyalties to the party. Views of the costs and benefits of decisions were increasingly influenced by party priorities and an individual decision maker's own role in the party. "Divided" loyalties were unproblematic as long as there were no severe differences between the two organizations. Once these differences surfaced, people had to make a choice. Those Islamists who had become party leaders chose the party; the MUR chose not to sacrifice its ideological commitments and credibility for the party's electoral strength.

3

The Regime Game

OPPOSITION PARTIES in electoral authoritarian regimes need to change the rules and practices to gain political power through elections. These parties may at least want to criticize these rules and practices so as to remain credible. An opposition party that takes these regime limitations seriously and focuses on changing them would both try to delegitimize the current regime and try to make the rules more favorable to its own victory.

In Morocco, changing the rules is indeed paramount for opposition parties' meaningful electoral participation. Although the Islamists were included at a moment of institutional reforms, through which King Hassan II conceded a more important role to Parliament and political parties in the political process, mechanisms to maintain the regime's grip on outcomes were preserved, and even some new ones were introduced.

In Morocco, as elsewhere, one way to harm regime legitimacy is to boycott or threaten to boycott elections or at least to denounce their manipulation. As for other electoral authoritarian regimes, for Morocco the domestic image and, maybe even more important, the external image of the political system as being in a democratization process are relevant means to ensure regime persistence. For that purpose, the organization of elections perceived as somewhat free, fair, and transparent is necessary. Elections are typically a moment when the country is in the spotlight of the international media and observers and thus an important opportunity for denouncing regime practices. Challenging the regime's democratic image can also present a criticism of political and human rights violations in a way that blames them on the system, not just on some faulty individuals.

Besides such type of public pressure, a party may also focus on pressuring for the adjustment of constitutional provisions or laws crucial to electoral competition. A peculiarity of Morocco compared to other electoral authoritarian regimes

is that, as a monarchy, major disadvantages for opposition parties include not only those provisions regarding electoral competition, but also those that prevent an elected government from governing. The country has several formal and informal rules that secure the supremacy of the monarchy as a ruling and governing institution Focusing on the regime game thus means focusing on steps to constitutionalize the monarchy. Crucial for the preservation of the monarchy's authority in Morocco is Article 19, defining the king as the "Commander of the Faithful." Taking on Article 19 is, however, only a hypothetical option because accepting the king's religious legitimacy is a prerequisite of inclusion in the political arena. Even a mild questioning of the king's status as "Commander of the Faithful" clearly violates the rules applying to the legal opposition. Indeed, Justice and Charity's rejection of that status for the king is one of the reasons why it is not a legal organization. More practically, the monarchy's executive and legislative power is secured via the "ministries of sovereignty," whose ministers are appointed directly by the king, not by the prime minister. This authority, however, is not enshrined in the Constitution. Article 24 of the Moroccan Constitution simply states that the king appoints the prime minister, but that the other ministers are appointed by the king in consultation with the prime minister. Therefore, which ministries are "ministries of sovereignty" is a matter of acceptance of the king's appointment of their ministers and ultimately of bargaining power. Another institutional mechanism that limits the power of the government is the large prerogatives of the upper house, introduced in the very reform that provided for the universal election of all the members of Parliament. Finally, the electoral law, as is often the case in electoral authoritarian regimes, also secures the power of the monarchy with respect to political parties. At the Islamists' entry into Parliament, the voting system was single-ballot majority, a system that encourages both the fragmentation of the party system and the limited role of parties in favor of notables. As a consequence, it has hampered the emergence of one party as the major player in Parliament and the formation of a government composed of less than at least five parties. Although the electoral system is only a procedural rather than a fundamental dimension of the political system, a reform of the electoral law would have very important practical implications.

When the PJD entered the political arena, it had to develop a stance vis-à-vis the quality of elections and the strength of demands for institutional reforms. It's strategies in the regime game changed over time.

1997–1999: GETTING SETTLED IN OFFICIAL POLITICS

The current of the Moroccan Islamist movement represented in the PJD discarded the revolutionary option in the 1980s. The party's official reading is that the initial revolutionary orientation resulted from the ideology's being an Egyptian import and that the mistake had been to embrace "all its [the Muslim Brotherhood's] antagonisms toward the regime" (interview no. 5). Those opting for revolutionary alternatives in the 1970s had ignored some fundamental differences between the political regimes in Egypt and Morocco. In contrast to the Egyptian political system, the Moroccan monarchy had to be understood as a "100 percent Islamic institution" (interview no. 5). Of course, the question—for both the Islamists and the palace—remains how much power this 100 percent Islamic institution should have in the political process.

In the first years of the Islamists' inclusion into the state's political institutions, issues of monarchic power were largely absent from the PJD's discourse. Rather, the party aimed to get settled in the political institutions and to secure its position there. For that purpose, it was generally willing to *contribute* to the regime's democratic image rather than to harm it. A first angle in this approach could be observed in its decision to cover less than half (146 out of 325) of the electoral districts in the 1997 parliamentary elections. To placate the regime, the PJD adopted a "step by step strategy of political participation." From the beginning, this strategy provided for a "qualitative instead of a quantitative participation" (interview no. 8)—that is, it limited electoral coverage. Although party leaders have always insisted that this decision was an autonomous one, they concede that it "coincided with the wishes of the government, the state" (interview no. 8).

Partial coverage was thus a palace condition for electoral participation. It was, however, also initially accepted inside the party as appropriate in view of Islamist parties' domestic and international image problems. The link between Islamist parties' good electoral performance and repressive backlashes—demonstrated, for instance, in Algeria and Tunisia—was a key concern. The party hoped that it could slowly help "people inside and outside Morocco [to] understand the PJD's intentions" so that "they [would] see that the PJD is a party like all the other parties . . . and that it is not necessarily—as these people think—a fundamentalist party that will imprison women, close the bars, drive away the

tourists, a party that will undertake actions that are disastrous for the Moroccan economy" (interview no. 8). Moreover, the Islamists were at that moment far from having consolidated their grip on the party organization, and their organizational capacities in general were limited.

A second angle of the PJD's strategy for consolidating its inclusion in Morocco's political arena can be seen in its reaction after the 1997 elections. These elections saw widespread allegations of vote buying and government manipulation. According to the US embassy's *Morocco Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,* most independent observers concluded that the election results were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the government (US Department of State 1998). The Moroccan National Commission to Supervise Elections examined several complaints of irregularities. Two successful candidates even gave up their seats, alleging unsolicited interference from the authorities (US Department of State 1998).[1] All opposition parties criticized the government, and some called for a boycott of Parliament. The PJD, although convinced that it had in fact gained many more seats than the nine attributed to it, was not among the parties calling for a boycott, however. Overall, it was content with having been permitted to gain seats at all (interview no. 2). It contested the results in only three constituencies (Willis 1999) because twelve mandates were necessary to establish a parliamentary group.

Contradictory comments emerged, however, regarding the degree of electoral fraud and its culprit. Mustafa Ramid, new MP and member of the PJD's General Secretariat, declared on December 10, 1997, that the party considered its nine seats a "positive result, given the frequent intervention of the local authorities and of money, the falsification of the results, and the marginalization [of the PJD] in the National Commission to Supervise Elections" (quoted in *Maghrib al-Yaum,* Dec. 10, 1997). In contrast, Abdelilah Benkirane, another member of the General Secretariat, stated two days later in another newspaper that, "with the exception of some vote buying, which bears witness to the incapacity of political parties to frame the citizens, one can say that the elections were generally honest. For our 140 candidates, we have challenged only three for flagrant falsification. . . . The parties are not to blame for these falsifications but rather the

1. One of these candidates was a USFP candidate, renouncing in favor of a PJD candidate.

maintaining electoral support are thus significant elements in the story of its participation in the Moroccan political arena.

1997–2002: ESTABLISHING A PARTY PROFILE

In the 1997 electoral campaign, the PJD, still under the name MPCD, began to establish its image of a party close to the ordinary people by employing a largely grassroots campaigning style. It focused strongly on door-to-door canvassing performed by MUR members, campaigning mainly on issues of social justice, morality, transparency, and authenticity. Its platform was "For a Total Revival. Authenticity—Justice—Development."[1] The party fielded candidates in 142 of the 325 constituencies, mainly in urban areas.[2] According to the official—strongly manipulated—results, the PJD received a total of 264,324 votes (including the votes for candidates who did not win seats) and nine seats. The number of PJD deputies grew to fourteen until the autumn of 1999, when, after by-elections and the defection of two MPs from other parties, the PJD was capable of forming a parliamentary group. Of the original nine seats, four were won in Casablanca, and five in other large or at least medium-size cities, such as Tangier or Agadir. A number of the PJD candidates won large shares of the vote: al-Muqri al-Idrissi Abu Zaid and Mustafa Ramid in Casablanca districts as well as Saadeddine El-Othmani in Agadir and Amine Boukhoubza in Tetouan received around 50 percent. The remainder of the PJD candidates received more than 30 percent of the vote.[3] Because of the high degree of electoral fraud, these results do not imply that the PJD did not have support in other areas. Assuming that the regime deflated the Islamists' scores, the percentage of votes gained in these districts mean that the Islamists' surely had substantial support in these areas.

Critical Support

In 1998, when the *alternance* government under Prime Minister Youssoufi was eventually formed, the PJD decided to lend that government its "critical support,"

1. The platform and the candidates' profile were published in *al-Raya,* the predecessor of *al-Tajdid*.

2. For the 1997 electoral campaign, see Tozy 1999a and Willis 1999.

3. The results are published in Tozy 1999a, 256.

a position wherein it essentially agreed to endorse the government's policies in Parliament and not to mobilize against it. Prime Minister Youssoufi had consulted all the political parties and apparently had even offered a ministerial portfolio to the PJD (interview no. 7), hoping to face less opposition to the government's reform projects. It is not clear which portfolio it was, but given that the party had only nine deputies, it would presumably have been largely of symbolic value only. In spite of the lack of influence the Islamists would have had in this government, some members of the PJD's General Secretariat were in favor of joining the government right away, not simply supporting it (interview no. 17); no one in the General Secretariat, where the decision was taken, was in favor of going to the opposition (interview no. 1). In the following year, the PJD voted in favor of the majority of the government's bills, claiming that the only condition it had initially requested of the government in return for its support was that governmental policies would respect the country's Islamic values (interview no. 14).

Supporting a government in which the Left (USFP and the Party of Progress and Socialism [PPS, Parti du progrès et du socialisme]) figured prominently was surely not what one would expect of an Islamist party (the party constellation in this 1997–2002 government is shown in table 7). USFP and the Islamists were in a situation of both competition and opposition. Competitors hunt for the same electoral resources—that is, claim to represent the same electorate, with "opposition" referring to ideological difference between each other (Panebianco 1988, 209–11).[4] As to competition, the USFP had always been strong in the cities, with a focus on the educated—precisely the areas where the Islamist movements had developed their organizations and now fielded their candidates for elections. As to ideological difference, key leaders of both groups had been socialized around the Islamist–leftist cleavage. Party programs are not that relevant in Morocco, but the ideological confrontation between the Islamists and the leftist, secularist parties over their respective concepts of society remained important. Even though the USFP dropped its references to socialism after 1990 and did have a more traditionalist wing, it was still a party with a predominantly secular, mod-

4. Two parties that might be programmatic allies can be most threatened by each other if they have an overlapping electorate. Correspondingly, two parties might be fierce opponents in terms of ideology but never compete for votes (Panebianco 1988, 209–11).

ernist ideology. Thus, it definitely constituted the target group of the Islamists' denouncement of the westernized antireligious elites, so supporting a government that was led by the USFP and that included the former Communist PPS must have been difficult to communicate to the PJD's supporters. But as noted in the previous chapter, this decision coincided largely with the party's relationship with the regime and, more precisely, with Hassan II.

After the death of King Hassan II in July 1999, the PJD could afford more public divergences and conflicts with the government; that is, it could bring the decision about supporting the government to the electoral level. Indeed, a general feeling of not being taken into consideration sufficiently or even of being pushed aside *("écarté")* by the government had grown in the party (interview no. 11). In particular, the PJD noisily opposed two governmental projects even though they related to the "Islamic" part of the PJD's agenda and eventually withdrew its support of the government.

These projects were a bill on microcredits and the reform of the personal status law. According to a member of the party's Forum for Development, the conflict about the bill on microcredits arose from an amendment the PJD wanted to introduce in the bill, providing for the possibility of introducing Islamic modes of financing—that is, loans without interest alongside the conventional means of financing. Islamists portrayed the government's refusal of the amendment as opposition to Islamic values and as lack of respect in its engagement with the party (interview no. 6).

In the same period, the project to reform the personal status law generated major conflicts between the government and the PJD. The joint mobilization of the party and Islamist organizations against the revision of the personal status law in the spring of 2000 culminated in a mass rally of hundreds of thousands of people in Casablanca, and the government eventually withdrew the project. By this point, many party members had come to the conclusion that the party had more impact through extraparliamentary mobilization than through participation in government. As one party leader noted, they had made "lots of noise about the draft bill on microcredits but . . . did not manage to block it. We managed to prevent [the reform of the personal status law], but we blocked it in the streets, not in Parliament" (interview no. 7).

In that context, the party's National Council mobilized for the withdrawal of support to the government. As supporters of the party's shift to the opposition

TABLE 7
GOVERNMENT–OPPOSITION CONSTELLATION, 1997–2002

Position with Respect to Government[a]	*Relation to Regime*	*%*	*Seats*[b]
In the Government Coalition			
USFP	Oppose/Reform	13.9	57
PI	Oppose/Reform	13.2	32
PPS	Oppose/Reform	11.1	46
PSD	Oppose/Reform	3.8	9
FFD	Oppose/Reform	3.0	5
RNI	Support	6.8	19
MNP	Support	4.3	9
Not Part of Government but Selective Support			
OADP	Oppose/Reform	2.9	4
PJD (1997–2000, "critical support" of the government; 2000–2002, "constructive opposition")	Oppose/Reform	4.1	9–14[c]
In the Opposition			
Popular Movement	Support	10.3	40
UC	Support	10.2	50
PDI	Support	1.2	1
PND	Support	4.2	10
MDS	Support	9.5	32
PA	Support	1.4	2

[a] See the abbreviations list at the beginning of the book.

[b] These figures are from just after the elections. Due to defections, the number of some parties' MPs has changed considerably during the legislative period. The official turnout was 58.3 percent. MPs were elected for a five-year term.

[c] Fourteen seats in 1999 after by-elections and two defections from other parties.

Sources: From statistics published in Daoud 1997 and http://www.electionworld.org; http://www.ipu.org.

argued, the PJD could and should now bring to the table nonregime considerations regarding cabinet participation—that is, the utility of cabinet participation for electoral support and policy. In their view, the original reasons for supporting the *alternance* government had evaporated (interview no. 9). This view and the eventual decision to join the opposition were, however, not consensual. In these and later debates and intraparty negotiations on the best stance toward the government, two party factions held rather different views on both the party's goals and the most important constraints it faced.

Intraparty Debates on Supporting the Government

One PJD group was in favor of opposition because it cared about policy and electoral support. The other group wanted to continue supporting the government. Indeed, in 2000 the size of these two groups appears to have been almost equal, as is demonstrated by the narrowness of the vote in the National Council: the decision against further support of the government was taken with a difference of only 11 votes out of 280. This opposition faction included different subgroups with different considerations.

The group in favor of opposition had ideological reasons to a certain extent, mobilizing against a government whose projects the PJD considered harmful for the country's Islamic identity. It is impossible to separate neatly the extent to which this view reflected the group's own ideological convictions or simply a fear of losing the support of the Islamist movement. Both conclusions appear valid: the parliamentary group was composed largely of members of the MUR's executive bureau and the Shura Council who had just began their political-institutional career. At the same time, the party also depended strongly on the MUR's logistic and reputational support. Even without the party's own ideological commitments, it would thus have been irrational to support a government with a non-Islamist, if not anti-Islamist, agenda. In addition to ideological concerns, this group's motivations were related largely and overtly to winning a broader electorate. After the first two years of the Youssoufi government, the initial popular support and enthusiasm for it had visibly cooled. It became clear that the difficult social and economic situation, the internal conflicts inside the governmental coalition of seven parties, and the baggage of the ministries of sovereignty as well as corruption would provide for a mediocre governmental

balance sheet.[5] There existed a palpable fear inside the PJD of being held responsible, along with the government, for these conditions. A party leader described the position in the following way: "The Youssoufi government has done nothing; it is weak, and we will take stick [take some blame] for all the mistakes [it has] committed, so one had to distance oneself; one had to go to the opposition so that the PJD's positions remained clear for the population" (interview no. 8). Rather candidly, a PJD MP stated that the party could not "remain with a government that is criticized by the people" (interview no. 12). Such fears were more likely to be due to the government's failure to implement the social reforms and to cure some of the population's grievances as it had promised in the 1998 governmental declaration than to the lack of its respect for "Islamic values."

The faction in favor of continuing to support the government was composed of different subgroups. One of these subgroups still looked at the issue through the "regime lens." To them, the initial reasons for supporting the government in 1998 had not vanished. Supporting or joining the government meant more security for the party organization—and for the MUR. In Morocco, opposing the government is not necessarily a regime issue because the government is not led by a regime party. However, like the group pushing for opposition, this group believed that withdrawing its support would increase the PJD's electoral support. In contrast to the opposition group, though, the members of this group considered the increase of electoral support a potential threat. They argued that being in opposition would inflate their electoral share to a degree where political elites might feel threatened. (According to them, those who had contested the argument in 2000 and 2002 agreed after May 16, 2003, that their analysis had been correct [interview no. 8].) Another subgroup inside this support faction basically argued that it was better to have little impact than none and claimed that staying in opposition did not contribute solving the problems of Moroccan society. In this line of reasoning, that which others criticized as a lack of coherence—that is, the multitude of parties in government—was understood as a "government of national unity" in which the PJD should take part (interview no. 7). Finally,

5. For a very critical assessment of the Youssoufi government's socioeconomic achievements, see Denoeux 2001; for its attitude toward public liberties, see Bendourou 2000–2001 and Hidass 2000–2001.

a subgroup of technocrats was especially driven by the desire to acquire political experience and to establish direct contact with the political decision makers through inclusion in the meetings with the ministers (interview no. 12).

This second main faction and its subgroups would resurface and grow after the May 16, 2003, terrorist attacks. In 2000, though, it was not yet dominant and accepted its defeat when the party withdrew its support of the government and changed its position to "constructive opposition" in the autumn of 2000. The PJD thereafter concentrated on establishing itself as the most visible and active opposition party. Indeed, it could rightly claim that it was the only remaining "true" opposition party, given that the traditional opposition parties (USFP, Istiqlal, PPS) were leading the government and that the other parties in the parliamentary opposition were palace parties.

The Good MP

In contrast to such contested decisions, there was general consent that cultivating the image of the PJD's parliamentary group as the incorruptible advocates of the Moroccan population was a key tool to generate electoral support. In its parliamentary interventions, the PJD brought in some typical elements of an Islamist program, such as the promotion of authenticity, morality, Zakat, Arabization, the "liberation of Palestine," and the like. But the central axis of the PJD's message was what it called the "moralization of the public and political institutions"—in other words, fighting corruption and clientelism as well as increasing legislators' work ethics.

The PJD's first parliamentary group worked toward and did successfully establish a reputation as hard-working defenders of the moralization of parliamentary life and of the population's interest vis-à-vis a corrupted political elite. To that end, providing the example of a "good MP" was an important task in these parliamentary activities. An MP had to "defend the population . . . by the moralization of the life of a parliamentarian and by his duty to make propositions and to control the government." Being elected was an "obligation to work," in contrast to the modus operandi of the typical MP, who carried his MP title as an "honorary title" only (interview no. 20).

As a symbolic move against absenteeism, PJD MPs started to circulate an attendance sheet that they would sign at the Parliament's General Assembly and

parliamentary commissions and that further required the explanation of late arrival or absence. Similarly, in the Wednesday sessions of oral questions, which are broadcast on Moroccan television, the group repeatedly insisted on enacting sections 164 and 165 of the Moroccan Parliament's internal regulation, which authorizes the Parliament's president to sanction absent MPs. Beyond denouncing the misbehavior of other MPs, PJD MPs did indeed ask the largest number of written questions and a substantial proportion of the oral questions in these sessions.[6]

Another key PJD message was proximity with society. One way of showing such closeness to the populace was to respond positively to their voters and members' requests to use their status and contacts to distribute individual and collective favors. Requests concerned the transfer of public employees from one city to another, the promotion or employment of individuals, legal recognition and finances for associations, acceleration of all sorts of requests from the administration, and, finally, intervention in judicial cases. The General Secretariat explicitly rejected only the last type of demand. In general, the PJD institutionalized these services. Its MPs opened local bureaus where citizens' requests and problems were collected and transferred to them; the MPs then wrote reports accounting for what they had done in the respective cases. The existence of these bureaus, their response to requests, and the fact that—contrary to popular practice—PJD MPs did not change their mobile phone numbers after the elections were part of the implementation of the PJD's proximity promise (interview nos. 2 and 13). This sort of constituency service cannot be distinguished clearly from the clientelist practices the PJD was claiming to fight. In the short run, however, it likely to increased the party's electoral appeal.

Campaigning for the 2002 Parliamentary Elections

In view of the popular disenchantment with the *alternance* government, the PJD's establishment as the only active opposition group in Parliament, the cultivation the image that its parliamentary group is clean and hardworking, and its MPs availability to the voters in their constituencies, the PJD was expected

6. The number of the PJD group's written questions was 714, the number of its oral questions 179 (cf. PJD 2002, 309).

to perform well in the 2002 parliamentary elections (Willis 2004). Being able to count in addition on support created by its own and the MUR's social activities and the MUR's full endorsement and mobilization, the party could indeed expect substantial gains.

However, for regime reasons, in 2002 the PJD contested only slightly more than half of the electoral districts. Nevertheless, it contested those seats vigorously. As discussed in chapter 2, the party base had relatively strong power in the selection of this year's electoral candidates, which ensured the mobilization of the party members in the electoral campaign and allowed the PJD to make yet another point about its difference with the other political parties where the leadership parachuted candidates into top positions on the lists. In the campaign, the PJD emphasized its candidates' high level of education, again as a difference to other parties, which even had some illiterate candidates on their lists (Willis 2004).

The party's electoral platform, "Toward a Better Morocco," centered on five axes: authenticity, sovereignty, democracy, justice, and development. The authenticity axis contained the "Islam" part of the PJD's message. It called for a greater role of Islam in education and public life and for the strengthening of Morocco's Islamic identity. Sovereignty contained what Michael Willis rightly calls the "obligatory nod towards nationalism and Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara" (2004, 65). The democracy and justice axes advocated the strengthening of the rule of law as well as the prerogatives of Parliament and the prime minister. Development contained the PJD's economic stance, mainly a call for Islamic banks and worries about economic globalization.

Although the party stressed the fact that it had a well-elaborated program, its role in the campaign is less clear. Especially older party leaders/candidates or those contesting seats in rural areas did not stress the program much. In fact, some even stated (in private) that there were no crucial programmatic differences between themselves and other parties because most parties agreed on the basic necessary reforms. The work that had to be done in Morocco was work about which "everybody basically agreed," such as reform of the education system, of the investment environment, and of the labor market. When one "[is] hungry, one first look[s] for something to eat, and when one [is] not that hungry anymore, one [can] go for special menus" (interview no. 7). Indeed, many PJD candidates campaigned in a way that a member of the party's technocratic group

called "populist" (interview no. 2). That is, in local rallies candidates basically focused strongly on the government's failure and offered "easy solutions" to these failures (interview no. 2).

2002–2007: GROWING STRENGTH

The PJD emerged from the 2002 elections as the third-largest party. It won a total of 595,459 votes (out of 6,036,952 votes cast) via the local lists, thus doubling the official number of votes the party gained in the 1997 elections. It did especially well in the Casablanca region, composed of eight circumscriptions (Casablanca Anfa, Al Fida Derb Sultan, Ain Sebaa–Hay Mohammadi, Ain Chock–Hay Hassani, Sidi Bernoussi–Zenata, Ben M'Sick–Mediouna, Moulay Rachid Sidi Othmane, and Mohammadia) that include both well-off areas and slums. In some of these circumscriptions, the PJD even won two seats out of a maximum of five seats per circumscription. The party also increased its representation in and around Rabat. With one exception (in Marrakech), all of the PJD's 1997–2002 MPs who stood for reelection were successful.

In the weeks following the elections, the PJD negotiated with the Istiqlal, the National Popular Movement (MNP, Mouvement national populaire), and the Popular Movement about a possible participation in the government. From these negotiations as well as from negotiations among other parties, no government emerged. At the beginning of October 2002, the king designated Driss Jettou, the former interior minister and a technocrat without party affiliation, as prime minister. That is, in practice the office of prime minister thus became a "ministry of sovereignty." When Driss Jettou was forming his governmental coalition, he informally consulted the PJD as to whether it was willing to participate but did not make a precise offer (interview no. 7).

From the outset, Deputy Secretary-General Saadeddine El-Othmani had given press interviews making clear that the PJD would not participate in a government in which the USFP took part.[7] On October 20, the PJD's National Coun-

7. See, for instance, *al-Tajdid,* Oct. 4, 2002: "Saadeddine al-Othmani declares . . . : 'we exclude any participation in a government led by the USFP'"; and *La Gazette du Maroc,* Oct. 7, 2002, "Saadeddine El-Othmani . . . : 'it is not an option to govern with the USFP.'"

TABLE 8
PARTIES REPRESENTED IN THE 2002 MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT

Party[a]	*Seats Obtained in 2002 Elections*	*Ministers*
USFP	50	8
Istiqlal	48	8
RNI	41	6
Popular Movement	27	3
PPS	11	2
MNP	18	2

[a] See the abbreviations list at the beginning of the book.
Source: From statistics available at http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/021108/2002110820.html.

cil endorsed this position. On November 7, the new government was formally announced. Of the six parties that participated in government, half were again from the historical opposition parties (USFP, Istiqlal, PPS), and half were palace parties (RNI, Popular Movement, MNP) (see table 8).[8]

Debates on the Cabinet Revisited

The motives behind the PJD's decision against cabinet participation in 2002 and the factions involved in the deliberations were similar to those arguing opposition in 2000. For those pushing to join the government, security and gaining experience still played a major role in this view. According to a key member of this group, "There were people in the power center [milieux du pouvoir] that started to worry because, given that our political profile is opposition, our political roof widens" (interview no. 8). In turn, a member of the technocratic group inside the pro-government faction argued that managing some portfolios in the 2002 government would have been good "as a preparation for 2007" (interview no. 14). However, these arguments could not win over a majority. Indeed, it appears that

8. USFP, Istiqlal, PPS, and RNI had already been in the previous government. Almost half of the ministers from the previous cabinet remained in office.

this time there was not much discussion inside the National Council regarding the possibility of joining the government because party leader El-Othmani had stated the party's refusal to govern with the USFP to the press even before the National Council's vote took place (interview no. 8).

Those pushing for opposition were to some extent again driven by ideology. There were still people who "did not want to be in the same seats as the USFP . . . a party that is ideologically totally opposed to the PJD" (interview no. 8). Moreover, the "conflicts in the street and in Parliament" (interview no. 10) with the USFP had created an even more hostile climate between the two parties. Besides the unhappy ending of their previous governmental cooperation, USFP and PJD had had harsh exchanges during the 2002 electoral campaign. The USFP accused the PJD of using the mosques for its campaign and of deviating donations for the Palestinians to the party. In turn, the PJD engaged in a polemic about the USFP's allowing the Israeli Labor Party representatives to attend the Socialist International held in Casablanca (Willis 2004, 64–65). The "MUR factor" also entered the debate. The policies Ahmad Raissouni had set as conditions for cabinet participation would have been difficult to implement in a government shared with the USFP. Joining government would thus have meant giving up core ideological convictions and risking a confrontation with the MUR in exchange for cabinet seats.

At the same time, electoral considerations again entered the debate strongly. The leadership believed that their new voters had come from groups beyond Islamist activists and sympathizers. Three groups were thought to form the PJD's electorate: a core group that adhered entirely to the party's ideological package; a second group that perceived the party as having integrity and that wanted more transparency; and a third group—composed of other parties' discontented voters—that expected the amelioration of the social and economic conditions (interview nos. 1, 3, 10, and 13).[9] Thus, PJD voters demanded quite different and

9. It is not important whether this grouping actually reflects the composition of the PJD's electorate. For the effects on decisions, it is more important what party leaders *believed*. These beliefs overlapped, however, largely with what Willis reports from Moroccan newspapers' interviews with voters. According to him, there was also evidence that the PJD had managed to attract secular-orientated voters in those constituencies that already had PJD MPs, mostly due to recognition of their proximity approach (2004, 68).

possibly incompatible policies and had rather large expectations (Islamist policies, a decrease in corruption, and economic or social improvements). As the country's third-largest party, the PJD would have had to bear a relatively large responsibility for the government's performance if it joined the government.[10]

Following this group's analysis, the PJD would most likely fail to satisfy both its old and its new electorates. The constraints of the governing monarchy and the multitude of programmatically unrelated parties was believed to be a likely barrier to visible achievements (interview no. 14). In addition, it was feared that without a finance portfolio (or a minister of finance favorable to the party line), the activities of their ministers would be blocked (interview no. 20).[11] Moreover, the party was somewhat caught by surprise by the magnitude of its electoral success in 2002. The PJD had yet to develop a "clear vision of what there is to do and how to govern" (interview no. 20), and it appears that there was widespread opinion that the party lacked representatives experienced enough for ministerial offices and the staff to support them (interview no. 5). In sum, joining the government was perceived as more threatening than promising. The PJD preferred to concentrate its energy and resources on finalizing its own organizational consolidation instead of engaging in an enterprise where the payoffs were unclear.

Control over the Parliamentary Group

In the years following the 2002 elections, the PJD continued inside Parliament on the lines it had established in the previous legislature to maintain and increase its electoral support. Similar to its first group of MPs, the new MPs had their local bureaus collect citizen demands. To lend credibility to the party's claim of proximity, the MPs aimed to meet or at least to demonstrate that they had tried to do something about these demands.

The party leadership considered its MPs' reputation to be crucial. As discussed in chapter 2, there was a significant difference in the size and profile of the

10. Taking as a basis the number of ministries obtained by other parties from similar results, the PJD would have held six to seven ministries (see table 8).

11. Another point made was that the party lacked deputies in the lower house to support it (interview no. 10). In 2002, it had only one councillor in that house, elected by the trade unions.

first and second generations of PJD MPs. Rather explicitly, party leaders (composing only about one-fourth of the total PJD MPs) trusted this new group less and visibly took on the role of guardians of the party's public image. The scope of their fears and awareness of the forces of institutional socialization are illustrated by the different mechanisms they installed to prevent both the MPs' factual adaptation to the style of Moroccan parliamentary politics and the perception by rank and file and supporters that the MPs were benefiting individually from their status.

One major focus of these control strategies targeted the party's parliamentary activities and aimed to ensure that they were in line with the party's objectives. Some of these strategies were enacted through new internal regulation of the PJD's parliamentary group (PJD 2003). This new regulation allowed the General Secretariat to take binding decisions on the parliamentary group's votes and strategy and imposed voting discipline in the parliamentary commissions and General Assembly. Moreover, the General Secretariat was entitled to intervene strongly in the appointment of the parliamentary group's key offices—that is, the group's head and the (vice) presidents of the parliamentary commissions.[12] Because almost the whole PJD leadership (eleven members of the General Secretariat) were MPs, there was also a strong implicit control.

A second major focus of the control mechanisms was the maintenance of the MPs' moral appeal. The internal regulation obliged PJD MPs to attend all plenary sessions and parliamentary commission sessions. It imposed the duty of parliamentary output: each member of the parliamentary group had to draft one oral question per week and one written question per month and had to propose one bill per year. Finally, the MPs' obligation to relocate at least 22 percent of their remuneration for holding office to the party, although important for party financing, was clearly intended to create a public image of the not-for-profit PJD MP.[13]

12. The Moroccan Parliament has six permanent commissions: Finance and Economic Development, Productive Sectors, Justice/Legislation and Human Rights, Social Sectors and Islamic Affairs, Interior/Decentralization and Infrastructure, Foreign Affairs and National Defense. As the third force in Parliament, the PJD was entitled to the presidency of one commission and the vice presidency of another one. The party held the Legislation and Human Rights Sector and the Productive Sector.

13. The gross monthly salary of a Moroccan MP was at the time thirty thousand dirhams (around thirty-eight hundred dollars), which can be regarded as high in Morocco. For instance,

Similar duties were also established at the end of November 2003 for the party's municipal councillors.

Preserving the MPs' previously acquired reputation—as the party's showcase—was crucial in order to maintain the support by three major groups. The first group was the electorate itself. In view of the importance of voters interested in a higher level of administrative transparency and a decrease in corruption, PJD MPs had to be blameless. As one MP put it, "The real capital of the PJD is sincerity. It is its greatest capital; if we lose this virtue, then one can consider us as a party like the others" (interview no. 12). For a party emphasizing and capitalizing so much on "honesty," a single deviation may have harmed the party's image. The PJD "was like a white leaf, if there was a black stain, one would see it immediately" (interview no. 19). The second and third groups were MUR activists and the PJD rank and file. Given that collective incentives for participation were dominant for both, a decrease in their level of mobilization for the party was likely if they could not see how the party goals materialized in the parliamentary activities, if PJD MPs became involved in corruption, or if PJD MPs were otherwise seen as benefitting materially from their status.

Elected PJD officials' adaptation to the current political system in the form of overt corruption, defections, and devaluation of the party program was effectively countered in this period. Only one case of corruption of a municipal councillor came to be known, but this person was immediately excluded from the party (interview no. 3). The control mechanisms functioned equally successfully as symbols for party members and activists alike. Both considered the control of the MPs and their financial contributions to be an important and distinctive characteristic of the party. Party members commented that in the PJD the contract was not between the electorate and the elected, but between the electorate and the party. In turn, the salary relocation was constantly referred to as a moral contract between the MPs and the party (interview no. 21), but in reality it was a written one.

Yet even if the internal and public image of the PJD's MPs remained untarnished, some initial tendency toward institutional socialization could be seen. This tendency was particularly visible in two areas. The first was an apparent

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the employees of the PJD's parliamentary group earn between two and four thousand dirhams per month. The average monthly income in Morocco is around fourteen hundred dirhams.

reluctance to carry out the high level of active work asked of the MPs. The PJD's MPs still asked the largest number of oral questions in Parliament, but their dedication to draft bills or written questions appeared to be much lower.[14] The second issue was the PJD MPs' reluctance to reallocate the required 22 percent of their salary back to the party. By the end of 2003, around twenty MPs were in arrears with their payments.[15]

Local Alliances: Governing with Whomever

The PJD's next electoral rendezvous was the municipal elections in September 2003. In contrast to the decision regarding whether to participate in the national government, the decision to participate in local government and to be open to "cross-ideological" alliances was taken before the elections occurred and was uncontroversial. In mid-April that year, El-Othmani had already declared that the PJD was ready to ally locally with all parties, "even with the USFP, despite our sometimes tense relations." The party's primary concern at the municipal level, he said, was to "moralize the management of public affairs" (quoted in *Le Matin du Sahara,* Apr. 22, 2003).

The PJD's willingness to enter local governance made sense from a support point of view because local governance is typically good for parties or individuals; there were about one hundred municipal councillors in the 2007–2012 Parliament. City governments have resources to distribute more directly, and citizens perceive city officers as people who can solve some of their daily problems. Indeed, as one party leader said, the MPs' problem was often that voters did not

14. In autumn 2003, only one of the interviewed MPs had already drafted a proposition, together with other colleagues. In fact, most of the PJD's parliamentary questions and propositions of amendments or draft bills of a more technical nature (for instance, relating to the budget law rather than to the denunciation of the collaboration between the left parties and the "Zionist entity" and the like) were produced by or in collaboration with the members of the PJD's Forum for Development. The forum intervened strongly in the drafting—"correcting, reformulating, . . . and validating" (interview no. 2) parliamentary questions and bill propositions.

15. As a member of the General Secretariat explained, in order to make these MPs pay, the General Secretariat decided to exclude them from the National Congress in April 2004 if by that time they had not regularized their financial situation (interview no. 4).

see a difference between national and local deputies and could not understand why the MPs could not take care of their local issues (interview no. 32).

After the Casablanca attacks of May 16, 2003, the decision to participate in local government and to ally with any Moroccan party on the local level became to some extent part of the PJD's relationship with the regime. Local responsibilities, alliances, and the type of local policies became part of its campaign to show that it was not a "party of opposition and refusal" and that it would not institute radical changes that might scare off investors and tourists.

Elections in municipalities with more than twenty-five thousand inhabitants as well as in the newly created city districts in cities with more than half a million inhabitants were enacted via a proportional-list vote. In municipalities with less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants, they were enacted via majority single-ballot vote.[16] The PJD covered 51 percent of the country's city districts (out of a total forty-one city districts in six cities[17]), 74 percent of the municipalities with more than twenty-five thousand inhabitants (out of a total 104 such municipalities), and only 6 percent of those with less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants (out of a total of 19,451 such cities).[18] Following the pattern of the parliamentary elections, the PJD thus covered mostly urban districts.

Given that the party covered mainly the constituencies where proportional-list vote was enacted, the question of electoral alliances was not posed; alliances began to matter after the elections with respect to the building of governing coalitions. Because of the PJD's limited coverage and the participation of more than twenty-five parties in the elections, successful postelectoral bargaining and alliance building were crucial if the party actually wanted to make it into local governance. This shared governance was obviously not the type the PJD had envisaged before May 16, when it had assumed that it would have a comfortable majority in a number of cities such as Tangier and perhaps Casablanca. The PJD won 320,299 votes and still came out as the second-strongest party in the total circumscriptions of the

16. In 2009, the population threshold for proportional vote changed to thirty-five thousand inhabitants.

17. Casablanca (16), Fes (6), Marrakesh (5), Rabat (5), Salé (5), Tangier (4). In Casablanca, the PJD covered 8 out of 16 districts; in Fes, 4 out of 6; in Marrakesh, Rabat, and Salé, 3 out of 5; in Tanger, none.

18. Statistics of the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior published in *Libération,* Sept. 1, 2003.

city districts *(arondissements)* and the cities with more than twenty-five thousand inhabitants. Nevertheless, it gained only 8 out of 81 councillors in Rabat, 10 out of 71 in Sale, 16 out of 131 in Casablanca, 14 out of 81 in Fes, and 6 out of 81 in Marrakech—hardly a majority for governance in any of these cities (REMALD 2004).

The General Secretariat had decentralized the managing of the alliances but posed criteria for the councillors when negotiating the coalitions: the integrity and competence of the person proposed as mayor and how a party had performed so far in the local management (interview no. 10). The leadership believed that persons running for a certain party in the local elections did not necessarily have any ideological affinity with that party[19]—hence, the decentralization of the bargaining, even if the General Secretariat maintained the prerogative for the final approval (interview no. 8). What mattered most was whether it was possible to form a coalition with people who were not completely delegitimized by their record of previous municipal management.

The local negotiators had a clear understanding that a coalition required a partial consideration of the party's program, and many adopted the General Secretariat's vision that to participate in governance was better than not to participate. If they insisted on their "program and philosophy," they would be part of "those minorities that will not govern" and would never give an "added value" (interview no. 20). In contrast to the party's discourse at the national level, honesty came to be viewed as a relative concept. Although the fight against corruption was among the criteria used to decide on alliance, PJD councillors now argued that "nobody was 100 percent honest" and no one was "100 percent bad" (interview no. 20). PJD councillors sometimes had to "close their eyes vis-à-vis some councillors or parties" (interview no. 18). The PJD was there to participate and to "help honest people govern and to minimize the damage, the losses, the corruption" (interview no. 20). As a result, the PJD often found itself in "tough" coalitions, not so much from an ideological point of view, but from a personal one as

19. In many interviews, PJD councillors were not even capable of listing all the labels of those parties with which they were cooperating but insisted that the labels did not matter anyhow. As a member of a city hall working with a coalition of ten parties put it, "We have ten [political parties] at the town hall; it's rather ten guys [bonhommes]. It's not ten political tendencies; it's rather ten guys, each with his mood, his will, each [with] his hidden agenda . . . and this makes the task much easier than it would be with parties. There is no program, there is nothing" (interview no. 6).

TABLE 9
TOWNS GOVERNED BY THE PJD, 2003–2009, ELECTORAL RESULTS

	Town	*% Seats 2003*	*% Seats 2009*
Isn	30.77	73.33	
Al-Kardan	45.45	77.33	
Ksar al-Kabir	40.00	51.28	
Oued Zem	32.26	74.29	
Temara	25.71	31.91	
Azru	20.00	13.79	
Ouislane	12.00	10.34	
Kasba Tadla	13.79	12.00	
Meknes	25.45	15.38	
Khenifra	12.90	0.00	Mayor defected
Had Boumoussa	8.00	0.00	Mayor defected
Tabia	7.69	0.00	Mayor defected

Note: The percentage of seats in 2003 and 2009 are not directly comparable because there was a higher threshold in the 2009 elections.

Source: From statistics available at http://www.elections2003.ma and http://www.elections2009.gov.ma (both sites run by the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior).

the party coalesced with "all sorts of people, illiterates, corrupted [individuals]" (interview no. 6). From these negotiations, the PJD representatives emerged as mayors in twelve towns (see table 9).[20] In general, the PJD appears to have focused on improving administrative services (e.g., decreasing the time it takes someone to obtain a birth certificate) and on investing in infrastructure at the local level. But even symbolic moves by local PJD councillors to implement parts of the Islam component of the party's agenda were absent (Pellicer and Wegner 2009).

As is shown in table 9, the PJD's experience of city government had mixed results from a support point of view. In some cases (such as in Ksar al-Kabir

20. In several cities, the PJD did not manage to govern even though it gained the largest number of seats. This was the case in, among other places, Larache, Errachidia, and Khenitra. In other instances, the PJD governed towns where it had not won the largest share of seats, such as in Khenifra and Kasba Tadla.

or Oued Zem), the PJD gained overwhelming support in the subsequent parliamentary and municipal elections; in others, the PJD's share of seats decreased or even collapsed in the 2009 municipal elections (such as in Meknes and Khenifra). Indeed, in the three cities listed at the bottom of table 9, the PJD appears to have chosen its top candidates badly because these mayors defected in the middle of the term.[21]

2007 Elections

Beginning in April 2006, the PJD was expected and did itself expect to win the 2007 elections—not necessarily by a large margin, but enough to make it the strongest party. Thus, the party strategists designed an electoral platform that was a program for governance. The party established thirty-six commissions that spent four months polling Moroccans regarding their main concerns. In the next step, the commissions examined the current public policies in a given domain as well as the impact of international actors and other constraints in that policy area. After that, they would decide whether they would propose a new policy or the adjustment of current policies. This way of designing the program—first to look at what people cared about and then to try to tailor a program that would respond to the society's main concerns—obviously had a strong electoralist component. At the same time and possibly more important given the lack of interest of Moroccans in electoral platforms, it showed very clearly the influence of the PJD's technocrats and the desire to succeed in governance.[22] As a result, the PJD's

21. Further research is necessary to understand the reasons for success or failure of the PJD local government. Preliminary research I did with Miquel Pellicer (Pellicer and Wegner 2009) suggests that support in the local and parliamentary elections was strongly influenced by the amount of investment PJD mayors managed to obtain while in office compared to what the previous city government had obtained.

22. The technocrats had clear ideas about the scope for change. They were aware of the fact that one cannot implement radical changes in legislation and that it was difficult to create new institutions. Instead, one can enhance the efficiency of existing policies and try to widen prerogatives of existing institutions. Similarly, they had precise ideas about different degrees of entrenchment of corruption. For example, in long-established courts there was a high degree of corruption, and that situation was difficult to change. In newly created courts, such as the commercial courts, there was not a strong culture of corruption, so change was perceived as easier to achieve in them (interview no. 35).

2007 electoral platform was quite different from 2002. It stressed issues such as health, education, and the investment climate but did not mention issues concerning Islam or constitutional changes.

The technocrats, however, did not manage to win sufficient support to continue their promotion of experts, as they had done in the 2003 elections. The technocrats wished a large-scale insertion of lawyers and economists in the PJD's electoral lists and pointed to the profile of the 2002–2007 parliamentary group as one that could not have influence on the policy output. The majority of these MPs worked in primary and secondary education and lacked a "culture of political, economic, and legal expertise" (interview no. 2).

The costs of changing this profile, however, were considered too high. Technocrats enjoyed only limited support among the rank and file. The latter tended neither to place them high in the electoral lists nor to select them for office in the party. A PJD vice mayor, for instance, who had been introduced by the party leadership into a list in 2003 had "excellent relations with the *wali* [the governor, appointed by the king]" but nevertheless failed to be elected to the PJD's National Council by the 2004 party congress (interview no. 6). Thus, the further technocratization of the PJD's representation in Parliament would have required the conservation of the trend toward autocracy in the party organization, as discussed in chapter 2. In view of the MUR's withdrawal, however, the PJD had to rely entirely on its own members for the very crucial door-to-door part of the campaign and could not afford to decrease their commitment to and mobilization for the party. Moreover, an autocratic approach to the composition of the PJD's electoral lists would have robbed the party of one of its signals of distinctiveness from other parties. Thus, party members had a relatively strong impact on the selection of the candidates, and the leadership introduced only a few lawyers (interview no. 33).

The PJD ultimately did not need its program for government. It gained only two more MPs from the local vote and two through the national list of women candidates. Although winning the largest number of votes (505,822), it won only the second-largest number of seats after the Istiqlal and lost almost a 100,000 votes compared to votes gained in 2002;[23] it was not asked to join the

23. The loss of votes is even larger if one considers that the PJD had mechanically increased the number of its votes by covering all the electoral districts. Pellicer (2008) argues, moreover, that there

TABLE 10
RESULTS OF THE 2007 MOROCCAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Party[a]	*Votes*	*%*	*Seats*
PJD	503,396	10.9	46
Istiqlal	494,256	10.7	52
RNI	447,244	9.7	39
Popular Movement	426,849	9.3	41
USFP	408,945	8.9	38
UC	335,116	7.3	27
PPS	248,103	5.4	17
FFD	207,982	4.5	9
MDS	168,960	3.7	9
PT	140,224	0.3	5
Union of PND and al-Ahd	139,688	3.0	14
PED	131,524	2.9	5
Union of PADS, CNI, and P(G)SU	98,202	2.1	6
PRE	83,516	1.8	4
UMD	76,795	1.7	2
Socialist Party	67,786	1.5	2
Others (parties with only one seat)	628,908	13.7	9
Total	4,607,494	100.0	325

[a] See the abbreviations list at the beginning of the book.

Source: From statistics available at http://www.map.ma/mapfr/legislatives07/francais/textes/resultats_definitifs.htm.

2007 government (see table 10 for the 2007 election results). Twenty-two of the members of the previous PJD parliamentary group were reelected; the majority of those failing to be reelected had already been eliminated by the PJD base when they were choosing the party's electoral candidates.[24]

Although the party leadership generally believed that there had been electoral fraud, some also pointed to party-related reasons that had prevented it from gaining more substantial electoral support. The first reason was, of course, the withdrawal of the MUR's support for the party. Although the party leaders did not emphasize this withdrawal very much, they acknowledged that the MUR activists were "more reliable and committed" than the PJD members (interview no. 32). That is, they saw the lack of the MUR's active support in the campaign as a possible factor in their failure to get out the vote. It is unclear whether the party lost the support of more "Islamist" voters as a consequence of the MUR's refusal to endorse it, but that result would not be surprising if one brings the lack of PJD mobilization for Islamic causes into the picture.

Another factor, mentioned by a member of the General Secretariat, concerns how the PJD was electorally hurt by decisions taken in playing the regime game. Even if the party had felt (re)accepted by the regime after the numerous compromises it had made in 2003 and 2004, a fear of provoking the regime and of offering pretexts for repression remained among those who controlled the party leadership after the 2004 party congress. Thus, since 2003 the party had limited its activities to Parliament and had abstained from mobilizing the street. For example, it had opposed a highly unpopular increase in the value-added tax in 2006, but because it did not call for rallies, people had not known that the party opposed the law (interview no. 33). Put differently: some part of the PJD's disappointing electoral result may have been due to the party's not being populist enough.

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is evidence that the PJD's voter profile had changed to some extent from a more grievance-driven profile to a middle-class voter profile.

24. Some of those not reelected were older MPCD figures, such as Mohammed Khalil and Mohammed Khalidi, who left the PJD to found a new party, Renaissance and Virtue (Renaissance et vertu). Of the new MPs elected locally, eight had already been candidates in 2002; the other twelve were "new" candidates.

Finally, the PJD had not managed to convince people that it could have an impact on policies. Even voters sympathetic to the PJD did not "believe that [it] can change anything" (interview no. 33). The failure of two subsequent governments led by the former opposition to the regime to bring about political and social reforms in Morocco certainly contributed to this perception. Indeed, voter turnout stood at only 37 percent of the registered voters, 19 percent of whom moreover cast invalid ballots. It is not clear to what extent the PJD was hurt by the turnout. It is assumed that Islamist parties typically benefit from a low turnout because it is believed that Islamist voters are reliably mobilized. In Morocco, however, this correlation is less obvious. The International Republican Institute's (in)famous poll predicting 47 percent of the vote for the PJD had asked how people would vote if voting were mandatory. Hence, it would not be surprising that the PJD's result was affected by the turnout and thus by the citizens' belief in the robustness of authoritarianism in Morocco—irrespective of the party in government.

CONCLUSION

Similar to the PJD's strategies in the regime game, its electoral and parliamentary choices were shaped by the interplay of different forces inside its organization. These forces had different visions not only about the role of elections and more generally about the role of the PJD in the Moroccan political system, but to some extent about the best way to win elections. The goal congruence of these three groups depended on the level of the game. On the one hand, there were the *old Islamist leaders,* such as Mohamed Yatim and Abdelilah Benkirane. They were not necessarily in conflict with the monarchy, but rather with the Left. According to them, the PJD should not be confrontational and not win too many votes, but mainly provide a value added from a policy-input and value/moral point of view. Like a second group, the populists, they did not care much about the party program and found the technical aspects of legislative work cumbersome. They in general performed their political party work in the same fashion as they pursued their activities in the Islamist movement. The *populists,* in turn, would do and say whatever was necessary to win elections and viewed elections primarily as a venue to gain political power. They viewed the PJD as a party in opposition to both regime and government. In general, the regime game was more important to them, and they were the only group inside the PJD that was more willing

to confront the regime and to remain faithful to a clear oppositional agenda. Finally, the *technocrats* agreed with the populists in that they viewed elections and electoral support essentially as a means to gain political power and then to reform Morocco thoroughly. In contrast to the populists, however, they were unwilling to confront and openly oppose the regime and had very precise and realist visions as to what to reform and how. To them, the key difference between the PJD and other parties was the PJD's professionalism; electoral support should have been generated by a developed party platform, professional parliamentary work, and proximity with the people.

During the first years after their inclusion in Morocco's formal political institutions, the Islamists managed to cooperate with and to grow under the regime without being corrupted or absorbed by it. Indeed, legalization and participation in elections allowed the PJD to broaden support well beyond its core constituency. Because of the regime's interference in electoral outcomes, this claim is not unambiguously quantifiable, but the party did double its share of votes between 1997 and 2002. Even if the regime included an organization without a large number of activists, the PJD certainly benefited from electoral support created through extraparty Islamist activities in Morocco. Perhaps the PJD even managed to win the support of a substantial share of the votes of Justice and Charity activists in the 2002 elections, despite the fact that the latter was officially boycotting the elections.[25] In addition, the party leaders' analysis regarding their newly acquired sympathizers among other parties' dissatisfied voters and those caring about transparency appears to be sensible.

Whatever the precise share of different voter groups, the PJD surely managed to establish itself as a credible opposition during the first years it came onto the Moroccan electoral scene. Important steps in this process were the withdrawal

25. Willis notes that Justice and Charity portrayed the PJD's success as an advance for Islamism in general and points to its "apparent desire to take some of the credit for the PJD's electoral success." He quotes Nadia Yassine commenting that Justice and Charity supporters almost certainly voted for the PJD in cities such as Casablanca, Tangier, and Tetouan, which explained the party's success in these places. Justice and Charity's spokesperson Fathallah Arslane stated that the common ground shared by the two organizations had benefited the PJD. Willis himself argues that "it seems likely . . . that many of the movement's rank and file and ordinary supporters may have voted for the PJD" (2004, 70–71).

of its support to the increasingly unpopular *alternance* government in 2000 and the mobilization of the street against the reform of the personal status code. Although this active opposition was important, the PJD also aimed to show what it could provide compared to the other parties: proximity with the people, hard-working MPs, and a democratically structured party organization, where members could choose who they wanted to represent them in the political institutions. Perhaps the palace-imposed limitation of coverage also contributed to the PJD's appeal in the beginning because it helped the PJD to sustain the image of being an oppressed actor in the eyes of its supporters.

In the years following the 2002 elections, the PJD had increasing difficulty in remaining a credible and mobilizing oppositional force even though it took several steps in this direction. The party's refusal to join the 2002 cabinet and coalesce with the USFP and the PPS on the national level was intended to avoid the alienation of both its Islamist core voters and the protest voters. That the MUR had disadvised such a governmental coalition surely increased the benefits of staying out of government for the PJD. The party also reproduced a historical model of party control over the parliamentary representatives to counter their corruption (Duverger 1963, 191–96), which worked effectively in that the PJD was largely perceived as a "clean" party. The majority of its MPs did not reproduce the patterns of other parties' MPs with respect to absence in Parliament sessions, defections, corruption, and the use of their status for personal benefit.

The PJD's poor showing in the 2007 parliamentary elections, however, demonstrated that this clean image was not enough and that the PJD had probably fallen in the credibility trap posed by cooperating too much with an authoritarian regime. Although it had not lost too many voters, large amounts of Moroccans clearly did not consider it a vote-worthy alternative of and opposition to the current system. This view can be related in part to non-PJD factors, such as—importantly—the fact that Moroccans had just seen the "old opposition" parties fail in government. These parties not only had failed to improve the socioeconomic situation but had also failed to advance civil and political liberties and may even have hampered these liberties (Hidass 2000–2001). Why would the PJD achieve what other parties in opposition for forty years had failed to do?

At the same time, the PJD's loss of credibility was very much of its own making. Indeed, since May 16, 2003, the PJD's strategy largely consisted of not appearing as an opposition. This strategy was shaped largely by a coalition of

the security and technocratic factions that dominated the party's General Secretariat and National Council—officially since April 2004. The "security group" was preoccupied with appeasing the regime, and the technocrats were preoccupied with becoming acceptable for future governance. The result was that—as discussed in the previous chapter—the PJD swallowed one difficult policy choice after another. It also took intraparty decisions in which it further lost much of its difference with other parties. The parachuting of technocrats, for example, was one of these choices with ambiguous consequences. Although this type of deputy appeared better prepared to deliver results, the technocrats' pragmatism toward alliances and negligence of the Islamist ideology had strong potential for alienating the MUR, the rank and file, and the Islamist core supporters. Moreover, the use of parachuting as well as the increase in autocracy inside the party organization were perhaps practices too similar to those of other Moroccan parties.

5

Comparing Islamist Strategies in Jordan and Morocco

HOW CAN THE OPPOSITION make progress in the contest with a hegemonic authoritarian regime? As argued throughout this study, an opposition party has to choose its mobilization intensity and will aim to optimize its strategies on two levels: the regime level, where it has to choose how much to challenge the regime in the form of electoral boycotts and general mobilization against the regime's preferences; and the electoral level, where it has to choose how much to invest in trying to win flawed elections by targeting and convincing (new) constituencies to join or support it. An opposition needs to confront the incumbent regime to keep its appeal and perhaps change the rules in its favor—but it also needs to have enough support from the population to put pressure on the regime and win elections. The two levels are strongly intertwined: the choices on one level will affect the outcome on the other.

The heuristic model used in this book to study the Moroccan case is not intended to predict how an opposition party will deal with the problems of electoral participation in authoritarian regimes. It identifies the forces shaping the strategies of an Islamist opposition party toward the regime and in the electoral arena: organizational development, the party's relationship with an ISMO, and institutional constraints. The empirical chapters of this book study the path of the Moroccan PJD within the framework of this model. This chapter aims to go beyond that in-depth study and ask two main questions: Can the Islamist opposition's key choices be explained by drawing on these factors? And to what extent can variation in different Islamist parties' key choices be explained by variation in these factors? A comparison of the PJD with the Jordanian IAF, founded in 1992 by the Muslim Brotherhood, looking

systematically at key differences in their choices and configurations, helps to answer these questions.[1]

The comparison with Jordan is useful primarily because, among MENA regimes, Jordan has a basic institutional setup that is closest to Morocco's: Jordan is also an authoritarian monarchy that holds elections, has some degree of political pluralism, and allows political organization. Both thus differ from hegemonic party autocracies such as Egypt or Tunisia and from closed monarchies such as Saudi Arabia. Although institutional differences have affected the two parties' choices, this basic similarity in the regime type assures that the effect of these differences is not so large that it overrides everything else—that different choices are not just due to core systemic differences.[2]

A note of caution is appropriate at this point. The factors this analysis draws on are obviously very broad and can be used in an arbitrary way to explain this or that choice. In addition, as shown in the Moroccan case, highly case-specific factors may affect an opposition party's strategies, such as the power balance of factions in the party's starting configuration, other opposition parties' attitude and legacies, and unexpected political events (such as the Casablanca attacks of 2003), to name only a few. A regime's choices regarding the change of rules and policies will similarly affect an opposition party's approach. For instance, an incumbent's particular policy choice may make the opposition more ready to confront that incumbent than it would otherwise be. As discussed in this chapter, the peace treaty with Israel is such a policy choice in Jordan. The consequences of such events and regime choices cannot be accounted for in a comparison unless they present comparable challenges to the parties in question.

Nevertheless, I hope to provide more general insights about the role of institutions, organizational development, and the relationship with an ISMO by tracing two types of choices back to particular configurations of these factors: (1) the basic choice whether to play a direct regime game or one via elections—that is, broad differences in the two parties' general orientation; and (2) the PJD and

1. The analysis in this chapter is based on my own field research in Jordan in 2007 as well as on Clark 2006, Jonasson 2004, Lucas 2005, and Schwedler 2006.

2. The impact of core systemic differences—especially of monarchies versus "republics"—on Islamist strategies has been addressed in other studies (for instance, Ferrié 2005; Pellicer and Wegner 2008).

IAF's choices regarding regime-induced decreases in electoral fortunes and civil liberties—that is, differences in each party's response to, as I argue, comparable challenges to the two parties.

KEY CHOICES OF ISLAMIST PARTIES IN MOROCCO AND JORDAN

The Jordanian IAF and the Moroccan PJD have taken quite different approaches toward the regime and the electoral contest. The PJD was overall docile vis-à-vis the regime and became increasingly so, although aiming at and successfully broadening its electoral support up to a certain point. The IAF, in contrast, devoted relatively little attention to reaching out to new constituencies. At the same time, the Jordanian Islamists were initially on good terms with the palace but over time confronted it much more than the PJD ever has the Moroccan regime.

Approaches to Elections

The PJD's concern with electoral support was strong from the outset. Its MPs immediately aimed to establish themselves as hard-working defenders of the Moroccan citizen and as a moralizing force in political institutions. As soon as the PJD's relations with the government were not part of the regime game anymore, the party withdrew its support for the *alternance* government. This strong concern to maintain and increase electoral support was later shown in the control of its MPs' reputation, the policies it promoted, and the way it designed its electoral platform and institutionalized proximity with the voters. The PJD further remained in parliamentary opposition after 2002. Compared to the PJD, the IAF devoted much less attention to reaching out to segments of the society that were not already involved in the Islamist movement in Jordan. Whereas the PJD avoided being a junior partner in national government because it feared the popularity costs and focused on popular policies such as the fight against corruption, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood entered government in 1991. In government, the Muslim Brotherhood's ministers designed policies that were highly ideological and highly unpopular among the non-Islamist majority of the population. These policies included a ban on male hairdressers in women's beauty salons, an attempt to segregate schools to a degree where fathers would not be allowed to

attend sports events in which their daughters participated, and a ban on alcohol (Robinson 1997, 375). These policies were not implemented because the cabinet was soon dissolved by King Hussein. However, they provide a good example of the Muslim Brotherhood elite's disinterest in winning the support of larger segments of the Jordanian society.[3] To my knowledge, the brotherhood also did not enact other measures similar to the PJD's for gaining and maintaining supporters: the IAF leadership did not have any developed ideas about who supported it, claiming simply (and wrongly) that "everybody supported it."[4] It did not see it as necessary to go beyond the assertion of the broad goals of Islamic unity and the "liberation of Palestine."[5] Although the Jordanian Islamists had sent in their political heavyweights in the 1989 and 1993 elections, they did not do so in 2003. In the latter elections, only the party's "second, if not third"[6] guard, who lacked political experience, ran as candidates for Parliament.[7] In sum, broadening support via elections and parliamentary activities was a key concern for the PJD, but not for the IAF.

Approaches in the Regime Game

Compared to the PJD, the IAF was overall much more assertive in the regime game, albeit not from the outset. In the first years after political liberalization in Jordan (1989–93), the Islamists' policies were shaped largely by the Muslim Brotherhood's old Transjordanian elite—namely, the initial party leaders, Ishaq Farhan and ʿAbd al-Latif ʿArabiyyat. They did not view themselves as an

3. The IAF did not join other governments after 1991, a decision that from both sides—regime and Islamists—flowed from the Islamists' opposition to the peace treaty. IAF leaders say they were "not asked [to join] anymore" because of their opposition to the peace treaty. Interview with an IAF leader, Amman, June 19, 2007.

4. Interviews with IAF leaders, Amman, May 30 and June 19, 2007.

5. A former member of the Muslim Brotherhood who had urged the party to develop more specific economic policies in the 1990s reported that his request was met with sarcasm. He was asked whether the party should now also start caring about the ozone layer. Interview, Amman, June 2, 2007.

6. Interview with a former IAF leader, Amman, June 11, 2007.

7. This decision generated increasing opposition and was reversed in 2007.

opposition to the regime and had by and large good relations with the palace (see Schwedler 2006). Like the PJD, the Jordanian Islamists thus did not start out with a confrontational approach, but unlike the Moroccan party they did not adopt appeasement measures, such as the PJD's support of the ideologically opposed *alternance* government.

Moreover, the IAF soon became much more ready to confront the regime. This readiness could be seen, first, in its energetic and sustained mobilization against an explicit core regime policy, the peace treaty with Israel (Lust 2005). King Hussein concluded the peace treaty in 1994 (mainly out of economic necessity because it eased the financial pressure on the regime [Wils 2004]). In contrast, the PJD's only large-scale street mobilization ever was geared against the "left" government, not against the palace. The IAF's choice to confront the regime on this key policy, however, cannot be compared easily to any of the PJD's challenges because the Palestinian cause was and is for the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF one of their foundational principles. Even if "Palestine" is in some way on most Islamist groups' agendas, it is only—with the exception of Hamas, of course—for the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood that the issue is key to its identity; Jordanians of Palestinian origin are indeed a major support and activist constituency (see Brown 2006; Robinson 1997). Tolerating or accepting the peace treaty for the sake of accommodating the regime would have caused a high credibility problem among the Muslim Brotherhood's core activists.[8]

Two other issues can be better compared to challenges the PJD faced. The first concerns electoral boycotts, typically viewed as the key opposition tool to put pressure on a regime in need of legitimacy. In general, the IAF had a much more critical view of the electoral contests held by the regime, demonstrated by a party vote held before each election on whether the party should participate or not.[9] The PJD, in contrast, participated in elections as a rule—only a boycott would have had to be brought to a vote. More specifically, in two elections, 1997 in Jordan and 2003 in Morocco, when the conditions had worsened for the two

8. It is noteworthy that some Muslim Brotherhood leaders nevertheless soon saw the peace treaty as a fait accompli and that some Muslim Brotherhood and IAF leaders would tolerate the peace treaty for the sake of inclusion into the cabinet as long as they did not have to meet Israeli ministers. Interview with an IAF leader, Amman, June 18, 2007.

9. Interview with a member of the IAF's Shura Council, Amman, June 7, 2008.

parties in a comparable way, the IAF chose a boycott, but the PJD chose participation, with only a negligible minority in the party favoring a boycott.

In its boycott of the 1997 parliamentary elections, the IAF protested against, among other things, a new electoral law that had been introduced by royal decree in 1993. It is largely acknowledged in the literature that the law's key aim was to decrease the Islamists' representation in Parliament (see Clark 2006, 545; Lucas 2005; Robinson 1997, 376). The law redrew the boundaries and number of seats allocated to electoral constituencies to the heavy disadvantage of the urban and Palestinian–Jordanian electorate, where the Islamists had most support, and introduced a new single-ballot system favoring tribal allegiances, to the disadvantage of party allegiances.[10] The Islamists had lobbied in the years between the 1993 and 1997 elections for a change in the electoral law but had not succeeded. Indeed, the IAF had lost more than one-fourth of its seats in 1993 even while maintaining roughly the share of votes it had gained in the 1989 elections.

The PJD participated in the 2003 communal elections even if it had to withdraw already prepared electoral lists, limit its participation to only 16 percent of the available seats, and largely give up on governing municipalities, which the party viewed as an important tool to gain popular support. From an "objective" point of view, the conditions of participation in these elections were thus not better for the PJD than for the IAF in 1997.

The second issue concerns the two parties' responses to a similar type of law within a similar political context: the "antiterrorist" law brought to vote in each country's Parliament after major suicide attacks in Amman and Casablanca, respectively. As discussed in this study, the PJD had energetically opposed the antiterrorist law before the suicide bombings on the grounds that the law was restricting political and civil rights, but it eventually endorsed the law after facing strong pressure to show itself as a party that was committed to fighting terrorism. In November 2005 in Amman, a series of coordinated attacks killed 60

10. The electoral law was changed from "unlimited vote" to the single nontransferable vote system. As Malek Mufti notes, this system implies in the Jordanian context that voters have to choose between candidates representing their clan or tribes and candidates whose ideological outlook they might share (1999, 118). In the Jordanian context, this mainly meant voting for the clan or tribal candidate.

people and injured 115 others. As in Morocco, the Jordanian government used the opportunity to hold a vote on an antiterrorist law. The IAF, although facing similar pressure, did not give in on its position as the PJD did and so voted against the law.[11] In short, the IAF was willing to go much further and to risk more in its protest of unfair treatment in elections and in defense of civil and political liberties.

Institutional Constraints, Relations with the Islamist Movement, Party Organization

Why did the PJD try so hard to win new voters while being outright docile toward the regime, whereas the IAF chose the opposite approach in both respects? To what extent can we make sense of these divergent trajectories in the framework of the heuristic model outlined in the introduction? Indeed, there is some variation in all factors considered in this study. Although both Morocco and Jordan are monarchies, the impact of formal pluralistic institutions on policymaking is even more constrained in Jordan, and the Islamists' inclusion into the formal institutions occurred under quite diverse conditions. Each party's relationship with its respective ISMO was likewise set up and evolved quite differently, as did the respective party organizations. For convenience, the most important similarities and differences are summarized in table 11.

How did these configurations impact the IAF's and PJD's trajectories? Party development and the relationship with the ISMO did not influence initial choices and orientations. These two factors do not vary at the beginning of their histories: in both cases, the party organizations had not (yet) acquired meaning to an extent that they constituted a constraint. In Morocco, a party organization existed theoretically, but rules were not institutionalized. In practice, the Islamists had to reach consensual decisions with the old guard of the MPCD, but the organization per se was not a constraint. In Jordan, because parties were

11. Like the PJD had done earlier, IAF leaders argued that the laws already in place in Jordan at the time of the new antiterrorist laws' introduction were sufficient to persecute terrorist attacks and that the new law was restricting civil and political rights. Interview with an IAF MP, Amman, May 30, 2007.

TABLE 11
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS, ISMOS, AND PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO AND JORDAN

	Similarities	*Differences*	
		Morocco	Jordan
Institutional Constraints	Monarchies	Developed party system	Parties banned from 1957 to 1992
		Islamists illegal	Islamists legal
		Party government likely	Party government unlikely
		Selective inclusion	Political liberalization
Relationship with ISMO	Official autonomy "partnership"	Formal autonomy Emancipation ISMO withdrawal of support	Unofficial, but formal dependency
Party Development	Detailed statutes provide for democratic structures	Organizational investment	No
		Organizational growth	No
		Institutionalization	No
		Party diversifies membership	Non–Muslim Brotherhood members leave party

not yet legalized, the Islamists contested the first parliamentary elections of the political liberalization process not as a party, but as "independent candidates." The IAF was then a genuinely new creation in 1992. As to the relationship with an ISMO, both parties initially depended on that organization for mobilization and support even if the party and the ISMO were officially separate entities simply linked by their joined goals. I come back to the evolution and subsequent impact of these two factors when discussing the two parties' later choices.

Institutional Constraints

Institutional constraints impacted both parties' worldviews from the outset. As mentioned, the broad institutional setting for both parties is similar. Jordan and Morocco are authoritarian monarchies in which the king claims religious legitimacy to some extent.[12] In the late 1980s and 1990s, both regimes liberalized and adopted a "legalistic approach" toward rule: although they often ignored constitutional rules, they rather amended than suspended "problematic provisions" (see Lucas 2005, 18). For both Islamist parties, the monarchical setting implied that even an accidental rise to power via elections was impossible. Even overwhelming electoral support would not allow them to gain full executive and legislative power. Broadly speaking, this meant that they could not rely just on winning elections and on increasing the fairness of these elections—if they aimed to govern genuinely. They also had to put pressure on increasing the prerogatives of an elected government for policymaking and on making that government dependant on parliamentary majorities.

There were, however, considerable differences in the configuration and rules of the political system in each of these regimes. These differences affected the necessity and function of broad(ening) support in an overall strategy of achieving policy goals; they also shaped the assumptions the Islamists had about the strength of each respective regime and its propensity to repress the Islamists. In general, for the Moroccan Islamists, increasing electoral strength

12. Jordan and Morocco are in fact the only two nondynastic monarchies in the MENA—that is, monarchies where the king is the head of the state, but the remaining governmental offices are not occupied fully or to a large extent by members of the royal family. These two countries are also similar in that they both are resource-poor Arab states. Neither has substantial natural resources, so they both depend (though Morocco to a lesser extent) on resources from the outside: transfers by citizens working abroad (Jordan in particular from the Persian Gulf, Morocco in particular from Europe) and Western aid. Both regimes rely on a broad coalition of social forces, made up mainly of the landed and business elites (Lucas 2005). In contrast to Morocco, religious legitimacy in Jordan derives only from a claim of lineage (i.e., descendance from the Prophet). The Jordanian king does not have religious authority to decide on dogmatic or legal questions and does not carry a religious title (see Krämer 1999). Nevertheless, the Jordanian regime attempts to control the training of preachers and the content of sermons in a fashion similar to Morocco.

was necessary and functional, and appeasing the regime was rational. For the Jordanian Islamists, increasing electoral strength was not seen as necessary or particularly useful, and—in the IAF's first years—the regime needed neither to be appeased nor confronted. Later, the Jordanian Islamists felt more confident in confronting the regime, whereas the Moroccans did not.

The first institutional factor that led to these different perceptions was the two regimes' record on organized political action—that is, whether a party system was established or not. This factor affected whether the Islamists' electoral competitors were strong or not and thus whether vying for electoral support was seen as a necessity or not. Broadly speaking, the Moroccan Islamists entered into the electoral arena from a position of weakness, the Jordanian ones from a position of strength. In Morocco, the Islamists were newcomers in a comparatively developed party system that had taken shape during decades of party pluralism. That system had—as discussed in this study—many flaws, and neither the party system nor the parties were highly institutionalized. But the system also had numerous parties, both from the old opposition of the national movement and from regime supporters with constituencies and mobilization capacities. The opposition parties had some degree of implantation in the society through their press, affiliated organizations, local bureaus, and connections to powerful trade unions. The palace parties, although lacking party activists, did enjoy support because they had well-established patron–client networks that allowed for access to material resources and office (Willis 2002b, 15). In Morocco, the Islamists thus had to find their electoral turf in an existing party system by competing for other parties' electorates. In Jordan, Islamists were the only organized political force when general elections were held in 1989 in the context of a general political liberalization. In stark contrast to the Islamist movement in Morocco, which was at best tolerated by the palace and had had several conflicts with the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood had been legal in Jordan throughout the previous decades and had built a network of charity organizations, schools, and mosques as well as a well-established network of regional offices (Clark 2004b; Schwedler 2006, 86). Other political and social organizations had been outlawed in Jordan since martial law was declared in 1957, and thus neither regime supporters nor other oppositional actors possessed developed political organizations or other organized outreach

capacities.[13] The Jordanian Islamists were thus in a very privileged starting position. Not only had they themselves a strong nationwide organizational network that could be used for electoral mobilization, but there was also virtually no other organized political actor for them to confront in the elections. In the 1989 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood won twenty-two seats (out of eighty),[14] although it had fielded only twenty-nine candidates.[15] In that first postliberalization Parliament, a Muslim Brotherhood MP was further elected as Speaker of the House for three consecutive years, which was viewed as another sign of the organization's dominance.[16] Hence, the Muslim Brotherhood/IAF believed—on good grounds—that it would be strong in elections "by default" and thus did not see it as necessary, let alone a priority, to reach out to new groups or constituents.The second institutional factor that affected how these two parties linked electoral strength to political influence and thereby the place that electoral mobilization would take in the hierarchy of actions to achieve the party's policy goals involved differences in the power of representative institutions and in political practice. In Morocco, the political liberalization process had increased the prerogatives of Parliament and of party government vis-à-vis the palace. In addition, the *alternance,* even if implemented from above, showed that leadership of the government was linked to electoral strength and could be handed even to an opposition party. With this potential for reform from within, a focus on increasing the Islamist party's electoral strength made sense even for those in the PJD who were more strongly opposed to the regime. The need to increase electoral strength in Morocco was later confirmed by the old opposition parties' failure to take a firm stand vis-à-vis the palace and to bring about meaningful change through the *alternance* government. This failure entrenched the conviction inside the PJD that one needed to win a big electoral majority to achieve effective governance.

13. Political organizations were still banned when the 1989 parliamentary elections were held. The party ban was not lifted until 1992, one year before the next elections.

14. In addition, four independent Islamists won seats.

15. According to Russell Lucas, the Jordanian electoral law for the 1989 elections had a bias toward people of the regime coalition and underrepresented the urban areas, but the Islamists were nevertheless successful because voters could vote for any combination of candidates (2005, 30).

16. Interview with a former IAF leader, Amman, June 11, 2007.

Otherwise, the government would suffer from infighting between the various coalition partners and would end as scapegoat for the country's economic and social problems.

In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood had possessed the chance to participate in government even before the political liberalization process. In several instances, King Hussein had appointed individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood as ministers. Hence, in the collective mind of the Muslim Brotherhood, the way to influence policy was not necessarily linked to electoral strength, but rather to social strength and good relations with the king—just as in the past. Moreover, political liberalization soon started to be reversed, including by means of the mentioned electoral law and new restrictions on demonstrations and on press freedom (Lucas 2005; Lust 2004, 160–61). There were thus generally few incentives for trying to increase the IAF's electoral strength, and the negative impact of the electoral law meant that an increase in electoral strength would more easily flow from rechanging that law than from gaining popularity among new voters.

Finally, how the two Islamist groups came to electoral participation—how they "arrived" in their countries' political institutions—affected their stance toward the regimes. In Morocco, the Islamists had actively sought inclusion for almost a decade. When the PJD was ultimately selectively included in a consolidated system, its careful approach vis-à-vis the monarchy reflected its view that selective reexclusion remained a possibility. The PJD remained isolated and could not count on support from other parties—whether from the former opposition or from the palace parties—in the event of its repression. To the contrary, these parties viewed the PJD's electoral advances with suspicion, and the leftist USFP especially remained very critical and used the 2003 attacks in Casablanca to call for outlawing the PJD.[17]

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood had not sought electoral participation in particular. In practice, as noted, the Muslim Brotherhood was already included in the system. Being legal, it benefited much less than the MUR, an

17. Up to 2008, the USFP had an explicit nonalliance policy toward the PJD. Since then, that policy has not been reversed, but more flexibility is allowed for forming local government coalitions with the PJD.

illegal Moroccan Islamist organization, from founding a political party.[18] In the instance of a repressive backlash in Jordan, political parties would be outlawed, but the Muslim Brotherhood would keep its license as a social organization and operate as it did before.[19] Hence, the Jordanian Islamists did not see any reason to adopt costly measures to consolidate electoral participation, not even in the early years, when it had cordial relations with the palace. Moreover, the IAF had good relations with other parties, which largely shared its protest against the peace treaty with Israel and the deterioration of political freedom. Much of its mobilization against the "normalization with the Zionist entity" and against deliberalization was undertaken jointly with other Jordanian actors,[20] as was the electoral boycott in 1997.[21]

ISMOs and Party Development

Differences in each of these organizations' relationship with its respective founding organization and in party development played at the very least a catalyzing role for the stance each party adopted vis-à-vis elections and the regime. In Morocco, as we have seen, the relationship with the founding ISMO evolved from informal dependency to forced autonomy. In Jordan, the IAF remained

18. This argument is similar to the one Ellen Lust (2005) makes about the influence of different "structures of contestation" on opposition actors' mobilization decisions.

19. This was also the main reason why the Muslim Brotherhood did not turn itself into a political party but founded the IAF as a separate organization. Interview with a former IAF leader who was also a current member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Executive Bureau, Amman, June 26, 2007.

20. In 1994, the Islamists in Jordan, together with the Left and the Baʿathists, founded the High Council for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (Majlis al-Tansiq al-'Ala' li-Ihzab al-Muʿarida) as a response to the change of the electoral law and peace treaty. See Clark 2006 for an analysis of the IAF's relationship with other opposition parties in Jordan.

21. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's boycott of the 1990 parliamentary elections was also a joint enterprise with other opposition parties. More precisely, the boycott was to some extent prompted by pressures from other oppositional parties and Islamist groups to take a more critical stance toward the regime. As a consequence of these critiques, the brotherhood made itself the leader of protest against the misuse of police authority and pressed for further transparency and a change in the 1971 Constitution (Auda 1994, 393).

dependent on the Muslim Brotherhood throughout. The official discourse about the relationship of the two Jordanian organizations was similar to the one the PJD and the MUR had before the MUR withdrew its support: supposedly a partnership of two organizations that shared the same objectives but pursued them in different arenas.[22] In reality, however, the IAF's dependency on the Muslim Brotherhood was formalized. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were obligated to vote inside party institutions for decisions already taken by the brotherhood's Shura Council. This rule implied de facto that all relevant decisions such as electoral boycotts, the participation in government, and the position vis-à-vis key laws were not taken by party institutions, but by the Muslim Brotherhood.[23] Similarly, the IAF's president was in reality pre-elected by the Muslim Brotherhood's Shura Council. The party did hold elections on these issues, but because around 90 percent of its members were Muslim brothers, party decisions were taken according to what was seen as best for the Muslim Brotherhood—or for the faction dominating the Muslim Brotherhood at a given time.[24] These decisions were obviously not necessarily the best from the IAF's perspective. However, even if party members have at times been unhappy with what an IAF leader pointedly called their "big brother,"[25] there has never been evolution toward autonomy.

Being dominated by an outside organization, the IAF party organization has remained irrelevant and has not acquired value on its own in Jordan. On paper—that is, according to its by-laws—the IAF looks very similar to the PJD and has been commended for its democratic internal structures (Schwedler 2006). However, different rules apply to different members (Muslim Brotherhood and non–Muslim Brotherhood) in the party,[26] and the many votes on issues that the IAF

22. This answer was given, among many others, by the spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood, Amman, June 10, 2007.

23. This commitment is based on a formal agreement: Muslim Brotherhood members have to sign a document. This information was confirmed by interviews with a member of the IAF's Executive Bureau who is also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Amman, June 18, 2007, and with a former member of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF, Amman, June 13, 2007.

24. See Brown 2006 for a very instructive analysis of divisions inside the Muslim Brotherhood.

25. Interview with an IAF leader, Amman, June 18, 2007.

26. In 2003, for example, when Muslim Brotherhood members of the IAF Executive Bureau were prohibited from running for seats in Parliament, this prohibition did not apply to party leaders

has indeed held are meaningless. The very fact that key decisions were taken elsewhere pushed the majority of those non-Muslim brothers out of the party who had been among the founding members in 1992—especially when the Muslim Brotherhood forced the electoral boycott on the IAF in 1997. This factor has possibly also deterred non–Muslim Brotherhood activists from joining the party, given that the IAF membership has stagnated since its foundation.[27] In practice, the party has not been very active, and the local bureaus in particular are largely passive (Jonasson 2004, 235, 250). In general, the development of independent means for electoral mobilization and ancillary organizations has been considered unnecessary; in the words of the head of the IAF women's section: "Why repeat?" (quoted in Jonasson 2004, 205).

The dependence on an outside organization and the party organization's own lack of intrinsic value have been important forces behind the more confrontational stance the IAF has adopted vis-à-vis the regime. In particular instances, if the Muslim Brotherhood's own credibility and interests were at stake, it could enforce whatever decision it wanted on the party—such as the boycott of the 1997 elections.[28] In that year, party leaders had already announced that the IAF would run in the elections and had even started to hold primaries, but then they had to reverse that decision after a vote of the Muslim Brotherhood's Shura Council—a vote that was afterward obviously repeated with the same result in the IAF's Shura Council. Not having invested in the party organization, the Muslim Brotherhood was not concerned about the IAF's getting outlawed. The same applies to the decision not to vote for the antiterrorist law. When I confronted IAF party leaders with the PJD's decision to vote for the antiterrorist law in Morocco because of its fear of a party ban, in contrast with the IAF's own vote against the Jordanian antiterrorist law, they simply stated that they would just found a new

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who were not affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Mohammed al-Buzur. Moreover, it is telling that party officials refer to the latter as "independents."

27. Interview with an IAF leader, Amman, June 18, 2007.

28. The Muslim Brotherhood was indeed the first of the two Jordanian organizations to announce an electoral boycott. It stated three reasons for this decision: the electoral law, the continued normalization with Israel, and the decree of amendment of press and publications law (Lucas 2005, 112–13).

party if the IAF were banned.[29] In short, even for party leaders the name "Islamic Action Front" has had no particular value or meaning—in stark contrast to the PJD, whose activists have often referred to the "PJD brand."

Formal dependency on the ISMO and the fact that a party organization has not institutionalized does not necessarily imply that the party will be more confrontational toward the regime. It does, however, imply that such confrontation comes at a low cost. This is especially visible in comparison with Morocco, where protecting the party organization became a key priority. "Party interests" were alluded to as being of greater interest than, for example, local leaders and members' frustrations. These party interests were indeed relevant enough for a sufficiently large group in the party that the party did not boycott the 2003 elections and ended up supporting laws in Parliament that the party was opposing and would have wanted to vote against; they were also relevant enough for those who later endorsed the leadership who had been responsible for these choices at the 2004 party congress. That the PJD had gained some degree of operational autonomy from the MUR through independent mobilization of resources and, of course, its formal autonomy implied that it could take these decisions caring only for such "party interests." No other position could be enforced on the party from an outsider.

These differences—dependency on the ISMO and no organizational development in Jordan versus autonomy and organizational growth/institutionalization in Morocco—also contributed to the different approaches in the electoral arena. In Jordan, the lack of party growth and development implied that the campaigning for elections, the development of platforms, and so on would always have to be done by the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, any party activity was constantly competing with all other Muslim Brotherhood activities for human and material resources and so needed justification, a reason why the activity in question helped the brotherhood's mission. Because no policy benefits accrued, resources spent on party actions came to be viewed as resources that could have been spent in a more useful way. As a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's executive who had previously been in the IAF Executive Bureau argued, the Muslim Brotherhood had only a limited amount of resources, and it

29. Interviews, Amman, May 30 and June 19, 2007.

was the brotherhood's obligation to use them in ways that helped the cause most efficiently. His own shift back from the IAF leadership to the Muslim Brotherhood executive demonstrated—in his own view—this reallocation of individual resources to a more beneficial use.[30]

In the PJD's case, the competition with other MUR activities for resources encouraged party leaders to invest in their own mobilization capacities, and the more resources it acquired, the more the party could actually serve as a means to generate support. Formal autonomy from the MUR and the PJD's independent resources did not per se cause the PJD's focus on winning elections. However, not having to take into account the MUR as an actor with stronger ideological concerns made possible the PJD's pragmatist, nonideological positions in elections.

SUMMARY

The comparison of strategies adopted by the Moroccan PJD and the Jordanian IAF shows that the factors considered in the heuristic model did indeed influence party decisions and how the two parties related to participation in formal politics. By far more complicated is apprehension of the particular way in which these factors influenced party strategies.

The key differences in the institutional setting were the larger importance of elections in Morocco and the fact that whereas the Moroccan Islamists were selectively included into a consolidated system, the Jordanian Islamists were the only strong organized actor in a newly liberalized system. The Moroccan combination has encouraged a focus on winning elections and a cautious strategy toward the regime. The Jordanian setup, in contrast, appears to have encouraged an attitude in which winning support from new groups is considered unnecessary. With respect to the regime, the Jordanian Islamists have felt strong and secure enough to confront it. The tightness of the relationship between these factors must of course not be overstretched, especially when it comes to the relationship with the regime. The type of inclusion and the party's relative strength are clearly important determinants of party choices. However, the observed outcomes of regime–Islamist relations have of course also been influenced by other

30. Interview, Amman, June 26, 2007.

factors not considered explicitly in the heuristic model. These factors include the attitude of other opposition groups toward the Islamists and whether regime treatment of such groups has encouraged alliances among the opposition or not.

Differences in organizational development and outcomes in Morocco and Jordan appear to suggest that organizational growth and institutionalization do make a party more cautious in the regime game. Their absence, in turn, does not make a party necessarily more confrontational but implies that it has less to lose. The IAF has not acquired, in the minds of its leaders and members, a value or an identity—the current party or another one would be essentially the same. These observations are likely to have more general value as they correspond directly to an old argument in the literature on party organizations. As Robert Michels has already argued, there is a link between a party's organizational size and its conservatism, especially in an authoritarian environment where a too confrontational stance might prompt a "reaction" and put at risk all previous investment in the organization (1970, 346–47). As to electoral contests, organizational investment and growth appear not to facilitate particular choices; rather, they appear to be a consequence of a party's focus on winning support. In the PJD's case, it is clear that the organization has been seen and developed as an important tool for electoral mobilization. In the IAF's case, the Islamists' approach to the electoral contest wherein they have not targeted groups beyond their core constituency is reproduced in a party organization with almost exclusive membership from the Muslim Brotherhood and in a general disinterest toward expansion.

Finally, the comparison of the respective parties' relationships with their founding organization showed that the relationship was a highly relevant influence on the parties. Formal dependence, as in Jordan, has impeded party institutionalization and the reaching out to new groups via that organization. It has hampered an aggressive and dedicated approach in elections. It can be safely said that elections and electoral mobilization are never a key priority for the external organization. They can at best be as important as the organization's other activities—in Jordan and Morocco, both ISMOs ultimately viewed them as a misallocation of resources. In Morocco—given that the party was formally autonomous—this view led to the MUR's withdrawal from that arena, but the PJD's continued energetic contestation of elections; in Jordan, it means that electoral mobilization and party activities in general have lacked resources.

In contrast, dependence on or autonomy from an ISMO has no clear impact on choices in the regime game. Formal dependence only implies that issues irrelevant to the party per se can influence its choices, such as the struggle among factions or other interests in the other organization.[31] The comparison shows that the interests of the founding organization cannot simply be assumed to be more "antiregime." In Morocco, the MUR itself endorsed regime policies against its own ideological preferences when it feared for its own "safety" after May 16, 2003.[32] In Jordan, it is perfectly conceivable that the Muslim Brotherhood might force an accommodationist stance on the party in the future given that the organization's charity activities have become the target of regime harassment since the early 2000s.[33] Thus, a main goal for further research is to analyze this relationship and to consider it a constraint when accounting for a party's choices in the regime arena.

CONCLUSION

The Moroccan PJD and the Jordanian IAF have tried to deal in different ways with the challenges of electoral participation in authoritarian regimes. The PJD chose an approach where regime reforms were essentially supposed to work through the party's success at the ballot box. Its strategy did not focus much on

31. Generational conflicts appear to have been an enabling force behind the 1997 boycott in Jordan and the 1990 boycott in Egypt. In Jordan, a younger generation had risen in the Muslim Brotherhood's hierarchy, whereas the IAF's executive bureau was controlled by the old leadership—namely, Farhan and 'Arabiyyat. Forcing the IAF into the boycott was a simple way of curbing the influence of that old leadership, which was then left without notable office. Interview with two former members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Amman, March 28 and June 2, 2007. Generational conflicts also appear to have played a role in the Muslim Brotherhood's 1990 electoral boycott. According to Gehad Auda, the Muslim Brotherhood's leadership feared to lose power to a younger generation of pragmatists who had gained new influence and skills through contesting elections (1994, 389).

32. By then, the MUR had achieved partial legalization. That is, the organization was not fully legalized, but many of its local bureaus were.

33. The regime confiscated the Muslim Brotherhood's biggest charity organization in July 2006. This action appeared to prompt a change in the thinking of some leading Muslim brothers, who felt that the confrontation with the regime had made them too much of a target. Interview with a Muslim Brotherhood leader, Amman, June 26, 2007.

changing the rules that impede party government but essentially on changing the practices. A key element of this strategy was to secure a large enough victory in elections that would allow it to govern in a small coalition, capable of making use of the constitutionally granted prerogatives of government. A second element was to upgrade the credibility of representative institutions—mainly through "soft" means such as presenting the people with the example of the responsible and hard-working MP or mobilizing against absenteeism and party defections. Although these means were also intended as an instrument to increase the PJD's electoral appeal, they also reflected the aim to increase the representative institutions' standing in the public's perception and vis-à-vis the regime.

The IAF's regime game, in contrast, was not indirect. It essentially focused on the rules as such; winning popular support for its positions was not part of the strategy. Since the 1993 change of the electoral law, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership felt that the party's influence was fundamentally impeded by the electoral law as well as by subsequent restrictions on press freedom and freedom of assembly, among other things. By boycotting the 1997 elections, by joining forces with other opposition parties, and by mobilizing the people in the street, the Islamists indeed hoped to force the regime to readjust these rules in its favor.

If the real improvements of rules or practices from the point of view of the opposition are the benchmark of success, both parties have failed. The PJD's quiescence and appeasement strategy meant that Moroccans stopped viewing the party as a credible alternative to the regime; at least, they doubted whether any party could make a difference, to the extent that more than 60 percent of Moroccans expressed their opinion and perhaps their opposition to all parties by *not* voting in the 2007 parliamentary elections. The IAF miscalculated its own strength compared to the regime's strength. Instead of winning concessions on the rules and policies it contested, the Islamists were increasingly repressed by the regime, including a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood's charity activities. The party became increasingly marginalized in elections, winning a meager 6 seats out of 110 and 5.5 percent of the popular vote in the 2007 parliamentary elections.

Both parties' failure raises the question whether opposition parties can "win" or even score in the contest with incumbents by participating in formal politics in *hegemonic* electoral authoritarian regimes. Perhaps in these regimes

there are few options for political parties other than being co-opted, like the "former opposition parties" in Morocco, or taking a more radical, revolutionary stance. Islamists in both Jordan and Morocco appear individually to be increasingly choosing a third option: abandoning involvement in the political party and retreating into societal activities, which they ultimately view as more rewarding.

APPENDIX A

PJD 2004 National Congress Data

	Total (%)	*Within 1st Generation (1992–1999) (%)*	*Within 2d Generation (2000–2004) (%)*	*Difference (%)*	*No Answer (%)*
Age					
Younger than 30	22	20	24	3	3
30–39	43	40	47	7	3
40–49	29	32	25	-7	3
50+	5	7	3	-4	3
	100	100	100		
Gender: percentage male	86	93	76	-17	0
Education: percentage with university degree	71	69	71	2	15
Employment: percentage of public sector	54	58	50	-8	15
Member of Labor Union	56	69	38	-31	2
Member of Social/Cultural Organization	76	77	75	-1	1
Party Office					
Members	41	32	56	24	13
Local Leaders	25	26	22	-4	13
Intermediate Leaders	34	42	22	-20	13
	100	100	100		
Candidate in 2003 Elections	55	56	55	-1	0
Elected in 2003 Elections	22	23	21	-2	0

Notes: N = 152. Failure to add up to 100 due to rounding. "Local Leaders" are members of local party bureaus. "Intermediate Leaders" are members of provincial bureaus or regional bureaus or the National Council.

APPENDIX B

Profile of PJD Electoral Candidates, 2002

	Proportion (%)	*No Answer (%)*
Work in Education	55	10
MUR Member	39	26
Party Office		11
National Leader	8	
Intermediate Leader	54	
Local Leader	9	
Member	5	
Not Member	24	
Member in Other Islamist Associations	32	18
Age Group		35
21–30	2	
31–40	38	
41–50	50	
51–60	9	
61–70	1	
Male	97	0

Notes: N = 179. "Local Leaders" are members of local party bureaus. "Intermediate Leaders" are members of provincial bureaus, or regional bureaus or the National Council. "National Leaders" are members of the General Secretariat.

Source: From information in *al-Tajdid* compiled by the author.

APPENDIX C

List of Interviews with PJD Members: 2003, 2004, 2007

Reference Number	*Date*	*Function(s) in Party and Moroccan Institutions (at the Moment of Interview)*
1	Dec. 12, 2003	Member of General Secretariat, MP, member of MUR Executive Bureau
2	Nov. 6, 2003	Member of General Secretariat, leading member of Forum for Development
3	Dec. 11, 2003	MP
4	Apr. 8, 2004	Member of General Secretariat
5	Sept. 8, 2003	Founding member of Forum for Development, candidate in 2003 municipal elections
6	Apr, 12, 2004	PJD vice mayor
7	Dec. 11, 2004	MP, member of General Secretariat, member of MUR Executive Bureau
8	Nov. 12, 2003	MP, member of General Secretariat, member of MUR Executive Bureau
9	Mar. 7, 2003	MP, member of General Secretariat
10	Nov. 17, 2003	MP, member of General Secretariat, member of MUR Executive Bureau
11	Nov. 5, 2003	MP, member of General Secretariat
12	Mar. 1, 2003	MP
13	Sept. 4, 2003	MP, member of General Secretariat
14	Nov. 9, 2003	Member of General Secretariat
15	Nov. 17, 2003	MP
16	Dec. 6, 2003	Member of a provincial secretariat
17	Dec. 6, 2003	Provincial secretary, municipal councillor
18	Dec. 6, 2003	Provincial vice secretary, vice mayor

(Continued)

Reference Number	*Date*	*Function(s) in Party and Moroccan Institutions (at the Moment of Interview)*
19	Dec. 6, 2003	Simple party member, municipal councillor, regional secretary of the National Labor Union of Morocco (Union nationale du travail au Maroc)
20	Nov. 12, 2003	Provincial vice secretary, vice mayor
21	Nov. 9. 2003	Regional and provincial secretary
22	Nov. 9, 2003	Treasurer of a local secretariat
23	Nov. 9, 2003	Simple party member
24	Apr. 10. 2004	Member of a city government
25	Nov. 18, 2003	Simple party member, responsible for youth at local branch
26	Nov. 18, 2003	Municipal councillor
27	Dec. 11, 2003	Information officer of parliamentary group, simple party member
28	Feb. 27, 2003	Coordinator in the national office, simple party member
29	Feb. 26, 2003	Member of National Council
30	Apr. 11, 2004	Member of local secretariat, candidate in municipal elections 2003
31	Apr. 9, 2004	Candidate in communal elections 2003
32	Nov. 3. 2007	Member of General Secretariat
33	Nov. 2, 2007	Member of General Secretariat
34	Nov. 1, 2007	Member of General Secretariat
35	Nov. 1, 2007	Member of National Council
36	Nov. 5, 2007	Municipal councillor

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